vrchat-mcp

An MCP server for the VRChat API. All 297 operations from the OpenAPI spec, generated at build time, plus hand-written tools for the things a single endpoint cannot do: two-factor login, file uploads, viewing images, and the event pipeline.

Runs locally over stdio, as a subprocess of Claude Code or Claude Desktop. Read-only until you say otherwise.

Built on Bun, the official MCP TypeScript SDK v2, and the official vrchat JavaScript SDK. Tools come from the VRChat OpenAPI specification and are committed, so the surface tracks upstream instead of rotting against it.

Cheatsheet

bun install && bun link                # `vrchat-mcp` is now on PATH
cp .env.example .env                   # fill in username, password, contact
claude mcp add vrchat -- vrchat-mcp

Minimum .env:

VRCHAT_USERNAME=you
VRCHAT_PASSWORD=hunter2
VRCHAT_CONTACT=you@your-domain.tld     # must be real, VRChat 403s generic agents

Tool names carry their origin. Two underscores means generated from the spec (vrchat__getCurrentUser), so the name is searchable in VRChat's own docs. One underscore means this server wrote it (vrchat_authStatus).

Hand-written tools, in full:

The last four appear only with VRCHAT_MCP_WEBSOCKET=1.

Related MCP server: Portals MCP

Install

bun link puts a vrchat-mcp executable on your PATH, so nothing downstream needs to know where the checkout lives.

bun install
bun link          # from the repo root

Register it by name:

claude mcp add vrchat -- vrchat-mcp

Or for Claude Desktop, in claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vrchat": {
      "command": "vrchat-mcp"
    }
  }
}

That is the whole config. Credentials come from the repo's .env, so they do not have to be repeated here, though anything you put in an env block wins. Remove the command with bun unlink.

If you would rather not put anything on your PATH, point at the entry file with an absolute path. The server is spawned from an arbitrary working directory, so a relative one will not do.

claude mcp add vrchat -- bun run /abs/path/to/vrchat-mcp/src/index.ts

The contact requirement

VRChat rejects generic User-Agents with a 403. VRCHAT_CONTACT goes into the descriptive User-Agent the SDK sends on every request, API and WebSocket alike, and it is effectively mandatory.

The value has to be real. The SDK refuses any contact containing @example.com, so the obvious placeholder is the one value guaranteed to fail. The server reports that as a configuration error on the first tool call rather than letting it surface as a mysterious 403.

Configuration

Three layers, highest priority first. A project can set its own options without repeating your credentials.

1. Real environment variables, including an MCP client's env block

2. .env in the directory the command runs from, which Bun loads automatically

3. .env at the repo root

So a project that wants storefront tools only, using credentials you already configured, needs one line next to it:

# ~/my-project/.env
VRCHAT_MCP_TAGS=store

Booleans accept 1 or true, case-insensitive.

Where state lives

State is per project. Run the server inside a project and its session and event history live in that project's .vrchat-mcp/. The project root is found by walking up from the working directory for a .git, package.json, deno.json, pyproject.toml or go.mod, so launching from a subdirectory reaches the same state instead of stranding a second session a level down.

The directory hides itself from version control: vrchat-mcp writes a .gitignore containing * inside it on creation, so the session file, which is an auth credential, is protected without the host project needing a rule for it.

Each project therefore logs in separately, and the first call in a new project may ask for a 2FA code. To share one login everywhere, point every install at the same file:

VRCHAT_MCP_SESSION=/abs/path/to/shared/session.json

Safety gates

The server starts read-only. 150 of the 297 operations register by default. Nothing that writes, deletes, spends or moderates appears until you ask for it.

Destructive and money layer on top of writes, so enabling writes grants exactly the ability to create and edit, never to delete or to spend. Admin stands alone and is implied by nothing: letting an agent edit your own content must never also let it delete the account.

What you are opting into:

• ALLOW_WRITES lets an agent create and change things you own. Reversible, mostly by hand.

• ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE_WRITES adds the calls with no undo. Deletes, bans, kicks, closing instances, wiping user persistence.

• ALLOW_PURCHASES lets an agent spend real balance. purchaseProductListing is a live transaction. Do not set this because a tool listing looked incomplete.

• ALLOW_ADMIN exposes deleteUser among others. Most of these 403 on a normal account, but deleteUser is the one that must never be an accident.

Gated operations stay in the generated table either way, so coverage remains 1:1 with the spec and the denylist is reviewable in the diff. MCP annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint) are set as well, so clients that surface them can prompt.

Which tools am I missing?

A gated tool is simply absent, which reads as "VRChat cannot do this" rather than "this server was told not to". That mistake has already been made in the wild: an agent reported the economy API as read-only when the write tools existed and were merely behind a flag.

vrchat_authStatus closes the gap. It reports every tag and safety class, how many operations each holds, how many are currently exposed, and the exact .env change that would expose the rest.

{
  "availability": {
    "toolsRegistered": 12,
    "toolsHidden": 285,
    "tagFilter": ["store"],
    "kinds": { "write": { "enabled": false, "hidden": 88 } },
    "nextSteps": [
      "88 `write` operations are hidden. Ask the user to set VRCHAT_MCP_ALLOW_WRITES=1 ..."
    ]
  }
}

Call it before concluding something is unsupported.

Choosing which tools to expose

VRCHAT_MCP_TAGS selects tags. Unset registers everything, and everything says so explicitly, which is easier than deleting a key from a JSON config. all and * work too.

VRCHAT_MCP_TAGS=everything          # all 297 operations
VRCHAT_MCP_TAGS=store               # just the storefront, 19 operations
VRCHAT_MCP_TAGS=store,users,worlds  # matches any of the three

Spec tags: authentication, avatars, calendar, economy, favorites, files, friends, groups, instances, inventory, invite, jams, miscellaneous, notifications, playermoderation, prints, props, users, worlds. Plus store, which this server adds.

A tag matching nothing is warned about on stderr at startup and reported by vrchat_authStatus. Without that, a typo like stores registers no generated tools and looks exactly like a broken server.

Logging in

Login is lazy. Nothing authenticates at startup, so tools/list works with no credentials at all and the server stays inspectable. The first tool call that needs a session triggers the login.

With VRCHAT_TOTP_SECRET set, that is the whole story. No prompts, ever.

Without it, VRChat emails a code and the call comes back parked rather than hanging:

vrchat__getCurrentUser
  -> Login paused: VRChat emailed a code. Ask the user for it, call
     vrchat_submitTwoFactorCode { requestId: 'a1b2c3d4', code: '……' },
     then retry the original call.

Answer it with vrchat_submitTwoFactorCode, then retry. The session persists, so this happens once per project until it expires.

Logging in from a new network

Changing proxy, VPN or ISP triggers a check that is not a two-factor code, and the two look alike enough to waste real time. VRChat answers with one of these:

401  It looks like you're logging in from somewhere new! Check your email for a message from VRChat.
429  Logging in from too many places? Check your email for verification link

Both mean the same thing, and neither is what it looks like. The email holds a link, not a six-digit code, so vrchat_submitTwoFactorCode cannot help. The login takes two rounds:

1. A tool call fails with one of those messages

2. The user opens the link in the email

3. Call vrchat_retryLogin. VRChat sends the actual code only on this second attempt

4. The user reads the code out, call vrchat_submitTwoFactorCode

5. Retry the original tool

The 429 is an auth challenge wearing a rate-limit status, so the local limiter ignores it. Waiting does not clear it, and every extra attempt costs one of the account's limited session slots, which is what produces the 429 in the first place. A failed login is cached for 30 seconds so a burst of tool calls cannot become a burst of login attempts. vrchat_retryLogin clears that cache, because by then the user has done the thing the failure was waiting on.

