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mcp-omada

License: Apache-2.0

A Model Context Protocol server for TP-Link Omada SDN controllers - read controller/site/device/WiFi state and, for one guarded write, change it, from an MCP client such as Claude Code.

This is a from-scratch implementation, sibling to mcp-mikrotik: same philosophy (structured API calls only, no generic "run any command" tool, tests against an in-memory fake instead of a real device, 100% test coverage), applied to a very different transport (HTTP + JSON instead of RouterOS's binary API) and a controller with two separate, non-interchangeable authentication mechanisms - see "Verified against real hardware" below.

Status

v0.2: read tools + the first guarded write. Seven read tools (controller identity, sites, devices, device detail, per-AP WiFi summary, Insight clients, alerts) plus one write tool, set_radio_channel, gated by the same read-only-by-default + central allowlist + confirm/preview model mcp-mikrotik established - see src/mcp_omada/guard.py and "Security model" below.

Related MCP server: safe-omada-mcp

Installation

Requires Python >= 3.11.

python -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"

Configuration

Configuration comes entirely from environment variables (v0.1 targets a single controller - there is no multi-controller fleet file, unlike mcp-mikrotik's devices.yaml).

  1. Copy the example:

    cp .env.example .env
  2. Edit .env (or export the variables another way):

    Variable

    Default

    Meaning

    OMADA_BASE_URL

    (required)

    Controller base URL, e.g. https://192.168.1.2:8043

    OMADA_OMADAC_ID

    (auto)

    Controller ID; auto-discovered via GET /api/info if unset

    OMADA_SITE_ID

    (auto)

    Site to operate on; auto-selected if the controller manages exactly one site (legacy auth only - see below)

    OMADA_USER / OMADA_PASS

    -

    Legacy local-user login (preferred - richer field set). A Viewer role is enough for all read tools; set_radio_channel (write) requires an Administrator-role user - the controller's own RBAC returns -1007 "user does not have permissions" for a Viewer even when OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE=true (verified live: a defense-in-depth layer on top of this server's write guard).

    OMADA_CLIENT_ID / OMADA_CLIENT_SECRET

    -

    Open API client_credentials (reduced field set)

    OMADA_VERIFY_TLS

    false

    Verify the controller's TLS certificate

    OMADA_TIMEOUT

    15

    HTTP request timeout, in seconds

    OMADA_LOG_LEVEL

    INFO

    Log level for the server process (stderr)

    OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE

    false

    Enable write tools (set_radio_channel) - see "Security model"

    OMADA_AUDIT_LOG

    (unset - stderr)

    File path for the write audit journal (JSON lines) - see "Security model"

    Set either OMADA_USER+OMADA_PASS or OMADA_CLIENT_ID+OMADA_CLIENT_SECRET - not partially, and if both pairs happen to be set, legacy wins (see "Verified against real hardware" for why it's the richer path). The Open API app itself is created in the controller UI: Global View > Settings > Platform Integration > Open API, mode Client, role Viewer.

    OMADA_VERIFY_TLS defaults to false (with a startup warning) because an OC200 commonly serves a self-signed certificate on its LAN management port - strict verification would refuse to connect out of the box. Set it to true once the controller has a certificate you can actually validate.

Running

The server speaks MCP over stdio - it is meant to be launched by an MCP client (e.g. configured as a command in Claude Code), not run as a network service:

mcp-omada
# or, without installing the console script:
python -m mcp_omada.server

There is no HTTP transport in v0.1. If one is added later, it must default to binding 127.0.0.1 (never 0.0.0.0) and require a bearer token from an environment variable - see the TODO(http-transport) note at the top of src/mcp_omada/server.py.

