Body-MCP
Provides local text-processing tools such as summarisation, extraction, redaction, and classification using models running on the user's machine through Ollama, keeping data local.
Enables searching YouTube for reference videos and reading video metadata, chapters, and official captions without downloading audio or models.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Body-MCP Open Chrome and search for the latest Python release"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Body-MCP
Give coding agents eyes, ears, hands, legs and reflexes — under your permission, verified in code.
Body-MCP is a lightweight, local-first Model Context Protocol server that gives coding agents such as OpenCode and Claude Code controlled access to your browser, desktop and microphone.
The coding agent is the brain. Body-MCP is only the body. It never pursues goals, never improvises, and never treats webpage content or model output as authorization.
you → coding agent (brain) → MCP / permissions gate → Body-MCP (body) → browser · desktop · micWhat it can do (v0.3)
Part | Tools | What it does |
👁 Eyes |
| Read pages/desktop: title, headings, text, links, buttons, inputs, forms; epoch-scoped refs ( |
🔴 Live screen |
| A live observation session: the screen is sampled and OCR'd only when the frame changed, off the MCP event loop, with an automatic slowdown under memory pressure. Nothing is stored |
👂 Ears |
| Mic → local Whisper transcript, with silence detection. Raw audio never touches disk; never transmitted |
🖐 Hands |
| Open/click/type/press/scroll with safety gates, stale-ref detection, human-like pacing, read-back verification |
⚡ Batch |
| A declared sequence of actions in one MCP call. Validate-then-execute, stop-on-failure, per-step + total deadlines, verification steps with evidence, never reports success without it |
🔀 Parallel |
| Bounded parallel tasks on isolated contexts (default max 2). No consequential actions; shared per-service cooldowns |
🦵 Legs |
| Launch an allowlisted app — user allowlist + fresh approval required |
🌐 Current browser |
| Drive the tab you already have open, over a loopback CDP connection you start yourself |
🔌 Your own browser |
| Drive your Edge/Chrome through a one-permission extension (Chromium 136+ forbids a debug port on the default profile); |
🔒 Privacy session |
| An explicit, isolated, disposable browsing context that keeps nothing in memory, the log or the event stream; |
🧠 Local worker |
| Summarise / extract / redact / classify text with a model running on your machine (Ollama or a GGUF) — nothing leaves the box; the catalogue ranks models against your measured RAM |
🛡 Reflexes |
| Verify observable outcomes; ask the human yes/no. One approval = one protected action |
📚 Memory |
| Local SQLite + FTS5 memory and human-editable Markdown notes. No cloud, no embeddings, no vector DB |
🔬 Research |
| Bounded, deduplicated evidence records: URL, title, date, excerpt, retrieval method, verification status |
🖥 Desktop hands | \desktop_inspect, \desktop_click, \desktop_type, \desktop_read_value\ | Drive NATIVE Windows apps by control name (UI Automation) - no blind coordinates; clicking/typing need approval |
🎬 Research video | esearch_video, esearch_youtube_search\ | Read a video's metadata, chapters and OFFICIAL captions (the audio, no model download); find reference videos |
🧠 Workflow | \ody_workflow_start, \ody_workflow_note, \ody_workflow_report, \ody_lessons\ | The ledger of EYES->BRAIN->HANDS->VERIFY, and what we learned from failures |
🖥 Console |
| Optional local activity view (loopback + token): real task timeline, cancel and disconnect |
🩺 Health |
| Capability states, live event stream, cancellation, system inventory, backend catalogue, a dry-run recommendation and the available speech engines |
🔊 Voice out |
| Optional Read Aloud with the built-in Windows voice (no download, no network) |
78 tools total. Every tool answers {success, message, data}; data carries the
result state, the evidence and the recovery hint.
Body-MCP is free and open source. There is no paid tier, no telemetry, no cloud account and no feature locked behind payment. Optional capabilities depend on optional software you install yourself (Tesseract, faster-whisper) — never on a subscription.
Related MCP server: AI Knowledge Center MCP
Result states (honest by construction)
State | Meaning |
| A postcondition was observed (URL matched, field value read back, expected text present). |
| The action was dispatched but its effect was not observable — say so, do not claim success. |
| A batch ran but no verification step proved the outcome. |
| A CAPTCHA, login wall, paywall, 403 or rate limit stopped the run. |
| The action failed, or its postcondition failed ( |
| A human decision is required (approval, login, challenge). |
A click that does not navigate returns UNCONFIRMED, never "done". A typed value
is read back from the field; if the page rewrote it, the call fails with
POSTCONDITION_FAILED.
The permission system (enforced in code, not prompts)
Every tool call passes one authorization decision path (permissions.py):
Profile:
%USERPROFILE%\.config\body_mcp\permissions.json—allow | ask | denyper capability (public web, private sessions, desktop capture, keyboard/mouse, mic, app launch, current-browser attach…). Unknown capabilities aredeny(least privilege).Consent: protected (high-risk) actions also require your acknowledged consent —
python -m body_mcp.consent --acknowledge.Scoped, single-use approval for protected actions.
reflex_ask(question, action='<json spec>')issues an approval bound to exactly one action —tool | capability | target | url | task_id— with a 300 s TTL, consumed atomically at execution time. A different target, a different task, a replayed approval or a missing approval all fail closed. Nothing said by a webpage or a model can mint one.Deny always wins — even over a fresh approval — and an approval never authorizes a second, different action.