Parallel calls during login

Agents fan tools out at once, and on a cold start they all land on an unauthenticated client. One call drives the login. The others wait up to three seconds and then return login_pending rather than blocking, so a slow login stalls one tool call instead of every tool call, and a login that parks on a code raises one prompt instead of several.

_responseKeys

Every tool takes _responseKeys, and every tool returns the raw upstream payload by default. There is no server-side curation, because a hand-picked field list guesses what matters, is wrong for whoever needed the other field, and has to be maintained for 297 operations against a spec that moves. The agent knows what it wants on this call. It should say so.

A World object is roughly 4 KB. Narrowing usually cuts that by more than half.

Projection keeps the shape. Objects stay nested, arrays keep their order and length, so a path learned on one call still works on the next.

Discovery matters more than the projection. An agent cannot ask for keys it does not know exist, and a silently empty result would make this design worse than trimming. So a path that matches nothing comes back as _unmatched, alongside _availableKeys listing what was actually there. Array element keys are named as *.id, *.name, the form that works as a _responseKeys entry.

["*"] returns the input by reference, so the raw path is provably lossless and nothing is ever hidden.

Viewing images

vrchat_getImage downloads a VRChat image and returns it as an image block, so the model can look at it rather than report a URL.

{ "name": "vrchat_getImage",
  "arguments": { "url": "https://api.vrchat.cloud/api/1/file/file_.../1/256" } }

Pass any imageUrl or thumbnailImageUrl from a user, world, avatar, print or product, or pass fileId and let the tool build the URL. savePath also writes the bytes to disk.

Prefer a URL ending in /256 or /512 when one exists. The image is carried as base64, so a full-size texture costs a lot of context and buys no extra detail. Anything over 4 MB is refused; raise maxBytes if you mean it.

The tool only fetches VRChat-hosted images, and only api.vrchat.cloud is ever sent your session cookie. A tool that fetches a caller-supplied URL while holding a session is a request-forgery primitive unless it is constrained, and a cookie sent to a CDN is a cookie given away.

Uploading files

Pass a local file path. The server runs on your machine and reads the file itself, so file contents never enter the conversation. Inlining a 2 MB PNG as base64 would cost roughly 2.7 MB of tool arguments, more than everything else in the call combined.

When there is no file on disk, for instance an image the agent just produced, the same argument takes the bytes inline:

{ "file": { "data": "iVBORw0KGgo...", "mimeType": "image/png", "filename": "icon.png" } }

A data: URI works in the string position too, so "file": "..." is equivalent. filename is optional and is invented from the MIME type when omitted, because VRChat rejects an upload it cannot name. Prefer a path whenever one exists: inline costs about 1.33 bytes of tool argument per byte of file, and that comes out of the same context budget as everything else.

Eight operations take a file directly, one call each:

{ "name": "vrchat__uploadImage",
  "arguments": { "file": "C:/Users/me/Pictures/icon.png", "tag": "icon" } }

The result names the bytes that were sent, and which form they arrived in, which is the only way to tell a successful upload of the right file from a successful upload of the wrong one:

{ "uploaded": [
    { "field": "file", "name": "icon.png", "bytes": 48211, "type": "image/png", "source": "path" }
  ],
  "result": { "id": "file_...", "name": "icon.png" } }

For everything else, vrchat_uploadFile runs VRChat's four-step sequence (create the record, request a presigned URL, transfer the bytes, finish) and returns the completed file record. Use it for asset bundles and unity packages. The bytes go straight to VRChat's storage provider with a plain request, deliberately not through the API client, because that client attaches your session cookie to everything it sends and the storage host is a third party.

Uploads are writes, so all of this needs VRCHAT_MCP_ALLOW_WRITES=1. Files are capped at 100 MB, and an empty file is refused before it reaches VRChat, which would otherwise store a broken record. If vrchat_uploadFile fails partway it names the file record it created, so you can inspect it with vrchat__getFile and remove it with vrchat__deleteFile.