Tools

Read-only

Tool

Description

get_controller_info

Controller identity: version, omadac_id, configured. Unauthenticated - works regardless of auth mode.

list_sites

Sites managed by this controller (id + name). Requires legacy auth.

list_devices

Devices on a site, normalized to one consistent shape regardless of auth mode - see below.

get_device_detail

Richest available detail for one device, by MAC (any common format accepted).

get_wifi_summary

Per-AP WiFi summary: parsed 2.4GHz/5GHz channel, client counts per band, radio utilization. Requires legacy auth.

get_clients

Insight/known clients on a site: mac, name, download/upload bytes, duration, last_seen, guest/wireless flags, VLAN, block/manager flags. Requires legacy auth.

get_alerts

Active alerts on a site. Pagination envelope confirmed against real hardware; individual alert row shape is a documented best-effort guess (raw always included) - see docs/api-notes.md. Requires legacy auth.

Write (guarded)

Tool

Description

set_radio_channel

Set an AP's 2.4GHz or 5GHz radio channel. Requires OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE=true and confirm=true; applied=true only after a post-write re-read confirms it - see "Security model" below. Requires legacy auth.

Normalization

list_devices/get_device_detail return the same field names regardless of which auth mode is active - a field unavailable in the current mode is null rather than omitted, so a caller never has to branch on auth mode. The normalization itself encodes three confirmed real-hardware gotchas (full detail in docs/api-notes.md):

  • connected: statusCategory == 1 (primary) with fallback status == 14 on the legacy path; status == 1 on the Open API path - the same field name (status) means something different on each path.

  • uptime_seconds: prefers uptimeLong (legacy-only, already seconds); falls back to parsing the uptime display string (e.g. "1h 43m") when uptimeLong is absent - notably, always, on the Open API path.

  • WiFi channel: actualChannel is a string like "11 / 2462MHz" (irregular whitespace) - parsed into {"channel": 11, "freq_mhz": 2462}. On the 5GHz radio, channel is an internal index, not the operator-recognizable channel number - freq_mhz is the reliable value.

Verified against real hardware (OC200 v5.13.30.20)

Everything below was confirmed against a real OC200 running firmware v5.13.30.20, across two verification passes (2026-07-12 reads, 2026-07-13 set_radio_channel/get_clients/get_alerts - the latter while correcting the channels of a real EAP fleet) - not assumed from public docs (which are thin, and in places silent about exactly these details). Full write-up, including the write endpoint's silent-discard gotcha, in docs/api-notes.md.

Capability

Legacy (/api/v2)

Open API (/openapi/v1)

Controller identity (/api/info)

Yes (unauthenticated either way)

Yes (unauthenticated either way)

List sites

Yes

Not verified - no Open API sites-list endpoint was exercised; set OMADA_SITE_ID explicitly in this mode

List devices

Yes, rich fields

Yes, reduced fields

Per-device detail

Yes for AP/EAP devices (/eaps/{MAC})

No separate endpoint verified - returns the list row

Per-radio WiFi detail (wp2g/wp5g)

Yes

Absent entirely

connected semantics

statusCategory==1, fallback status==14

status==1 (different meaning, same field name)

Insight/known clients

Yes

Not verified

Alerts

Yes (envelope only - row shape unverified)

Not verified

Set AP radio channel (write)

Yes (PATCH /eaps/{MAC})

Not verified

Device/system logs

Not found - every path tried returned errorCode -1600; deferred to v0.3

Not attempted

The two auth mechanisms (legacy session + CSRF token vs. Open API access token) are not interchangeable - a session from one is rejected (empty response) by the other's endpoints. See src/mcp_omada/client.py's module docstring and docs/api-notes.md for the full login flows.

Security model

src/mcp_omada/guard.py follows the security model mcp-mikrotik's own guard.py established, studied first - not a claim of an exact mirror (see docs/api-notes.md's "Design decisions" for where the two genuinely diverge and why). Four independent controls apply to set_radio_channel:

  1. Read-only by default. OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE defaults to false. With writes disabled, set_radio_channel returns a clear WriteDisabledError and never touches the device - the gate is checked before any read or write call is made, regardless of confirm.

  2. Central allowlist, no generic command tool. There is no tool that accepts an arbitrary API path or request body. The one write operation this package exposes is a dedicated, named function (guard.set_radio_channel) mapped to exactly one fixed endpoint in guard.ALLOWLIST. There is no code path by which a caller can reach an API path outside that table - OmadaClient._patch_v2 (the underlying write primitive) is never called anywhere except that one function.