Audit: decisions, result states and redacted targets are appended to
audit.log(plaintext, local, size-capped with one rotation).Fail-closed: if the policy engine cannot decide, the action does not happen.
Reserved-but-unimplemented categories (shell, files, downloads/uploads, TTS) are
enforced deny at the policy layer. VPN control is implemented but deny by
default — you turn it on in your own profile. Nothing here secretly enables them.
Install
Requirements: Python 3.11+ (tested on 3.14), Windows (tested); macOS/Linux run the browser parts but are not verified here.
git clone https://github.com/you/body-mcp
cd body-mcp
python -m venv .venv
.venv\Scripts\Activate.ps1
pip install -e ".[dev]"
playwright install chromium
# Consent BEFORE protected actions (optional for read-only research):
python -m body_mcp.consent
python -m body_mcp.consent --acknowledge # writes consent.json + permissions.json
# Optional extras (the core stays light):
pip install -e ".[desktop]" # desktop capture + OCR (mss, pytesseract, Pillow)
pip install -e ".[voice]" # microphone + local STT (sounddevice, faster-whisper)
pip install -e ".[all]"
# Optional, for desktop OCR:
winget install -e --id UB-Mannheim.TesseractOCRDiagnostics (read-only — it never changes permissions, downloads a model or edits agent config):
python -m body_mcp.doctor # human-readable report
python -m body_mcp.doctor --json # machine-readableConnect your agent
# OpenCode
opencode mcp add body -- python -m body_mcp.server
# Claude Code
claude mcp add body -- python -m body_mcp.server
# Codex
codex mcp add body -- python -m body_mcp.serverOpenCode V2 config (mcp.servers; disabled replaces the old enabled key):
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"body": { "type": "local", "command": ["python", "-m", "body_mcp.server"] }
}
}
}Verified against opencode 2.2.6, claude 2.1.319, codex 0.167.0 on this
machine. OpenCode has no mcp remove — disconnect by deleting the body entry
from ~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc (back it up first).
See examples/research_prompt.md for a safe research prompt to your agent.
Driving the browser you already have open
Body-MCP can drive your Chrome/Edge tab instead of a Playwright-managed one. The connection is explicit and loopback-only:
# 1) YOU start the browser with a debug port (Body-MCP never does this for you)
python -m body_mcp.cdp_launch --browser chrome # add --port 9222
# Use --user-data-dir <temp> for a disposable profile while testing.
# 2) The agent asks for approval, then attaches
attach_browser(endpoint="http://127.0.0.1:9222") # lists your tabs (title/url only)
select_tab(selector="0") # or a unique url/title substring
... normal eyes_see_browser / hands_* tools now act on that tab ...
detach_browser() # closes OUR connection onlyRules that are enforced in code:
The endpoint must be
http://127.0.0.1|localhost|::1— a non-loopback host is refused.Attaching and selecting a tab each require their own scoped approval (
chrome_attachcapability). The spec you approve names the exact endpoint/tab.DevTools windows are never candidates; unselected tabs are never read or touched.
detach_browser()closes only our CDP session — your browser keeps running.The debug port is unauthenticated: while it is open, any local process can drive your browser. Restart the browser normally afterwards to drop the port.
Your own browser, honestly
Body-MCP can drive a browser it starts itself (python -m body_mcp.cdp_launch +
attach_browser()). It cannot drive the Edge/Chrome window you opened yourself:
since Chromium 136 the browser ignores --remote-debugging-port when the default
profile is used, so there is no endpoint to connect to (verified on this machine:
the process starts with the flag and the port still refuses connections).
What works today for your own window is read-only: body_windows() reports the
visible window titles (no content, no screenshots). Controlling your everyday window
needs the extension bridge - a Chromium extension attaching with chrome.debugger
after you click "Allow", over a validated native-messaging channel. That is the one
browser piece still to be built; everything else is in place.
Seeing (vision mode)
By default the eyes return text and structure - no pixels ever enter the model's context. That is the cheap, exact path for web pages. When text is not enough (a canvas, an image, a video frame, a game), ask for the pixels:
eyes_see_browser(url="…", screenshot=True) # text AND one downscaled image
eyes_see_desktop(as_image=True) # the screen/region as one image
desktop_watch_read(as_image=True) # the latest frame of a live sessionThe image is produced in memory, downscaled (max 1280 px wide) and compressed
(≤ 900 KB), delivered as an extra MCP content block next to the usual JSON, and never
stored. Details: docs/perception.md.