Running a store

Managing a storefront is an ordinary write, not a money operation. Creating a product, renaming it, changing its image, publishing or unpublishing a listing: none of these spend or earn anything, so they need only VRCHAT_MCP_ALLOW_WRITES=1. The money gate is for buying and for the payment processor.

VRCHAT_MCP_TAGS=store
VRCHAT_MCP_ALLOW_WRITES=1

Setting a product image takes one call:

{ "name": "vrchat_setProductImage",
  "arguments": { "productId": "prod_...", "file": "/abs/path/cover.png" } }

That uploads with tag: "product" and attaches the returned file id as the product's imageId. By hand it is vrchat__uploadImage with tag: "product" or "listinggallery", then vrchat__updateProduct with the id it returns.

One thing VRChat itself does not allow: a listing exposes only active for editing, so its price, title and description cannot be changed after creation. Delete the listing and create a new one. The name, description and image live on the product and are editable through vrchat__updateProduct.

Pagination

One page per call. Paginated tools default to 25 results and echo back a nextOffset to continue with. There is no internal pagination loop, deliberately: a hidden auto-paginate would burn the request budget and a large slice of context inside what looks to the agent like a single call.

A short page means the end. VRChat reports no total, so that is the only reliable signal.

WebSocket events

Off by default, because an idle always-on socket burns a session slot. Set VRCHAT_MCP_WEBSOCKET=1 to open it and register the four vrchat_events* tools.

VRCHAT_MCP_WS_EVENTS picks which types to subscribe to, replacing rather than extending the default set of notification, notification-v2, economy-update, friend-online, friend-offline and instance-queue-ready.

Pipeline messages are double-encoded: the content field is stringified JSON needing a second parse, except for see-notification and hide-notification, which carry bare ids. All of that is normalised once at ingest, so no tool ever hands you a JSON string inside JSON. The SDK's own socket silently drops those two message types, which is one reason this server does not use it. The other is that it takes no proxy.

Retention is per type

History goes to SQLite at .vrchat-mcp/events.db, and it keeps 1000 events per event type, not 1000 in total. A chatty type like friend-location can never evict a rare, valuable one like economy-update, which a single global cap would do within minutes.

VRCHAT_MCP_HISTORY=1000,friend-location:200,economy-update:5000
VRCHAT_MCP_HISTORY_MAX_AGE=7d

An age ceiling runs alongside the count cap, and whichever bites first wins. Count alone lets a rarely-fired type sit on months-old events that read as current. Age alone lets a burst blow up the database. vrchat_eventsStatus reports which limit is currently binding, per type, so the window is legible instead of silent.

History survives restarts, so vrchat_eventsSearch can answer what happened while you were away. A live-only buffer cannot.

Proxy

VRCHAT_MCP_PROXY routes traffic through an HTTP or HTTPS proxy, with optional user:pass@ credentials.

VRCHAT_MCP_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:8080
VRCHAT_MCP_PROXY=https://user:pass@proxy.internal:8443

SOCKS is not supported. Bun's fetch rejects socks5:// outright, so a SOCKS URL fails at startup with a configuration error naming the limitation rather than half-working. Front it with a local HTTP proxy instead.

The proxy covers both API and WebSocket traffic. The two go through different mechanisms, and the failure mode of getting only half of it right is a server that looks proxied while leaking its real IP on the event stream.

If the proxy cannot be reached, calls fail with a clear error. The server never silently falls back to a direct connection, because for anyone using this for IP separation that is the worst possible outcome. The proxy URL is never logged, since it may embed credentials.

Development

bun link                    # install the vrchat-mcp command on PATH
bun unlink                  # remove it
bun run generate            # regenerate tools from the latest upstream spec
bun run generate --offline  # regenerate from the committed snapshot, no network
bun test                    # offline suite
bun run test:live           # live suite, needs VRCHAT_LIVE_TESTS=1
bun run inspect             # MCP Inspector against this server
bun run typecheck           # tsc --noEmit

bun run generate fetches vrchatapi/specification at main, bundles it, and writes the bundled spec plus spec/VERSION.json (upstream SHA, timestamp, content hash) alongside the regenerated src/generated/operations.ts. Both are committed, so every regeneration produces two reviewable diffs, the spec change and the tool change it caused, and a bad upstream commit is revertible rather than load-bearing. --offline reproduces the output from the committed snapshot byte for byte with no network at all.

src/generated/operations.ts is generated. Do not edit it by hand.