  3. Explicit confirm with before/after preview. set_radio_channel takes a confirm: bool parameter. With confirm=False (the default), it reads the device's current radio configuration and returns what would change - a before/after structure - without applying anything. Only confirm=True applies the change.

  4. Empirical re-read verification - mcp-omada's own addition, not something mcp-mikrotik needs. A confirmed write's errorCode 0 is never trusted on its own: set_radio_channel re-reads the device afterward and compares the resulting freq against what was requested. applied=True is returned ONLY when they match - a controller that accepts a write but doesn't actually apply it (an uncharacterized rejection - a DFS channel the firmware refuses, say - beyond the two silent-discard causes already ruled out by construction) is reported as applied=False with a clear message, never a false positive. This exists because Omada's controller CAN answer "success" for a write it didn't apply - RouterOS's own API doesn't, so mcp-mikrotik has no equivalent control.

Every call also carries a warning: changing a channel restarts the radio (clients on that band briefly disconnect and reassociate), plus, on 5GHz, the confirmed channel-persists-as-internal-index caveat (see docs/api-notes.md) - so a caller reading only applied/after can't miss either.

set_radio_channel is registered unconditionally (like mcp-mikrotik's set_identity) - the tool is always callable; OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE=false makes every call cleanly refuse rather than making the tool disappear, which would be harder to diagnose.

Audit journal. Every set_radio_channel call - previewed, applied, rejected by the re-read check, or errored - is recorded as one structured JSON-lines event (src/mcp_omada/audit.py, following the model mcp-mikrotik's audit.py/correlation.py established): a per-call correlation id, the target MAC, before/after, warning/message, and outcome. Written to OMADA_AUDIT_LOG if set, otherwise a stderr INFO line. Never includes a controller credential, in any outcome - see docs/api-notes.md's "Audit journal" section for the full shape and the fourth outcome ("rejected") mcp-mikrotik's own three-outcome journal has no equivalent of.

On top of the write guard:

  • Structured HTTP, not shell commands. All controller communication goes through httpx with structured URL path segments, query parameters, and JSON bodies. Nothing in this codebase builds a request by concatenating strings from caller-supplied input, so injection through a MAC address or site ID is ruled out by construction rather than by input filtering.

  • Input validation on top, for its own sake. get_device_detail/ get_wifi_summary/set_radio_channel's mac argument is still validated and normalized before use (src/mcp_omada/validation.py), and set_radio_channel's band/channel are validated against a fixed channel/frequency table (src/mcp_omada/channels.py) before any device is touched - purely to reject garbage input early with a clear error, not as an injection defense (see previous point).

  • No secrets in output or logs. Password, client secret, CSRF token, session cookie, and Open API access token are never included in a log message or an exception's own text - exceptions carry only what the controller told us (an errorCode/msg), never the request that was sent. Settings' credential fields are all repr=False.

  • TLS verification is explicit, not silently bypassed. OMADA_VERIFY_TLS defaults to false with a loud startup warning (not a silent downgrade) - see "Configuration" above for why an OC200 in LAN needs this by default.

  • Structured errors. All errors raised inside the package derive from OmadaMCPError (src/mcp_omada/exceptions.py) and are caught at the tool boundary in server.py, which returns a clean, structured result. Unexpected exceptions are logged server-side and returned to the caller as a generic internal-error message, never as a raw traceback.

Development

pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest --cov=mcp_omada --cov-report=term-missing --cov-fail-under=100
ruff check .
ruff format --check .
mypy src/mcp_omada

The test suite never talks to a real controller: tests/fakes.py provides an httpx.MockTransport-backed fake that reproduces both auth flows and the exact JSON shapes (including the documented gotchas) confirmed against real hardware, injected via a client_factory parameter on build_server() - the same dependency-injection shape mcp-mikrotik's tests/fakes.py uses for its RouterOS connection.

