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A2A /.well-known/agent.json Identity & Capability Card Verifier

verify_a2a_agent_card
Read-onlyIdempotent

Verify a remote A2A agent discovery card before delegation by checking JWS/DID binding, HTTPS enforcement, and capability spoofing.

Instructions

Verifies a remote agent's A2A /.well-known/agent.json discovery card, checking JWS/DID signature binding, endpoint HTTPS enforcement, and capability spoofing. Use when authenticating a peer autonomous agent before delegating subtasks or exchanging payments over A2A; for auditing an MCP tool server's tools/list manifest rather than a peer agent's A2A card, use audit_mcp_server_manifest instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'agent_card_json' ('trust_policy' defaults to 'require_https_and_did'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "agent_card_json": "<agent_card_json>"
    },
    "name": "verify_a2a_agent_card"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
trust_policyNoVerification policy for DID/DNS binding; defaults to 'require_https_and_did' when omitted.
agent_card_jsonYesJSON string or object of the peer agent's /.well-known/agent.json descriptor.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
agent_idYesCanonical identifier of the verified peer agent.
card_validYesTrue when the A2A agent card schema, transport, and identity claims pass verification.
spoofing_flagsYesList of impersonation or downgrade anomalies detected.
delegation_verdictYesHandshake decision ('SAFE_TO_DELEGATE_A2A' or 'REJECT_UNVERIFIED_AGENT').

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.3.3

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world), but the description adds material operational detail annotations cannot express: a 32 KB payload ceiling, a 60 RPM rate limit, the default trust_policy, the '?demo=true'/L402 15-sat access path, and an HTTP 400 on invalid input. That is exactly the kind of cost, limit, and failure-mode disclosure the description is supposed to carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the purpose and the sibling routing before the operational details, which is the right ordering. The second half is dense — size, rate limit, parameters, default, demo/L402, and error code packed into one sentence — costing a little scannability but no clause is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need no explanation, and the description still flags the HTTP 400 failure path. For a two-parameter read-only validator, every decision an agent needs — when to call it, what to pass, defaults, limits, and cost — is present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the enum is documented, so the schema already does the semantic work; baseline 3 applies. The description does restate the trust_policy default and add the non-schema '?demo=true' access flag, but it adds no meaning about what the three policies actually accept or reject.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Verifies a remote agent's A2A /.well-known/agent.json discovery card') and enumerates the exact checks performed (JWS/DID signature binding, HTTPS enforcement, capability spoofing). It explicitly names the closest sibling, audit_mcp_server_manifest, and the axis that distinguishes them (peer agent card vs. MCP tools/list manifest).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit trigger ('Use when authenticating a peer autonomous agent before delegating subtasks or exchanging payments over A2A') and an explicit exclusion with the correct alternative for the MCP-manifest case. Nothing is left to inference about when to reach for this tool versus its nearest sibling.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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