Hearing
ears_listen(seconds=8, stop_on_silence=True)Push-to-talk: the recording starts on request and ends shortly after you stop talking. The transcript comes back as editable text, with the fragments that were recognised at low confidence listed separately so you can ask the user to confirm them. Raw audio stays in memory and is zeroed after use.
Live desktop OCR
python scripts\acceptance_desktop.py # real window -> real capture -> real OCReyes_see_desktop(monitor=1)captures one screen (or aregion) and OCRs it.desktop_watch_start(interval=3)starts a live observation session: the screen is sampled and OCR'd only when the frame changed, in a worker thread, with the sampling interval growing automatically when memory is tight.desktop_watch_read()returns the latest observation;desktop_watch_stop()ends it.The OCR engine is discovered, never assumed: Tesseract by default (a packaged release may bundle it), RapidOCR optional. Without an engine you get the exact install command.
Screen content is returned on request and never written to disk, the audit log or memory.
Details, licences and the platform status: docs/ocr.md.
Downloading a release
python scripts\build_release.py # -> dist/*.zip + .sha256 + manifest.json
python scripts\build_release.py --list # the release matrixBody-MCP is MIT and free: no paid tier, no telemetry, no cloud account. See
docs/release.md for what was built and tested on which platform, and
THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md for the licences of everything that may be bundled.
Seeing what the body is doing (optional console)
# from inside an agent session:
body_console_start(port=8765) # returns http://127.0.0.1:8765/?token=...The console is a small local page showing the real executor events: task
lifecycle, the action that actually ran, verification results, blockers and
where your approval is needed. It can cancel the running task and disconnect the
browser. It binds to 127.0.0.1 only and requires the session token; the MCP
server works fine without it.
Persistent local memory
# search what the project already learned
memory_search("how do we run the tests?")
# store a verified lesson
memory_write(title="Browser refs are epoch-scoped", content="A ref from an older scan is refused as stale",
scope="project", type="decision", verified=True)
# human-editable Markdown notes
memory_note("conventions.md", "# Conventions\nRun `python -m pytest -q` before reporting done.")Everything is a local SQLite file (<config>/memory.db) plus Markdown notes in
<config>/notes/. Credentials are refused. Unverified lessons stay marked as
proposals. Privacy-session browsing never lands here.
Evidence-based research
research_collect(urls) fetches the listed pages in a throwaway context and
returns evidence records: source, URL, title, publication date, excerpt,
retrieval method, content hash, verification status and any limitation. Pages
behind a login, CAPTCHA, paywall or rate limit are reported as blocked — never
bypassed. Only the listed sources are fetched; the tool never claims a platform
was searched exhaustively.
Privacy sessions
privacy_session_start() opens an isolated, disposable browsing context. Its
URLs, titles and content are not written to the audit log, the event stream or
persistent memory; privacy_session_end() closes the context, discards its
cookies/storage and reports whether the cleanup was verified. Your ordinary
browser profile is never touched. This reduces local persistence — it is not
anonymity.
Two levels, and they are not the same thing:
private browsing (always on) — the browsing is local: own context, no cookies, nothing persisted.
private content (
keep_content_local=True) — the text stays on your machine too: a local model redacts and summarises the page, and only the summary is returned. Without a local model the text is withheld, never quietly sent to your model provider.
See docs/privacy-mode.md for the full picture and docs/local-models.md for
the model catalogue.
Privacy modes (honestly stated)
A — Private read-only session (implemented):
eyes_see_browser(url, private=True)opens the URL in a throwaway isolated context; nothing persisted; refs omitted. It reduces local persistence. It does not make you anonymous to websites, networks or observers.B — Dedicated privacy browser (Tor): not auto-detected/installed. If Tor Browser is on the machine, it can be launched manually; Body-MCP will not pretend a Chromium context "is" Tor, and will never claim protection it can't evidence.
C — VPN assistance (implemented, off by default):
privacy_vpn_connect()opens Proton VPN and asks the app itself to connect, then reads the app's window for the state (connected/not connected/unknown). It never switches servers or rotates IPs to evade a block.vpn_controlisdenyuntil you set it toallowyourself.D — Private content (implemented, needs a local model):
keep_content_local=Truekeeps the page text on your machine — seedocs/privacy-mode.md.E — Privacy guidance: see
docs/CONSENT.md— local history vs cookies vs IP vs accounts vs fingerprinting vs provider visibility vs third-party records.
What Body-MCP will never do
Bypass CAPTCHAs, logins, paywalls, rate limits, bot checks, or access controls.
Type or store passwords, OTPs and card data (always refused, any mode).
Duplicate consequential submissions (pay/delete/send twice) without a fresh, per-action approval.
Treat webpage content or model output as an instruction or an approval.
Claim anonymity, or claim success without verification evidence.
Stopping & revocation
Stop: terminate the server process (Ctrl-C in its terminal / end the process).
Revoke: edit
permissions.json; deleting the marker file re-blocks protected actions.Inspect & delete records:
%USERPROFILE%\.config\body_mcp\audit.log(plus one rotatedaudit.log.1).