Roadmap

  • v0.2 - delivered. set_radio_channel, the first guarded write, following mcp-mikrotik's guard.py model (a named, reviewable write operation; a read-only gate checked before anything is touched; explicit confirm/before-after preview; an audit journal) plus, specific to this package, empirical re-read verification of the write - and get_clients (Insight/known clients) and get_alerts (envelope verified, row shape honestly flagged as unverified). See docs/api-notes.md.

  • v0.3 - get_logs + more guarded writes. get_logs is NOT in v0.2: every device/system log endpoint path tried (log, logs, logs/queryLog, setting/logs/logs, insight/logs) returned errorCode -1600 against real hardware - deferred until a working endpoint is found (see docs/api-notes.md). Additional guarded writes under consideration: AP reboot (needs its own confirmation/cooldown policy - no meaningful before/after preview for a reboot, mirroring mcp-mikrotik's own reasoning for excluding it from its v0 allowlist), LED control.

  • v3-controller compatibility. The pre-v5 controller UI uses a different login call and session cookie name entirely - recorded as a historical note (not independently verified) in docs/api-notes.md, for whoever picks this up.

License

Apache-2.0 - see LICENSE.

No official TP-Link MCP server exists as of 2026-07; TP-Link's official offering is the Omada Open API (OAuth, /openapi/v1, reduced field set). Community MCP servers we know of:

How this project differs: read-only by default with no generic endpoint escape hatch (every write lands behind an explicit, reviewable allowlist - OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE + guard.py, mirroring mcp-mikrotik), and the legacy /api/v2 path — which Open-API-only clients cannot reach (the Open API token is rejected there; verified against real hardware) — for the rich per-radio/per-client data, with every field-shape gotcha documented in docs/api-notes.md.

Available Tools

8 tools
get_alertsA

List active alerts on a site.

The pagination envelope is confirmed against real hardware; the shape of an individual alert row is NOT (no alert was active during verification) - each entry includes a best-effort module/level/ content/time guess AND the untouched raw row, so nothing is lost if the guess is wrong. See docs/api-notes.md.

Requires legacy login (OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS) - no Open API equivalent has been verified against real hardware yet.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
site_idNo

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
resultYes

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and delivers: it discloses that the pagination envelope is verified but the per-row shape is not, that entries contain best-effort guesses plus an untouched `raw` row, and that legacy authentication is required. This is unusually candid behavioral context an agent could not get from the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded in one line, followed by detail blocks that each add real information (data-shape caveat, auth requirement). It is slightly verbose with parenthetical asides but nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values needn't be explained, and the description supplies valuable caveats about unverified row shape and auth. The only meaningful omission is the semantics of the site_id parameter, which leaves the definition slightly short for a 1-param tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single parameter site_id has 0% schema description coverage, so the description is responsible for clarifying it, yet it never mentions site_id at all. It is unclear whether omitting site_id lists alerts across all sites or behaves some other way, leaving a real gap for the only input.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence gives a specific verb and resource ('List active alerts on a site'), making the tool's function immediately clear. Although siblings like list_devices exist, the alerts resource is distinct enough that no explicit differentiation is needed. An agent can identify this tool's job from the first line.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description states a prerequisite (legacy OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS login) but never says when to choose this tool over alternatives or under what conditions alert listing is appropriate. There is no when-to-use or when-not-to-use framing at all.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

get_clientsA

List Insight/known clients on a site: mac, name, download/upload (bytes), duration_seconds, last_seen_ms, guest/wireless flags, vid (VLAN), and block/manager flags. This is the controller's "Insight" view (historical + known clients), not just currently-associated ones.

