Strac MCP DLP
OfficialProvides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Box files and folders before they reach an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Confluence pages before it reaches an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Databricks notebooks and data before it reaches an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Dropbox files before they reach an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in GitHub repositories and content before it reaches an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Google Workspace and Google Cloud resources before they reach an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Jira issues before they reach an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in MongoDB databases before it reaches an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Notion pages before it reaches an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Salesforce records before they reach an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Slack messages and files before they reach an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Snowflake data before it reaches an AI agent.
Provides detection and redaction of sensitive data in Zendesk tickets before they reach an AI agent.
Strac MCP DLP — PII/PHI/PCI & secret redaction for AI agents (MCP)
An open-source Model Context Protocol server that gives any AI agent — Claude, Cursor, VS Code, your own — a way to find and strip sensitive data before it reaches the model.

Point your agent at it, and redact_text turns
Please onboard the user with SSN 123-45-6789 and email jane@acme.cominto
Please onboard the user with SSN [REDACTED] and email [REDACTED]...along with a structured list of what was found. It works the same on images, PDFs and scanned documents.
This is a thin client over the Strac DLP API. Bring your own API key; all detection and redaction happens server-side at Strac.
Why
Agents are now wired into inboxes, ticketing systems, CRMs, databases and file stores. Every MCP tool call is a chance for an SSN, a card number, a patient record or an AWS key to be pulled into a prompt — and from there into a model provider's logs, a vector store, a Slack summary or a support ticket.
Filtering that data after the model has seen it is too late. This server puts the check in front of the model: detect first, redact, then let the agent reason over text that no longer carries the sensitive values.
Related MCP server: privacyscrubber-mcp
This server is one door into Strac
Redacting a string you hand it is the smallest thing Strac does. The product is coverage: connect Strac to the SaaS and cloud apps where your sensitive data already lives, and it discovers, classifies, redacts and remediates it there — continuously, under your policies, with an audit trail — rather than waiting for someone to paste it into a prompt.
Slack, Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Salesforce, Zendesk, Box, Dropbox, Jira, Confluence, GitHub, Notion, OneDrive, SharePoint, Snowflake, Databricks, BigQuery, Postgres, MongoDB, AWS, Azure, GCP, browsers and endpoints — 60+ integrations, agentless, no code to write.
That matters most when those systems are reached over MCP. When an agent — Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, OpenAI Codex — pulls a Salesforce record or a Drive file through an MCP connector, Strac redacts the sensitive data inline, before the agent receives it. That is the difference between asking an agent to redact and enforcing it whether or not it asks.
strac.io/mcp-integrations is that product. This repo is its developer-facing sliver: the same detection engine, reachable from any MCP client, for when you want to sanitise a string or a file yourself.

Every MCP invocation your agents make — tools called, files read, the identity behind the prompt — captured and inspected.
60-second quickstart
1. Install
pip install strac-mcp-dlp2. Request an API key
Request a key, or email hello@strac.io.
Keys are prefixed sk_live_ (production) or sk_test_ (sandbox); the server picks the matching endpoint automatically.
3. Add it to your MCP client
Claude Desktop — ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows:
{
"mcpServers": {
"strac-dlp": {
"command": "strac-mcp-dlp",
"env": {
"STRAC_API_KEY": "sk_live_your_key_here"
}
}
}
}Claude Code:
claude mcp add strac-dlp --env STRAC_API_KEY=sk_live_your_key_here -- strac-mcp-dlpCursor — .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json globally: use the same block as Claude Desktop.
4. Restart your client and ask it to redact something
Use Strac to redact this before I paste it into the ticket: "Customer Jane Doe, SSN 123-45-6789, card 4111 1111 1111 1111."
No install at all, if you have uv:
{
"mcpServers": {
"strac-dlp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["strac-mcp-dlp"],
"env": { "STRAC_API_KEY": "sk_live_your_key_here" }
}
}
}See examples/ for ready-to-copy config files.
