Dispatch a Harness run
start_runCreate or reuse a Harness session, configure model, reasoning, agent and permission presets, then submit the first path-referenced task and get a stable session link to track it.
Instructions
Create or reuse a native Harness session, select provider/model/reasoning, agent preset, and native permission preset, then submit the first task and return a stable session link. Task parameters are path-reference-only: provide the authorized workspace, reviewTargets, contextReadScope, excludedPaths, writeScope, and acceptance criteria. reviewTargets identify what to assess; they are not a read whitelist. contextReadScope declares where Harness may search and read supporting implementation, tests, configuration, and architecture material. Never embed source text, diffs, file dumps, encoded source, or repository archives. Harness reads named files from the authorized workspace itself. These fields are task instructions, not enforced per-path filesystem isolation. The selected Harness model may send content it reads to its configured model provider even though Relay itself uses a loopback address. Sharing webUrl is not completion: keep wait_run until a terminal status, then consume assistantText.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| task | No | Task parameters are path-reference-only: provide the authorized workspace, reviewTargets, contextReadScope, excludedPaths, writeScope, and acceptance criteria. reviewTargets identify what to assess; they are not a read whitelist. contextReadScope declares where Harness may search and read supporting implementation, tests, configuration, and architecture material. Never embed source text, diffs, file dumps, encoded source, or repository archives. Harness reads named files from the authorized workspace itself. These fields are task instructions, not enforced per-path filesystem isolation. The selected Harness model may send content it reads to its configured model provider even though Relay itself uses a loopback address. | |
| model | No | ||
| content | No | Task parameters are path-reference-only: provide the authorized workspace, reviewTargets, contextReadScope, excludedPaths, writeScope, and acceptance criteria. reviewTargets identify what to assess; they are not a read whitelist. contextReadScope declares where Harness may search and read supporting implementation, tests, configuration, and architecture material. Never embed source text, diffs, file dumps, encoded source, or repository archives. Harness reads named files from the authorized workspace itself. These fields are task instructions, not enforced per-path filesystem isolation. The selected Harness model may send content it reads to its configured model provider even though Relay itself uses a loopback address. | |
| provider | No | ||
| sessionId | No | ||
| workspace | Yes | Authorized absolute Harness workspace root; Harness reads named in-scope files from here. | |
| writeScope | No | Paths Harness may modify. Must be empty for read-only runs; this is an instruction declaration in addition to native permissions. | |
| agentPreset | No | ||
| openBrowser | No | Keep false unless the user explicitly asks to open the Harness page in the OS browser. | |
| sessionMode | No | ||
| excludedPaths | No | Paths excluded from contextual reading. This is an instruction declaration, not filesystem enforcement. | |
| reviewTargets | No | Subjects to assess. This is not a read whitelist; supply together with contextReadScope. | |
| idempotencyKey | No | ||
| reasoningEffort | No | ||
| contextReadScope | No | Workspace paths Harness may search and read for evidence. Use only the targets when the user explicitly requests a target-only review. | |
| permissionPreset | No | ||
| authorizationBasis | No | Truthful evidence that the user explicitly selected Harness or this named Harness model to inspect the stated workspace scope. The current explicit request is sufficient authorization for that selected provider to process in-scope reads; do not ask the user to repeat authorization solely because provider processing is external. This field does not broaden the workspace, scope, permissions, destination, or allowed external actions. | |
| confirmedDangerousPermission | No |