Requires legacy login (OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS) - no Open API equivalent has been verified against real hardware yet.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
site_idNo

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
resultYes

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden and does disclose two important traits: the authentication method required (legacy login, no verified Open API path) and the historical/known scope of the data. It omits pagination, rate limits, and how fresh last_seen_ms is, which are secondary for a read tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose and scope clarification, followed by the auth caveat. The field enumeration is long but informative rather than redundant, and no sentence is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool is low-complexity (one optional param) and an output schema exists, so return-value explanation isn't required. The auth requirement and scope caveat are the key operational facts and are present; only the site_id default semantics are left uncovered.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% for the single site_id parameter, and the description never mentions it or explains default behavior when omitted. The description adds no parameter meaning beyond the bare schema name, so it fails to compensate for the coverage gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb (List) plus resource (Insight/known clients on a site), with the return fields enumerated. It explicitly distinguishes itself from a plain 'currently-associated clients' listing, giving the agent a clear mental model of the scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description clarifies when this view applies (historical + known clients, not just currently-associated), which is a meaningful selection cue. It also states the auth prerequisite. It doesn't name a sibling as the alternative for live-only listings, so it stops just short of full routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

get_controller_infoA

Get the Omada controller's own identity: controller_version, omadac_id, configured. Unauthenticated (GET /api/info) - works regardless of which auth mode this server is configured with.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No parameters

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose the key behavioral trait: this endpoint is unauthenticated and independent of the server's auth mode, plus the underlying route GET /api/info. It omits rate-limit or failure-mode notes, but the safety-relevant auth behavior is covered and an output schema exists for the return shape.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two compact sentences, front-loading the identity/fields and then the auth property. Every clause adds information, with no padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-parameter, read-only identity probe with an output schema already documenting the return values, the description supplies everything needed: what it returns, the underlying route, and that no authentication is required.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool takes zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate beyond what the empty schema already shows; the baseline for a no-param tool applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Get the Omada controller's own identity') and enumerates the returned fields (controller_version, omadac_id, configured), which cleanly separates it from siblings like list_sites and get_clients. An agent can distinguish it without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a clear usage condition: the call is unauthenticated and works regardless of the server's configured auth mode, which tells the agent it is safe to call at any time. It stops short of naming alternatives or explicit exclusions, but the context is unambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

get_device_detailA

Get the richest available detail for one device by MAC address (any common separator - colon, hyphen, Cisco-dotted, or bare - is accepted and normalized).

Legacy auth: full detail (ssidOverrides, lanPortSettings, ledSetting, ...) for AP/EAP devices via /eaps/{MAC}; other device types fall back to their grid/devices summary row (no richer verified endpoint yet - see README). Open API auth: the matching (reduced-field) row from the device list.

The normalized fields (see list_devices) are included, plus the complete raw response under raw so nothing the controller returned is lost.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
macYes
site_idNo

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses that output depth varies by auth mode (legacy full detail for AP/EAP, summary rows otherwise, reduced fields on Open API), that fields are normalized plus a raw passthrough, and that MAC separators are normalized. It stops short of permission/rate-limit or error behavior, so it is strong but not exhaustive.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose and the MAC-format detail in the first sentence, then auth-mode behavior, then return shape. Dense and mostly waste-free, though the parenthetical asides and trailing 'so nothing the controller returned is lost' add mild length.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, yet the description still usefully characterizes the return shape (normalized fields plus raw), and it documents the auth-dependent behavioral split, which the schema cannot convey. The unaddressed `site_id` parameter is the notable gap preventing a 5.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate for both parameters. It compensates excellently for `mac` (accepted separators: colon, hyphen, Cisco-dotted, bare; normalized), but `site_id` is never mentioned, leaving half the parameters undocumented in both schema and description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('get the richest available detail for one device') plus the keying mechanism (MAC address), which sharply distinguishes it from the sibling list_devices. An agent can tell what the tool returns and how it is identified without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the contrast with list_devices (one device vs. a list) and by the noted fallback behavior, but there is no explicit 'use this when / not when' statement or named alternative. The auth-mode caveat hints at when richer data is available, which is useful but not a routing rule.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

get_wifi_summaryA

Per-AP WiFi summary: 2.4GHz/5GHz channel (parsed from the controller's irregularly-formatted actualChannel string), client counts per band, and radio utilization. One entry per AP on the site, or just the one matching mac if given.

Requires legacy login (OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS) - the Open API device list has no per-radio fields at all (confirmed against real hardware; see README's auth x endpoint matrix).