Tools
redact_text
Redact PII, PHI, PCI and secrets out of a block of text, returning the sanitised string plus what was found
Inputs:
text(string): the text to redactredact_field_mode(string, optional):REDACTED(default),BLANK,MASK_SEVEN_XorTOKEN_LINK_PLAINTEXTinclude_matched_text(boolean, optional): also return the raw sensitive values. Off by default
Call it before putting untrusted or user-supplied text into a prompt, a log line, a ticket or any downstream system
redact_text(text="SSN 123-45-6789")→"SSN [REDACTED]"
detect_sensitive_data
Report which sensitive data types are present in text, without changing it
Inputs:
text(string): the text to scaninclude_matched_text(boolean, optional): also return the raw values. Off by default
Use it to decide whether text is safe to send onward
detect_sensitive_data(text="call me at jane@acme.com")→EMAIL
detect_file
Scan a local file — image, PDF, scan, config or source — using Strac OCR and classifiers
Inputs:
path(string): path to the file to scaninclude_matched_text(boolean, optional): also return the raw values. Off by default
The file is never modified
detect_file(path="./w2.pdf")→TAX_ID_NUMBER, NAME, ADDRESS
redact_file
Write a redacted copy of a local file to disk
Inputs:
path(string): path to the file to redactoutput_path(string, optional): where to write the copy. Defaults to a.redactedsuffix beside the original. Pointing it at the source is refusedoverwrite(boolean, optional): allow replacing an existing destination. Off by default
The original is never modified
redact_file(path="./w2.pdf")→./w2.redacted.pdf
detokenize
Resolve Strac vault tokens (
tkn_…) back to their original values, for authorised callersInputs:
token_ids(string[]): the token identifiers to resolve. Maximum 10 per call
Requires an IP-allowlisted server-to-server key in live mode
detokenize(token_ids=["tkn_abc"])→"111-22-3333"
Redaction styles
redact_text takes a redact_field_mode:
Mode | Result |
|
|
|
|
| removed entirely |
|
|
Redaction that doesn't leak
By default these tools return the types and positions of what they found, not the values:
{
"redacted_text": "Please onboard the user with SSN [REDACTED]",
"detection_count": 1,
"data_element_types": ["TAX_ID_NUMBER"],
"detections": [{ "type": "TAX_ID_NUMBER", "begin_index": 33, "end_index": 44, "length": 11 }]
}Returning the matched text alongside the redacted text would hand the model exactly the data you just removed. Pass include_matched_text=true when a caller genuinely needs the raw values.
What gets detected
Strac ships 191 built-in data elements across 10 categories, plus custom elements you define with regex or your own trained model:
Category | Elements | Examples |
Identification | 126 | SSN/TIN, passports, driver licences and national IDs across ~60 countries — Aadhaar, PAN, PESEL, BSN, Fiscal Code, IRD — plus NPI and DEA registration numbers |
Secrets | 30 | AWS access and secret keys, GitHub and GitLab tokens, Slack tokens, GCP credentials, Azure storage and service-principal keys, private keys, JDBC and MongoDB connection strings, seed phrases |
Financial Account | 10 | Card number and tail, CVV, expiry, bank account and routing numbers, IBAN, SWIFT |
Advertisement Identifiers | 7 | Apple IDFA and IDFV, Google GAID, Roku, Amazon Fire OS, Huawei OAID |
Contact | 6 | Name, address, email, phone, date of birth, age |
Device Tracking | 5 | IP address, MAC address, IMEI, webpage URL, date/time |
Asset | 3 | Source code, VIN, vehicle licence plate |
Document Properties | 2 | Invoice, password-protected document |
Content Moderation | 1 | Offensive content |
Intellectual Property | 1 | Chemical/molecular structure |
Every element named individually: Strac Catalog of Sensitive Data Elements.
Detection runs on text and, via OCR, on PDFs, JPEGs, PNGs, DOCX, XLSX, screenshots and .msg email files — which is what detect_file and redact_file reach.
One caveat worth setting expectations on: the type values these MCP tools return depend on which endpoint answered, and the two use different vocabularies for the same element. A US Social Security Number comes back as TAX_ID_NUMBER from redact_text and as SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER from detect_sensitive_data — which additionally reports SSN under reported_element_types. Both vocabularies are surfaced as returned rather than normalised, so nothing is invented on your behalf. Which elements are detected at all depends on what is enabled for your account; the full catalog above is what runs across your connected apps, where policies, remediation and audit live.
Configuration
Variable | Required | Default |
| yes | — |
| no |
|
| no |
|
Without a key, every tool returns: Set STRAC_API_KEY — request one at https://www.strac.io/mcp-integrations.