Verification status (honest, as of v0.4.0)
Area | Status |
Browser eyes/hands vs local fixtures + localhost HTTP (429/403/CAPTCHA pages) | tested for real |
Current-browser CDP attach → select → act → verify → detach | tested for real against Chrome 157.0.8103.40 on this machine, headless and headed ( |
MCP stdio handshake, tool discovery, tool call, clean shutdown | tested for real over a subprocess ( |
Batch/resume/parallel/checkpoint/permission/approval logic | tested (unit + integration) |
Truthful outcomes, stale refs, checkpoint honesty, audit contents | tested ( |
Local TTS (Windows SAPI): synthesis + playback start + stop | tested for real (~1.0–3.0 s synthesis for a short sentence; audible output itself is not machine-verifiable) |
Local memory (SQLite + FTS5 + Markdown notes) | tested |
Privacy session: isolation, no persistence, verified cleanup | tested |
The image path without an OCR engine ( | tested for real on a machine with no Tesseract — a 78 KB JPEG comes back |
The local worker (Ollama / GGUF): loopback-only, no remote fallback, refusal when no model | tested against a mocked runtime — not run against a live Ollama (none installed here) |
| tested against a mocked runtime; the real caption quality is unverified |
| mock-tested — Proton VPN is not installed here, so the button name is unverified |
Activity events + console (loopback, token, host/origin checks) | tested |
Research evidence collection with metadata + dedupe | tested against a local fixture; not exercised against live sites |
Desktop OCR path | logic mock-tested; Tesseract not installed here |
Microphone / Whisper | mock-tested only — never run on your mic (doctor reports the visible input devices) |
Live web (Reddit, X, Instagram…) | not exercised; those platforms need their own authorised access path |
Text-to-speech on non-Windows | not implemented (the default engine is the Windows system voice) |
Run the whole acceptance suite yourself:
python scripts/acceptance.py # real checks, honest statuses
python scripts/acceptance.py --allow-mic # + a 5-second microphone recording
python scripts/campaign.py --runs 3 # the full QA campaign -> reports/qa-campaign/
python scripts/measure.py # startup, latency and payload sizesThe QA campaign results live in reports/qa-campaign/ (test-report.md,
test-matrix.csv, defects.md, environment-report.md).
Measured performance (scripts/benchmark.py, local fixtures, 5 reps each)
Mode | Verified ok | Median | p95 | Calls |
Sequential eyes→type→click→verify | 5/5 | ~399 ms | ~6904 ms* | 4 |
hands_batch (same task) | 5/5 | ~283 ms | ~655 ms | 2 |
hands_parallel (2 independent tasks, 1 call) | 5/5 | ~288 ms | ~567 ms | 1 |
Same 2 tasks sequentially | 5/5 | ~143 ms | ~161 ms | 4 |
* p90+ includes one Chromium cold start; batch cut MCP round-trips ~50%; parallel's context overhead only pays off on network-bound loads. Machine-dependent — run python scripts/benchmark.py yourself.
Support matrix (what is actually verified)
Platform | Browser (managed) | Browser (your tab, CDP) | Desktop OCR | Mic/STT | TTS | MCP client |
Windows 11 (this machine) | tested | tested (Chrome 157) | logic only (no Tesseract) | mock only | tested (SAPI) | opencode 2.2.6, claude 2.1.319, codex 0.167.0 |
macOS / Linux | code paths exist, not run | code paths exist, not run | not verified | not verified | not implemented | MCP-standard, unverified |
Docs
docs/architecture.md— modules and flowsdocs/safety.md— the safety spine: enforced in code vs documentation-onlydocs/CONSENT.md— user consent and responsible usedocs/install.md— detailed setupdocs/opencode.md— OpenCode setup, first-run checks, troubleshootingexamples/research_prompt.md— a safe research prompt for your agentAGENTS.md— the standing rules for agents using Body-MCP
Contributing / License
MIT. See LICENSE. Keep the body small, honest and fail-closed.
Available Tools
78 toolsattach_browserA
Connect to your CURRENT Chrome/Edge tab via CDP (loopback only).
Requires Chrome/Edge running with --remote-debugging-port (launch: python -m body_mcp.cdp_launch). Requires your acknowledged consent + a scoped reflex_ask approval for exactly this action.
Without tab: lists your real tabs (index, title, url) and keeps the session open.
With tab: attaches directly to that tab (index, or unique url/title substring).
DevTools windows are never candidates; unselected tabs are never touched.
The CDP port is unauthenticated-loopback: detach when done and restart the browser normally.
Inputs: endpoint (required), tab.
body_cancelA
Request cancellation of the running task (or a specific task_id).
Cancellation is cooperative: the executor stops at the next step boundary and reports CANCELLED. It never pretends the cancelled work was done.
Inputs: task_id.
body_console_startA
Start the optional local Body Console (activity timeline + cancel/disconnect).
Binds to 127.0.0.1 only and requires a session token; the returned URL contains it. The console shows REAL executor events — tasks, actions, verifications, blockers — and never page content. Stop it with body_console_stop().