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
macNo
site_idNo

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
resultYes

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses that legacy login (OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS) is required, explains why (the Open API device list has no per-radio fields, verified against real hardware), and warns that actualChannel is irregularly formatted and must be parsed. These are exactly the operational caveats an agent needs before calling.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the returned payload, followed by scope and then the auth caveat; every clause carries information. The parenthetical on the parser and the README reference are slightly verbose but justified.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return-value documentation is unnecessary, and the description covers the data source, auth path, and scoping. The only real gap is the unaddressed `site_id` parameter and its default behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% for two parameters, so the description must compensate. It clarifies `mac` as an optional single-AP filter, but says nothing about `site_id` or what a null/default value implies, leaving half the parameters undocumented in both places.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific resource and enumerates the exact fields returned (2.4/5GHz channel, per-band client counts, radio utilization), so an agent knows precisely what it gets. It doesn't explicitly contrast itself with siblings like get_device_detail or get_clients, which keeps it short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states the scoping behavior clearly — one entry per AP on the site, or a single AP when `mac` is given — and notes the legacy-login prerequisite. However, it never says when to prefer this over the sibling get_device_detail or list_devices, so usage routing is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

list_devicesA

List devices on a site, normalized to one consistent shape regardless of auth mode (see formatting.normalize_device): connected, uptime_seconds, per-radio wifi_2g/wifi_5g channel info, and every raw field this package knows how to normalize - fields unavailable in the active auth mode are present as null rather than omitted, so a caller never has to branch on auth mode.

site_id defaults to OMADA_SITE_ID, or auto-selects if the controller manages exactly one site (legacy auth only).

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
site_idNo

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
resultYes

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the burden and does so well for return-shape behavior: fields unavailable under the active auth mode appear as null rather than being omitted, so callers never branch on auth mode. It omits read-only/pagination/rate-limit disclosure, which is a gap for a list tool, but the null-filling contract is genuinely non-obvious behavioral information.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the purpose, then the normalization contract, then the parameter default. Two short paragraphs, no filler sentences. The detail on return shape is somewhat long for a one-parameter tool but each clause carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so raw return values need not be explained, yet the description usefully adds the null-semantics contract that the schema likely cannot express. It leaves out pagination/result-size behavior and any explicit read-only statement, which are the only notable gaps for a zero-required-arg list tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% (the schema only says 'Site Id', default null), so the description must compensate — and it does: site_id falls back to OMADA_SITE_ID or auto-selects when the controller manages exactly one site (legacy auth only). That is real added meaning beyond the schema, including an auth-mode caveat.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('List devices on a site') and immediately qualifies the scope with the normalization guarantee. It does not name or contrast with any sibling (e.g. get_device_detail or get_clients), so the agent must infer boundaries itself, but the core purpose is unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied rather than stated: the site_id defaulting rules (OMADA_SITE_ID, single-site auto-select) tell the agent it can call this with no arguments, which is useful context. However, there is no explicit when-to-use-this vs get_device_detail/get_clients guidance and no exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

list_sitesA

List sites managed by this controller: id + name.

Requires legacy login (OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS) - see README's auth x endpoint matrix for why the Open API path can't serve this in v0.1.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No parameters

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
resultYes

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations exist, so the description carries the full burden and does so well. It discloses a critical behavioral trait: this endpoint requires legacy login (OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS) and the Open API path cannot serve it in v0.1, pointing to README for the auth x endpoint matrix. This is exactly the kind of context an agent needs to know before attempting the call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with what it does and what it returns, then immediately covers the auth caveat. Every part earns its place; no fluff.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite no output schema details needed (output schema exists), the description covers the key gaps: no annotations means it must disclose auth requirements, which it does thoroughly. For a zero-param list tool, this is complete – it tells the agent what to expect and what's required to call it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Zero parameters, so baseline is 4. The description correctly adds no parameter details, but the auth prerequisite is effectively an implicit input requirement (needs OMADA_USER/OMADA_PASS credentials), which is useful semantic context.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('List') and resource ('sites') and even specifies the exact output fields ('id + name'). An agent can immediately distinguish this from siblings like list_devices or get_controller_info, which target different resources.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage ('List sites managed by this controller') but provides no explicit when-to-use vs alternatives guidance. There's no sibling differentiation or condition named. The auth note is a prerequisite, not usage guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

set_radio_channelA

Set an AP's 2.4GHz ("2g") or 5GHz ("5g") radio channel.