The server speaks stdio by default. strac-mcp-dlp --transport streamable-http serves HTTP instead.
How it works
Your MCP client spawns this server locally; it forwards each tool call to the Strac API over HTTPS with your X-Api-Key, and returns the result. Nothing is classified or redacted on your machine, and this repository contains no detection models.
Your data element definitions, custom policies, remediation rules and audit trail live in your Strac account, not in this repo — which is why the same key that powers these five tools also governs every connected app.
MCP client ──stdio──▶ strac-mcp-dlp ──HTTPS──▶ Strac DLP API
(Claude, Cursor, (this repo, (classifiers, OCR,
your agent) ~600 lines) vault, policies, audit)Limits inherited from the API: 4 MB for inline content, 10 MB for document uploads, 10 tokens per detokenize call.
Development
git clone https://github.com/strac-io/strac-mcp-dlp
cd strac-mcp-dlp
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]"
.venv/bin/python -m pytestThe test suite mocks the Strac API with respx, so it runs without a key. To try the server by hand:
STRAC_API_KEY=sk_test_… .venv/bin/python -m strac_mcp_dlpOr point the MCP Inspector at it:
STRAC_API_KEY=sk_test_… npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector strac-mcp-dlpFAQ
Do I need a Strac account?
Yes. This is a thin client over the Strac DLP API and every call is authenticated — there is no anonymous mode. Request a key at strac.io/mcp-integrations or email hello@strac.io.
Does my data stay on my machine?
No. Text and files you pass to these tools are sent to the Strac API over HTTPS for classification. Nothing is classified locally — this repository contains no detection models, no classifier and no vault. detect_file sends files under 4 MB inline without storing them; larger files, and anything passed to redact_file, are uploaded to your Strac document vault.
Which MCP clients does it work with?
Any client that speaks stdio — Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code and others. --transport streamable-http is available if you need to run it as a service rather than a subprocess.
Does it detect secrets, or only PII?
Both. Alongside personal, health and payment data, Strac classifies AWS access and secret keys, GitHub and GitLab tokens, Slack tokens, GCP credentials, Azure storage and service-principal keys, private keys, and JDBC and MongoDB connection strings. See the full catalog.
Why doesn't redact_text return the values it found?
Because handing them back would undo the redaction. If the tool returned "123-45-6789" in its detections alongside the redacted string, the model would end up with exactly the data you just removed. You get types and positions by default; pass include_matched_text=true when a caller genuinely needs the raw values.
Will redact_file modify my original?
No. It writes a copy, refuses an output_path that resolves to the source file (including via symlink), and will not replace an existing file unless you pass overwrite=true.
What happens if the Strac API returns something unexpected?
The tool errors. It never reports a clean scan it could not verify — a malformed or unparseable response raises rather than returning "no sensitive data found", because a silent false negative is the one failure a DLP tool cannot have.
How is this different from the Strac platform?
This repo is on-demand tooling your agent chooses to call. The platform sits across your SaaS, cloud and database connectors and enforces policy whether or not the agent asks — redacting inline before the agent receives the data, with remediation and an audit trail. See strac.io/mcp-integrations.