Inputs: port.
body_console_stopA
Stop the local Body Console (if running).
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_eventsA
Read the real execution event stream (task lifecycle, actions, verifications, blockers).
Events are emitted by the executor itself, not by the model. Use it to report what actually happened, and to notice when the user must act (approval, CAPTCHA, login).
Inputs: limit, since.
body_lessonsA
What we already learned from failures - read it BEFORE repeating an attempt.
Every failed action leaves a proposed lesson (root cause + likely fix). These are the lessons that apply to a tool or an error code, newest first.
Inputs: tool, limit, error_code.
body_local_modelsA
The local-model catalogue and what THIS machine can run.
Sizes and SHA-256 are the published ones, so a download can be verified before it is used. The ranking uses the measured free RAM - it never suggests a model that would not fit. Nothing is downloaded: you choose, you fetch it, you point BODY_MCP_LOCAL_MODEL at it.
Inputs: role, uncensored, multilingual.
body_local_workerA
Process text (or an image) ON THIS MACHINE with a local model. Nothing leaves.
task: summarise | extract | redact | key | classify | describe text: the text to process. image: base64 PNG/JPEG - only for task='describe' (the eyes for a text-only brain). Take it from eyes_see_desktop(as_image=True) or desktop_watch_read(as_image=True).
This is the private mode's content half: the page text goes to a model running
on your machine, so only a short redacted summary ever leaves. It needs Ollama
(ollama pull qwen3:0.6b) or a GGUF via BODY_MCP_LOCAL_MODEL - Body-MCP never
downloads a model and NEVER falls back to a remote provider: with no local
model it says so and stops. 'describe' additionally needs a local VISION model
(e.g. ollama pull gemma3:270m): a text-only model would invent a caption, so
it refuses instead.
Inputs: task, text, image.
body_modelsB
Catalogue the model/harness backends available on this machine, with what each can do, its licence, privacy and cost. Read-only; installs nothing.
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_open_externalA
Open a URL in the USER'S OWN browser (a new tab), not in Body-MCP's browser.
Use it when the task says "open it in my browser". browser: "" = the operating system default, or one of chrome | edge | brave | firefox to pick the browser explicitly. Only http/https are handed over (no shell, no command strings) and the browser executable comes from a fixed table. Body-MCP's own Chromium stays separate - it is the controlled one.
Inputs: url (required), browser.
body_privacy_preflightA
Check the privacy posture BEFORE a private session starts.
Reports: which browsers are installed, whether the VPN app is installed and open, whether a LOCAL model is configured, the free RAM, and the warnings - including the one about your reasoning model still being remote (a warning, never a block). It changes nothing and asks for no IP unless you ask for it.
Inputs: show_ip.
body_profileB
Read-only capability inventory of this machine (OS, CPU, RAM, disk, GPU, optional modules, agent CLIs, local speech models).
Nothing is installed or downloaded, nothing private is crawled, nothing is uploaded. The result is cached locally and can be cleared.
Inputs: refresh.
body_recommendB
Dry-run recommendation: which installed backend fits a task best, and why.
Needs: e.g. ["tools", "vision", "audio", "structured_output"]. Never downloads or launches anything - it only ranks what is already here.
Inputs: needs, max_ram_mb, offline_only.
body_role_finishC
Close a role contract with the evidence it produced.
Inputs: role_id (required), evidence, verified.
body_rolesB
The team: each role's tools, permission and what it must produce.
The roles are responsibilities, not separate models - the connected agent is the orchestrator and the brain; the body executes each contract.
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_role_startC
Open a contract for one role: its tools, its budget and what it must produce.
Inputs: goal (required), role (required), max_actions, max_seconds.
body_similarity_checkB
Is this new content actually new? Compare it with what was produced before.
Used for adapted execution: keep the method, change the content. Reports the highest similarity found (token overlap and sequence ratio) and a verdict.
Inputs: text (required), previous.
body_skill_listC
The skills we know: name, goal, why, steps and whether they were verified.
Inputs: limit.
body_skill_replayB
Do exactly the same thing again: replay a verified skill's steps, in order.
Same targets, same content, same permission gate, same verification - this is the 'copy paste the same' path. Unverified skills are refused until someone checks them.
Inputs: skill_id (required), task_id.
body_skill_saveB
Save a procedure you learned from your own work, so it can be replayed.
steps: the same action schema hands_batch uses (click/type/fill/goto/verify...). why: what you learned and why it works - this is the part that makes it a skill and not a script. verified: only true if the result was actually checked. An unverified skill stays a proposal and is never replayed blindly.
Inputs: goal (required), name (required), steps (required), why, +2 more.
body_speakA
Speak text with the LOCAL system voice (Windows SAPI - no download, no network).
Playback runs in the background and can be stopped with body_stop_speaking(). Typed chat stays fully usable without this; the tool never sends audio anywhere.
Inputs: text (required), voice.
body_statusB
Real capability states: what is importable, launched, blocked, or not configured — never claimed as 'verified' without a real check.