WRITE tool, guarded: blocked entirely unless the server is running with OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE=true. Call with confirm=False (the default) to get a before/after preview (channel + freq) without changing anything; call again with confirm=True to actually apply it.

applied=True is only ever returned once a post-write re-read confirms the change (comparing freq, the one reliable round-trip value) - a bare "the controller said Success" is never trusted on its own. If the controller accepted the write but the re-read shows no change, applied=False and message explains why - see guard.set_radio_channel's docstring and docs/api-notes.md. Every call also carries a warning: changing a channel restarts the radio (clients on that band briefly disconnect and reassociate), plus, on 5GHz, the confirmed channel-persists-as-internal-index caveat.

Legacy auth only. channel is the operator-facing channel number (e.g. 11 on 2.4GHz, 149 on 5GHz) - this tool always derives the matching frequency itself (channels.py) and resends the complete current radio configuration with only channel/freq changed, so the confirmed real-hardware silent-discard gotcha (int channel, or a missing freq) can't be hit by construction - see docs/api-notes.md.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
macYes
bandYes
channelYes
confirmNo
site_idNo

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are present, so the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses the write guard, the preview/apply flow, that applied=True requires a post-write re-read of freq, the applied=False outcome with an explanatory message, the legacy-auth requirement, and the warning that changing a channel briefly drops clients on that band.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the operation, then the guard, then confirm semantics, then return/warning details in a logical order. It is dense with implementation references to guard docstrings and docs/api-notes.md that could be trimmed, but little of the content is truly redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a guarded mutation with an output schema, the description covers the guard, the confirmation protocol, what applied/message mean, and the side effects. Returns are already documented by the output schema, so nothing an agent needs to invoke this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does for the two non-obvious params: channel is the operator-facing number (11 on 2.4GHz, 149 on 5GHz) with freq derived internally, and confirm's preview-vs-apply semantics are spelled out. mac and site_id are left unexplained, and band only gains the '2g'/'5g' hint, so the coverage is strong but not complete.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (Set) plus the exact resource (an AP's 2.4GHz or 5GHz radio channel) and names the band tokens '2g'/'5g' that the agent must supply. All siblings are read-only tools, so this write tool is unambiguously distinguished.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states the write guard (blocked unless OMADA_ALLOW_WRITE=true) and the two-step flow: call with confirm=False for a preview, then with confirm=True to apply. This is exactly the when-and-how guidance an agent needs before invoking.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. 8 tool updatesv0.2.0
    • First observedget_alerts
    • First observedget_clients
    • First observedget_controller_info
    • First observedget_device_detail
    • First observedget_wifi_summary
    • First observedlist_devices
    • First observedlist_sites
    • First observedset_radio_channel

TDQS

A4/5.0

Scored across 8 tools

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes (list vs detail vs summary vs info), and get_clients/get_alerts are unambiguous. However list_devices and get_wifi_summary overlap on per-AP channel/radio data, so an agent could reasonably confuse them for WiFi-channel queries.

Naming Consistency5/5

All tool names use consistent snake_case verb_noun patterns: list_sites, list_devices, get_device_detail, get_wifi_summary, get_controller_info, get_clients, get_alerts, set_radio_channel. The verbs list/get/set are applied predictably.

Tool Count5/5

Eight tools is a well-scoped size for an Omada controller server: it covers sites, devices, clients, alerts, controller info, WiFi summaries, and one guarded write without feeling bloated or thin. Each tool maps to a distinct data need.

Completeness3/5

The read surface covers common monitoring needs but lacks broader management operations: no SSID/VLAN configuration, no client block/unblock, no device reboot, and no update/delete beyond a single radio-channel write. Notable gaps remain for a server named mcp-omada.

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessUnresponsive

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