Links
Strac MCP integrations — the full MCP DLP gateway, connectors, policies and audit
Strac catalog of sensitive data elements — every data element, named
Strac integrations — the full SaaS and cloud connector list
Security
Never commit an API key. sk_live_ keys are server-side credentials; keep them in your MCP client's env block or your secret manager, not in source control. To report a vulnerability, email security@strac.io.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
Available Tools
5 toolsdetect_fileDetect sensitive data in a fileA
Detect PII, PHI, PCI and secrets in a local file — image, PDF, scan or text. Strac runs OCR on images and scanned documents. Returns the data element types found, without modifying the file.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | Yes | ||
| include_matched_text | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It transparently states that Strac runs OCR on images/scanned documents, returns the found data element types, and does not modify the file. It does not cover edge cases like no matches or file access requirements, but the core behavior is well disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is three sentences with no fluff. It front-loads the core purpose, then gives OCR context, then states the output and non-mutating behavior. Every sentence earns its place and the length is appropriate for the tool's complexity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the output schema exists, the description does not need to explain return structures. It covers the key operational aspects: supported file types, OCR behavior, data categories, and non-modification. The main gap is that it leaves the meaning of include_matched_text unexplainede and does not mention any file-size or access prerequisites, but overall it is complete enough for a detection tool with this schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description should compensate for parameter meaning. It does not mention 'path' or 'include_matched_text' at all; the optional matched-text behavior is entirely absent. The schema's property names are self-descriptive, but the description adds no value beyond the schema and fails to clarify what include_matched_text affects in the results.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states a specific action (detect), a resource (local file), and target data categories (PII, PHI, PCI, secrets). It also distinguishes file types and notes that OCR is applied to images/scans. However, it does not explicitly differentiate this tool from the sibling detect_sensitive_data, so the sibling advantages are not directly addressed.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use this tool: when you have a local file (image, PDF, scan or text) and need detection without modification. It also implies OCR handling for images/scans. But it does not explicitly state when not to use it or name alternatives such as detect_sensitive_data, and no usage exclusions are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
detect_sensitive_dataDetect sensitive data in textA
Detect sensitive data in text without changing it — personal data (PII), health data (PHI), payment and card data (PCI), and credentials such as API keys, cloud access keys, tokens and connection strings. Returns the data element types Strac found. Use this to decide whether text is safe to send onward; use redact_text when you need the sanitised text itself.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | ||
| include_matched_text | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
There are no annotations provided, so the description carries the burden. The description clearly discloses a key behavioral trait: the tool is non-mutating ('without changing it') and reports only the data element types found ('Returns the data element types Strac found'). However, it does not disclose the exact return structure, pagination, or error behavior. At least the non-destructive nature and detection-only scope are stated.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a compact three-sentence block that front-loads the core action and scope, then adds the return-value expectation and the usage-dependent sibling alternative. Every sentence contributes useful guidance with no filler or redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a detection tool with only two parameters and no output schema provided, the description covers the purpose, the input domain, the output concept, and the key distinction from its sibling. The only minor gap is not clarifying the exact format of the returned element types or how include_matched_text affects the response, but given that the tool itself is conceptually simple and the return value is summarized, this is adequate.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema describes 'text' only as a generic string, but the description clarifies the domain and purpose of that text, namely that it contains potentially sensitive data and the tool returns the types found. For include_matched_text, there is no schema description at all, and the main description does not explicitly explain it either, though the boolean default is self-explanatory. Overall, the description adds meaningful semantic context beyond the bare schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description begins with a clear verb-object pair, 'Detect sensitive data in text without changing it', and enumerates the exact categories (PII, PHI, PCI, credentials) the tool detects. It also explicitly contrasts the tool with redact_text, which distinguishes it from the sibling tool. The title alone would not convey this scope, but the description fully specifies the tool's unique function.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description states both when to use this tool — 'to decide whether text is safe to send onward' — and when to use the alternative, redact_text, 'when you need the sanitised text itself.' This explicit when/when-not guidance with a named sibling alternative is exactly what an agent needs for correct selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
detokenizeDetokenize Strac tokensA
Resolve Strac vault tokens (tkn_…) back to their original values. Use this only when the caller is authorised to see the raw sensitive data. Accepts up to 10 tokens per call and requires an IP-allowlisted server-to-server key in live mode.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| token_ids | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral disclosure burden. It discloses the authorization requirement, the key requirement, the live-mode restriction, and the 10-token-per-call limit. This is meaningful beyond the schema, though it doesn't cover error behavior or non-live-mode differences.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose, followed by critical constraints. No filler or redundant restatement of the schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The output schema already covers return values, so the description's focus on authorization, key requirements, and input limits is sufficient for a single-parameter tool. Minor gaps such as non-live-mode behavior are acceptable given the explicit live-mode constraint.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema provides no descriptions for token_ids (0% coverage). The description compensates by defining the token format ('tkn_…') and the maximum array size (10 tokens per call), giving the agent enough to construct valid input.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Resolve') and resource ('Strac vault tokens back to their original values'), and even identifies the token format ('tkn_…'). This clearly distinguishes it from the sibling tool redact_text, which presumably transforms rather than reveals data.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit conditions for use: only when the caller is authorised to see raw sensitive data, and requires an IP-allowlisted server-to-server key in live mode. It doesn't explicitly mention when to use redact_text instead, but the authorization condition serves as a strong gate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
