TruckerFetch MCP

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by truckerfetch

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JavaScript

Hybrid

remove_authority_watch_target

Destructive

Removes a specific authority target from an owned watchlist after user confirmation, preventing accidental deletions.

Instructions

Remove a specific authority target from an owned watchlist after confirming the target with the user. The local REST bridge additionally requires confirm_action=true after user approval.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "watchlist_id": "<watchlist_id>",
      "target_id": "<target_id>",
      "confirm_action": "<confirm_action>"
    },
    "name": "remove_authority_watch_target"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`target_id`	Yes
`watchlist_id`	Yes
`confirm_action`	Yes	Local bridge only: confirm this exact mutation with the user before setting true.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv1.0.0Nov 6, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the description earns credit by adding the human-approval workflow and the 'owned watchlist' authorization scope, plus the local-bridge confirm_action requirement. It does not say whether removal is reversible or what happens if the target is not on the list.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences with the destructive action and the confirmation gate front-loaded. The confirmation requirement is stated twice ('after confirming the target' and 'after user approval'), a mild redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a three-parameter destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers the safety-critical flow: user confirmation, ownership scope, and the confirm_action gate. Missing only edge-case behavior (target not present, idempotency) and any note on the response.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 33% (only confirm_action is documented), so the description must compensate. It clarifies watchlist_id as an owned watchlist and target_id as the specific target, and reinforces confirm_action's semantics, but adds no further detail beyond the schema's UUID formats.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (remove) and resource (authority target on an owned watchlist), which cleanly separates it from the add_authority_watch_target sibling. It stops short of naming a sibling explicitly to route the agent, so it is clear rather than exemplary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a concrete precondition: confirm the target with the user before calling, and set confirm_action=true only after approval. No when-not-to-use cases or alternative tools are mentioned, but the gating condition is unambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.