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_stop_allA
STOP EVERYTHING: cancel the running background tasks and close the open contracts.
This is the panic button - it never touches your files, only the work in flight.
Inputs: reason.
body_stop_speakingA
Stop the local speech playback started by body_speak().
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_task_cancelB
Cancel a background task (it stops at the next step boundary).
Inputs: task_id (required).
body_task_startA
Start a LONG batch in the background and get a task id straight away.
The agent keeps working while the body carries on (own isolated context, never the page you are using). Poll body_task_status(task_id) for progress, or body_task_cancel(task_id) to stop it. Small jobs should just use hands_batch - this is for the slow ones.
Inputs: actions (required).
body_task_statusB
Progress of a background task: steps done, percent, elapsed, last evidence.
Inputs: task_id.
body_undoA
Undo the most recent reversible change (a typed value, a navigation).
Irreversible steps are NOT undone - the journal says so instead of pretending.
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_undo_listC
What the body changed and whether it can be undone.
Inputs: limit.
body_voice_enginesA
Which speech-to-text and text-to-speech engines this machine can use.
Nothing is downloaded and nothing is loaded: this only reports what is already installed, which model files are present, and what each engine would cost in memory. The default text-to-speech engine is the Windows system voice.
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_windowsA
See which windows are open right now (titles only - no content, no screenshots).
This is read-only and needs no debug port, so it works even for a browser you started yourself. It CANNOT drive those windows: for that the browser needs a sanctioned connection (a debug port on a separate profile, or the extension bridge).
Inputs: no named parameters.
body_workflow_noteB
Add one step to the workflow ledger.
kind: observation | decision | action | verification | blocker | lesson | note | approval. Write the decision BEFORE the action, and the verification AFTER it - that order is what makes the run auditable.
Inputs: kind (required), text (required), workflow_id (required), evidence.
body_workflow_reportA
The evidence-backed report of a workflow (empty id = the latest one).
Shows the goal, what was observed, what was decided, what was done, what was verified and what blocked it - so the final answer cites evidence, not impressions.
Inputs: workflow_id.
body_workflow_startA
Open an execution ledger for one goal: EYES -> BRAIN -> HANDS -> VERIFY.
Record every step with body_workflow_note(): what you SAW (observation), what you DECIDED and why (decision), what the body DID (action), what PROVED it worked (verification). The ledger is what the final report is built from - evidence instead of memory. The decision stays yours; the body only records it.
Inputs: goal (required).
browser_bridgeB
Drive the browser the USER has open, through their extension.
action: status | connect | tabs | navigate | read | screenshot | disconnect. The user connects a tab in the extension (one click, with Chromium's own "debugging this browser" bar); Body-MCP then acts only on that tab. Nothing is read or navigated before the user connects it.
Inputs: url, action.
demo_learnA
Learn a workflow from a screen recording and turn it into a skill DRAFT.
Frames are extracted (ffmpeg/opencv if installed), the screen text is read with OCR - or, when no OCR engine is installed, described by a LOCAL vision model - changed frames become steps, and the unclear parts become questions for you. The result is a draft, not a verified skill - answer the questions first.
video_path may also be a FOLDER of images (PNG/JPG): extract the frames yourself and hand the folder over - no decoder needed.
Blocked honestly when there is neither a decoder (or a folder), nor an OCR engine, nor a local vision model.
Inputs: video_path (required), name, max_frames.
desktop_clickA
Click a control in a native Windows window, by its visible name.
Uses UI Automation's Invoke pattern - not blind coordinates - so nothing is clicked by accident. Needs the desktop_control permission (default: ask).
Inputs: title (required), control (required).
desktop_inspectB
Look inside a native Windows window: its controls (name, type, position, state).
This is the desktop equivalent of eyes_see_browser - it reads the real UI tree through Windows UI Automation, so controls are found by their visible name. Reading is allowed; acting on the window needs the desktop_control permission.
Inputs: title.
desktop_monitorsB
List the connected screens and which OCR engines are usable on this machine.
Inputs: no named parameters.
desktop_read_valueB
Read the current value of a field in a native window (the verification step).
Inputs: title (required), control (required).
desktop_typeA
Type into a field of a native Windows window, by its visible name.
Password-like fields are refused - the user types those. Needs the desktop_control permission (default: ask).
Inputs: text (required), title (required), control (required).
desktop_watch_readB
Read the latest observation of a live desktop session.
Returns the recognised screen text (bounded), when it was observed, whether it
changed since since, and how many frames were skipped as unchanged.
Inputs: since, as_image, session_id.
desktop_watch_startA
Start a LIVE desktop observation session (explicit user request only).
The screen is sampled every interval seconds and OCR'd only when the frame
actually changed, so an idle screen costs almost nothing. OCR runs off the MCP
event loop. Screen content is returned on request and NEVER written to disk,
the audit log or memory. Poll desktop_watch_read() for the latest observation
(MCP has no push channel) - the console shows the same events.
ocr=False watch the screen as IMAGES instead of text: frames are still captured and compared, but nothing is recognised. Use it when no OCR engine is installed and a vision model will look at the frames (desktop_watch_read(as_image=True)).