Ten operationIds have no matching method in the VRChat SDK, because the spec moves faster than the client library. Those route through a raw-request fallback on the same client, so cookies, User-Agent, proxy and rate limiting still apply, and 1:1 coverage stays true instead of quietly becoming a lie. Codegen prints the list on every run.

stdout is the JSON-RPC channel. All logging goes to stderr, and one stray console.log corrupts the protocol stream.

Testing

bun test is the offline suite: codegen output, gating, the rate limiter against a fake clock, history retention and search, projection, error mapping, upload path handling. No network, no credentials, no account. This is what runs by default.

bun run test:live hits a real account, opted into with VRCHAT_LIVE_TESTS=1 and skipped otherwise. Rules it holds itself to:

• Reads and creator-owned writes only. It hard-refuses anything classified money or admin, before a client is even constructed. A test suite must not be able to spend money.

• Every write cleans up after itself and is tagged so stray artifacts are identifiable in-game.

• It routes through the same limiter as production and stays small. A run that trips VRChat's throttling is worse than no run.

• Assertions are on shape and status, never volatile content. Friend counts and world listings move between runs.

• Use a dedicated account where you can. Credentials come from .env only.

Security

• .env and .vrchat-mcp/ are gitignored, and .vrchat-mcp/ also ignores itself from within so it stays hidden inside other projects.

• .vrchat-mcp/session.json is an auth credential, a valid session cookie. Treat it like a password. Deleting it, or calling vrchat_logout, forces a fresh login.

• 2FA codes, passwords, TOTP secrets and proxy URLs are never logged, including to stderr.

• Your session cookie goes to api.vrchat.cloud and nowhere else. Uploads to VRChat's storage provider and image fetches from its CDN deliberately bypass the authenticated client.

• Errors come back as structured results carrying status, VRChat's own message, and an actionable hint. Raw exceptions and stack traces never reach the transcript.

• stdio only, local only. No HTTP transport, no multi-user credential isolation. This server is for one account on one machine.

Project layout

scripts/generate-tools.ts     # build-time codegen: spec -> src/generated/operations.ts
spec/openapi.bundled.json     # committed snapshot of the upstream spec
spec/VERSION.json             # upstream SHA + fetch timestamp + content hash
src/config.ts                 # the entire env surface, read once
src/types.ts                  # shared contracts
src/generated/operations.ts   # committed, generated, 297 entries, do not edit
src/vrchat/client.ts          # lazily-authed VRChat client, proxy, 2FA sniffing
src/vrchat/twofactor.ts       # pending-code broker
src/vrchat/ratelimit.ts       # token bucket + global 429 backoff
src/vrchat/events.ts          # websocket client + waiter registry
src/vrchat/history.ts         # bun:sqlite event store, per-type retention + FTS5 search
src/tools/auth.ts             # authStatus / submitTwoFactorCode / retryLogin / logout
src/tools/images.ts           # getImage
src/tools/upload.ts           # uploadFile / setProductImage
src/tools/events.ts           # eventsRecent / eventsWait / eventsSearch / eventsStatus
src/registry.ts               # gating, registration, the one shared handler
src/project.ts                # _responseKeys path projection
src/upload.ts                 # local path -> File, with size and type guards
src/errors.ts                 # HTTP status -> structured tool error with hint
src/index.ts                  # serveStdio entry point
tests/                        # offline suite; tests/live/ is the opt-in live suite
docs/PLAN.md                  # design document
PROGRESS.md                   # build status and verified SDK behaviour

License

See LICENSE.