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Paperboy

Paperboy

Official
by sudostash

scan_pdf

Read-onlyIdempotent

Scan PDFs from untrusted sources for malicious scripts, launch actions, disguised attachments, hidden data, and known malware; get a risk verdict to guide safe handling.

Instructions

Scan a PDF you didn't make for risks: scripts (especially ones that run on open), actions that launch programs, attachments that are programs or disguise their type, disguised names, hidden data around the file, and (if ClamAV is installed) known malware. verdict is no_active_content_found, active_content or suspicious, never "safe": a scan can't prove that. To remove active content, use sanitize_pdf.

Any password argument can be "ask": the user then types it on a local page, so it never passes through the chat.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "input_path": "<input_path>"
    },
    "name": "scan_pdf"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passwordNo
antivirusNo
input_pathYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathYes
limitsYes
verdictYes
antivirusYes
indicatorsYes
embedded_filesYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing the verdict vocabulary and the crucial fact that it never returns "safe" because a scan can't prove safety. It also flags the conditional ClamAV dependency for malware detection and the "ask" password mechanism, which is meaningful auth/secret-handling behavior the annotations say nothing about.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose leads, then scope of checks, then the verdict caveat, then the alternative tool — a sound front-to-back ordering with no filler. The middle sentence is a long comma-delimited list that could be tightened, but each item adds real scanning scope rather than padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return values need not be described, and the readOnly/idempotent annotations cover the safety profile. The only substantive gap is that the antivirus toggle's effect is not stated explicitly, which matters given zero schema coverage.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description has to carry all three parameters. It explains the password parameter's special "ask" value very well, and implies input_path via "a PDF", but the antivirus boolean is only obliquely referenced through the ClamAV parenthetical rather than tied to the flag that toggles it.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Scan a PDF") plus a scoping qualifier ("you didn't make") and enumerates exactly what categories of risk are checked. It also names the related removal tool (sanitize_pdf), so an agent can distinguish it from siblings without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage context is clear: this is for untrusted PDFs, and removal of active content belongs to sanitize_pdf. It does not explicitly say when not to bother scanning (e.g., self-produced files), but the "you didn't make" framing effectively draws that boundary.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.