Inputs: ocr, region, monitor, interval, +2 more.
desktop_watch_stopC
Stop a live desktop observation session and release its resources.
Inputs: session_id.
detach_browserA
Disconnect the CDP bridge. NEVER closes your browser or tabs. Restart the browser normally afterwards to drop the debug port.
Inputs: no named parameters.
ears_listenA
Hear the user through the microphone (push-to-talk).
Records locally, transcribes locally, and NEVER stores or transmits raw audio. With stop_on_silence=True the recording ends shortly after the user stops talking (like a push-to-talk button); the transcript comes back with the fragments that were recognised with LOW confidence so you can ask the user to confirm them. The transcript is editable: send it, edit it, or ignore it.
Inputs: seconds, stop_on_silence.
eyes_see_browserA
See the browser page: title, headings, visible text, links, buttons, inputs and forms. Interactive elements get stable refs (btn_1, input_2, link_3) usable by hands_*. If private=True: the URL is opened in a throwaway isolated context (fresh cookies/storage), read-only, refs omitted, context always closed — weaker local persistence, NOT anonymity. screenshot=True attaches ONE downscaled image of the page (vision mode, on request). Restricted pages (CAPTCHA, rate limit, paywall, access denial) are reported, never bypassed.
Inputs: url, private, screenshot.
eyes_see_desktopA
See the desktop: capture a screen (or a region) and OCR its visible text.
Screenshots are processed in memory and never written to disk. The OCR engine is
discovered, never assumed: without one you get the exact install command instead of
a silent failure. region = [left, top, width, height] in physical pixels.
as_image=True attaches ONE downscaled image of the screen (vision mode, on request).
Inputs: region, monitor, as_image, language, +1 more.
hands_batchA
Execute a declared sequence of browser actions in ONE request.
Actions: goto, click, fill, press, scroll, wait_for, verify_text, verify_url, screenshot. Validate-then-execute; stop on first failure (or on_failure='continue' for SAFE steps only); per-step and total timeouts; consequential clicks still require fresh approval per step; no JavaScript/Python/shell escape hatches; duplicate consequential submissions refused.
Verification outcomes (in result): completed | failed | blocked | needs_user | retry_scheduled. Never reports success without verification evidence.
resume_from=<checkpoint_id>: re-inspect the page and resume from the last verified step — never blindly replays; redacted steps need fresh explicit text. task_id=: run as the SAME task (use the task_id from a previous needs_user result when re-running after approval — scoped approvals are bound to it).
Inputs: actions (required), task_id, on_failure, deadline_ms, +1 more.
hands_clickA
Click a browser element by ref (btn_1/input_2/link_3) or unique visible text. Dangerous buttons require a fresh reflex_ask() approval — one approval, one click.
Inputs: target (required).
hands_openB
Open a URL in Chromium (http/https/file-under-CWD only; credentials-in-URL refused). Respects per-service rate-limit cooldowns and stops at access restrictions.
Inputs: url (required).
hands_parallelA
Run INDEPENDENT browser tasks on isolated pages (default max 2 concurrent).
tasks: [{"id"?, "actions": [], "on_failure"?, "deadline_ms"?}] Rules: isolated contexts per task; NO snapshot refs across tasks (use unique visible text / label / placeholder / name); consequential actions are refused in parallel mode — run them via hands_batch with reflex_ask approval; per-service cooldowns are shared; per-task and overall deadlines; contexts always cleaned up.
Inputs: tasks (required), max_concurrency.
hands_pressC
Press a key or chord, e.g. 'Enter', 'Tab', 'Escape', 'Control+A'.
Inputs: key (required).
hands_scrollC
Scroll the browser page. direction: up|down. amount: 1-50.
Inputs: direction (required), amount.
hands_typeB
Clear and type into a field by ref (or unique label/placeholder/name). Refuses password/OTP/card fields — the user must type those.
Inputs: text (required), field_ref (required).
legs_open_appA
Launch an allowlisted installed application (e.g. 'notepad'). The allowlist lives in YOUR permissions.json (allowed_applications) — empty by default. Launching requires the app in your allowlist plus a fresh reflex_ask() approval.
Inputs: application (required).
list_tabsA
List the candidate tabs of an ALREADY-ATTACHED CDP session (index/title/url only). Read-only; requires nothing beyond a completed attach_browser().
Inputs: no named parameters.
memory_deleteB
Delete one memory by id, or every memory in a scope (destructive).
Inputs: scope, memory_id.
memory_exportC
Export memories as JSON and Markdown (readable, portable, local).
Inputs: scope, project.
memory_listC
List stored memories, newest first, optionally filtered by scope/project.
Inputs: limit, scope, project.
memory_noteB
Write a human-editable Markdown note (project instructions, conventions).
Notes live in /notes/*.md, are included in memory_search, and can be edited directly in your editor. Credentials are refused.