redact_fileRedact a fileA
Redact PII, PHI, PCI and secrets out of a local file — image, PDF, scan or text — and write the redacted copy to disk. The original is never modified. Returns the path to the redacted file.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | Yes | ||
| overwrite | No | ||
| output_path | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose key behavioral facts: the original is never modified, the redacted copy is written to disk, and the path is returned. It does not cover overwrite or output-naming behavior, but the core side-effect profile is transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two tight sentences, front-loads the action and scope, and each clause adds information (data types, input format, side effect, original-file safety, return value). No wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
It covers the main invocation context and the output, but the meaning of overwrite and output_path when null/true is left ambiguous. Since the schema provides no param descriptions and there are no annotations, an agent may not know how to set these fields correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 0% schema description coverage, the description needed to explain path, overwrite, and output_path. It only indirectly relates to 'local file' and 'returns the path'; it never explains how overwrite or output_path behave. This leaves parameter semantics largely undocumented.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Redact') and resource ('local file'), enumerates target data types (PII, PHI, PCI, secrets) and file formats (image, PDF, scan, text), and specifies the write-to-disk behavior. This clearly differentiates it from siblings like detect_sensitive_data and redact_text.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly frames the tool for redacting content out of a local file, giving a clear context of use. It does not name alternatives or state exclusions, so it stops short of a 5, but the local-file qualifier makes the intended use obvious.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
redact_textRedact sensitive data from textA
Redact PII, PHI, PCI and secrets out of a block of text using Strac DLP. Returns the redacted text plus the data element types that were found. Call this before putting untrusted or user-supplied text into a prompt, a log line, a ticket or any downstream system.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | ||
| redact_field_mode | No | REDACTED | |
| include_matched_text | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses the output ('Returns the redacted text plus the data element types that were found') and implies external processing via 'using Strac DLP,' but it does not mention the irreversibility of redaction, the effect of different redact_field_mode values, or whether the original text is stored or transmitted. The core behavior is clear, yet edge behaviors are left to inference.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences, no filler. The first sentence states the action, the second the return value, and the third the recommended usage context. Every sentence earns its place and the most critical information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is adequate for an initial selection decision, and an output schema is present to document return values. However, the lack of parameter semantics—especially include_matched_text and redact_field_mode—means an agent cannot fully understand invocation options without additional context. For a tool with no annotations, the description is not fully complete on its own.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate for all three parameters. It only implicitly identifies 'text' as the input, and it says nothing about redact_field_mode or include_matched_text. The parameter names and enum values offer some self-evident meaning, but an agent receives no guidance on the semantics of include_matched_text or the trade-offs between modes, which is a significant gap at this coverage level.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb ('Redact') and a precise resource ('PII, PHI, PCI and secrets out of a block of text'). It also states the return value, and the scope ('block of text') clearly distinguishes it from file-based siblings like redact_file and from detect-only siblings like detect_sensitive_data.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives an explicit call-to-action: 'Call this before putting untrusted or user-supplied text into a prompt, a log line, a ticket or any downstream system.' This clearly establishes when to use the tool, though it does not mention alternatives or exclusions such as 'if you only need detection, use detect_sensitive_data.'
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
5 tool updates
v0.1.1- First observed
detect_file - First observed
detect_sensitive_data - First observed
detokenize - First observed
redact_file - First observed
redact_text
TDQS
Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: detect vs. redact, text vs. file, and detokenize is a separate vault operation. Even the two text tools are unambiguous because one returns sanitized text while the other only returns detected types.
Most tools follow a verb_noun pattern like redact_text, detect_file, and redact_file. detokenize is the only slight deviation since it is a single verb with an implied object, but the naming style remains consistent and readable.
Five tools is a well-scoped set for a DLP-focused server. It covers the essential text and file operations plus detokenization without unnecessary bloat.
The core detect/redact workflows are covered for both text and files. The main gap is the lack of a tokenize companion to detokenize, though this does not break primary DLP workflows.
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Related MCP Connectors
Detects and redacts PII (emails, phones, SSNs, names, addresses) from text. $0.02/call via x402.
Toxicity, sentiment, NER, PII detection, and language identification tools
Scan configs, files, or text for leaked secrets and obvious misconfigurations. Nothing stored.
Detect and redact Norwegian PII (fodselsnummer, names, health data) in text and PDFs.
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