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Glama

Domain registration and DNS

domain_check
Read-onlyIdempotent

Check domain registration expiry, registrar, DNS records, nameservers, DNSSEC, SPF and DMARC to see if a domain is lapsing, misdirected, or spoofable.

Instructions

Reports when a domain registration expires, who the registrar is, and how the domain is configured in DNS — nameservers, address records, mail exchangers, TXT and CAA records, whether the delegation is signed with DNSSEC, and what its SPF and DMARC records say about who may send email as it.

Use it to answer "is this domain about to lapse?", "who do we renew this with?", "where does this domain point?" or "why does the apex not work when www does?". It is the right first call when a site has gone dark for no obvious reason.

Use it too for "why is this client's email going to spam?" or "can someone spoof this domain?" — SPF and DMARC are read from the domain's own DNS.

It also asks each of the domain's own nameservers, directly, whether they agree about the zone. That answers "why does this site work for some people and not others?" and "is this old nameserver still in the delegation?" — a question no recursive resolver can answer, because it replies with whatever one server told it and does not say which. Pass checkNameservers: false to skip it.

Do not use it to check whether a website responds — that is uptime_check — or to inspect an SSL certificate, which is ssl_check. It reads only what registries and DNS publish. It reports no DKIM: finding a DKIM key needs its selector, and a selector cannot be discovered without guessing at names, which this project will not do.

Registration data comes from RDAP. Some country registries (.de, .nl, .no, .au, .fi) publish no expiry date at all; the result says so explicitly rather than reporting a gap as if it were an unknown. An expiry inside 30 days is reported as a warning and inside seven days as critical — a manual renewal needs that much lead time. Returns findings ordered by how much attention they need, worst first.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
domainYesThe domain to check, e.g. "example.com" — no scheme, no trailing slash. A full URL such as "https://example.com/pricing" is also accepted and reduced to its hostname. Internationalised names ("café.pt") are accepted and converted automatically. Registration is a property of the registrable domain, so "www.shop.example.co.uk" is checked as "example.co.uk".
checkNameserversNoWhether to ask the domain's own nameservers whether they agree about it, which no recursive resolver can answer. Costs one DNS query over TCP to each nameserver the domain publishes, in parallel, and finds a server left in the delegation that no longer serves the zone and a zone edited on one server and never transferred to the others. Defaults to true. Set false to skip it — the rest of the check is unaffected. Example: false

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dnsYesDNS records for the registrable domain.
emailYesEmail authentication, read from the domain's own TXT records. DKIM is not reported: finding a DKIM key needs its selector, which cannot be discovered without guessing.
dnssecYesWhether the delegation is signed. This is not a validation of the DNSSEC chain.
domainYesThe hostname that was checked, in ASCII (punycode) form.
findingsYesWhat needs attention, worst first.
severityYesHow much attention this needs. "critical" means act now; "warning" means act this month; "unknown" means the check could not establish the fact, which is not the same as it being fine.
checkedAtYesWhen the check ran, ISO 8601 in UTC.
dnsResolvedYesWhether the DNS lookup answered at all. When false every field under "dns" is empty because nothing could be read, not because the domain has no records.
nameserversYesWhat the domain's own nameservers said when each was asked directly, over TCP port 53 with recursion off. This is the only way to see a nameserver left in the delegation after a migration, or a zone edited on one server and never transferred to the others; a recursive resolver answers with whatever one server told it and hides which.
registrationYesWhat the registry publishes about this registration.
unicodeDomainYesThe Unicode form when the domain is internationalised, otherwise null.
registrableDomainYesThe domain registration was checked against, e.g. "example.co.uk".

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.6.1

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive), yet the description adds substantial operational context: RDAP as the data source, the fact that .de/.nl/.no/.au/.fi publish no expiry and say so rather than reporting a gap, warning at 30 days and critical at 7 days, and that findings are ordered worst-first. It also discloses the cost and mechanism of the nameserver check (one TCP query per nameserver, in parallel) and that it can be skipped without affecting the rest.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the capability, then usage, then exclusions, then caveats — a sensible order. It is on the long side (five paragraphs) with mild redundancy: 'Pass checkNameservers: false to skip it' appears both in the nameserver paragraph and again in the schema description, and the registrar-expiry warning thresholds could be tighter. Every paragraph still carries distinct information, so nothing is truly wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return-value formatting is correctly left out. Given that, the description covers everything an agent needs: what is queried, where the data comes from, known data gaps by TLD, threshold semantics for warnings, ordering of results, and the opt-out parameter. Nothing material to calling or interpreting the tool is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description earns extra credit by explaining why checkNameservers exists at all — 'a question no recursive resolver can answer, because it replies with whatever one server told it and does not say which' — and by describing the failure modes it detects (a stale server left in the delegation, a zone edited but never transferred). It does not restate the domain-normalisation rules that the schema already documents, which is appropriate restraint.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a precise verb+resource statement — reports registration expiry, registrar, and DNS configuration — and enumerates the concrete record types covered (NS, A, MX, TXT, CAA, DNSSEC, SPF, DMARC). It also explicitly distinguishes itself from the sibling tools uptime_check and ssl_check, so an agent can route without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit trigger phrases ('is this domain about to lapse?', 'why is this client's email going to spam?') and an explicit negative boundary ('Do not use it to check whether a website responds — that is uptime_check — or to inspect an SSL certificate, which is ssl_check'). It even states a capability it deliberately omits (DKIM) and why, which prevents an agent from expecting it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.