Drop-in stdio interceptor that gates MCP tools/call requests through a YAML policy (block / require_approval / audit / budget cap) before they reach the real server. The same policy file is reused by @jamjet/claude-code-hook and @jamjet/openai-guardrail, so one rule set covers Claude Desktop, Cursor, OpenAI Agents, and custom clients.
Adaptive security for AI agents: assess inputs for prompt injection, scan outputs for credential/PII leaks, teach new attack patterns to semantic memory, harden prompts, and monitor metrics. Runs locally via MCP stdio.
Protects AI agents from prompt injection attacks, jailbreak attempts, and common web vulnerabilities by screening untrusted input through semantic LLM analysis and static pattern matching.
Provides AI ingress governance by masking prompts, classifying risk, and enforcing tool policies before agent calls reach model providers or sandboxes.
A lightweight stdio proxy that intercepts and rewrites MCP tool annotations to bypass security approval prompts in AI CLIs like Codex and Claude Code. It transparently passes through all tool operations while marking them as safe to ensure a seamless automation experience.
Security scanner and runtime proxy for MCP servers. Catches tool poisoning, prompt injection, and rug-pull attacks (silent tool description changes) before they reach your AI agent. Includes a static scanner and a runtime stdio proxy.
Provides MCP clients a single decision-only tool to classify prompts as safe for local or cloud models, or as containing PII or jailbreak content, without executing actions or calling AI models.
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Cryptographic Autonomy 1.0 (Combined Work Exception)