Inputs: filename (required), markdown (required).
memory_searchC
Search persistent local memory (project notes, verified fixes, limitations, preferences).
Memory is a local SQLite file - nothing leaves this machine. Unverified entries are proposals, not facts; pass include_unverified=False to get only verified ones.
Inputs: limit, query, scope, project, +1 more.
memory_writeB
Store one durable memory.
Scopes: project | workflow | capability | user | knowledge | research. Credentials are refused - store the fact, never the secret. Use verified=True only when you actually verified the claim.
Inputs: title (required), content (required), tags, type, +5 more.
privacy_session_endA
End a privacy session: close its context, discard its cookies/storage and VERIFY the cleanup. Your ordinary browser profile is never touched.
Inputs: session_id (required).
privacy_session_openB
Open a URL inside a privacy session. Access controls are still enforced - a login, CAPTCHA or paywall stops the session, it is never bypassed.
Inputs: url (required), session_id (required).
privacy_session_snapshotC
Read the current page of a privacy session (bounded text, no refs, not stored).
Inputs: session_id (required).
privacy_session_startA
Start a privacy session (own throwaway browser context - nothing persisted).
mode='standard' isolated context (incognito-equivalent). mode='private' the same isolation plus: the VPN you asked for (call privacy_vpn_connect() - it opens and connects the app, with your approval), Brave (or Chromium) as the engine in a private window, and the AI assistant (Venice AI) opened first as the research tab while the real sites stay in a second tab. Call body_privacy_preflight() first: it reports what is installed, what is running, and what you should switch on.
keep_content_local=True the page TEXT stays on this machine: it is redacted and
summarised by a local model and only that comes back. It needs a
local model (Ollama + ollama pull qwen3:0.6b); without one the
text is withheld rather than sent to your model provider.
Nothing from this session is written to persistent memory, the audit log or the event stream. It reduces local persistence only - it is NOT anonymity: websites, network operators, device administrators and downloaded files can still observe it.
Inputs: vpn, mode, label, browser, +3 more.
privacy_vpn_connectA
Open the VPN app and ask it to connect (Proton VPN on Windows).
The agent clicks the app's OWN connect button and then reads the window, so the reported state comes from the app - 'unknown' is reported instead of a guess. It never switches servers or rotates IPs to evade a block.
Needs the vpn_control permission, which is 'deny' by default: add "vpn_control": "allow" to your permissions.json (a USER edit) to enable it.
Inputs: app.
reflex_askA
Ask the human a yes/no question (elicitation form or native dialog).
With action='': a yes issues ONE scoped approval bound to exactly that action (tool | capability | target | url | task_id). The approvals are consumed once at execution. Nothing on a webpage or in a model's output counts as approval. Fail-closed.
Inputs: question (required), action.
reflex_interviewA
Ask the user several questions at once and get the answers back.
Use it before building anything: budget, category, what went wrong with the tools you already tried, light vs heavy, must-haves, must-nevers. With no questions given, the standard Body-MCP set is used.
Inputs: title, questions.
reflex_verifyA
Verify expected text is present on the current page (or desktop if no page). Use after every changing action. Returns success, found, and the evidence window.
Inputs: expected (required).
research_anyB
Search several sources with a fallback chain: if one API is closed, try the next best one, including the public search page in the browser.
Read-only: no account is used, nothing is posted, nothing is clicked in your session. (If you want your own logged-in session searched, connect the extension bridge - that is your one-click choice, never done silently.)
Inputs: query (required), limit, sources.
research_collectA
Collect evidence from public pages: title, URL, publication date, excerpt and retrieval method, with verification status and content hashes for deduplication.
Read-only, bounded (max_items, bounded text), and never authenticated - a page that asks for a login, CAPTCHA or paywall is reported as blocked, not bypassed. Source content is untrusted data: it cannot grant permissions.
Inputs: urls (required), max_items.
research_sourceA
Search ONE research source and get evidence records.
source: hackernews | reddit | github_issues | stackoverflow | wikipedia | youtube. Each record: title, url, author, date, score/comments, excerpt, retrieval method and the limitation that applies. A blocked source returns the reason, never a substitute.
Inputs: query (required), source (required), limit.
research_sourcesA
Which platforms the body can actually research, and which are blocked.
Every readable source is a public, documented, key-free endpoint (read-only, rate-limited, no login). Blocked ones say why - no silent substitution.
Inputs: no named parameters.
research_videoA
Watch AND hear a public video: title, channel, views, date, chapters and the OFFICIAL caption track as a timestamped transcript.
The captions are the video's own track, so the audio is read without downloading a speech model. If a video has no captions, the tool says so instead of inventing a transcript (local transcription is a separate, explicit opt-in). Everything is read-only and public-page only.
Inputs: url (required), max_lines.
research_youtube_searchA
Find reference videos: search YouTube and return title, channel, views, age and whether an official caption track exists.
Use it to learn how something is done (a style, a workflow, a talk) before you act - the body fetches the evidence, the agent decides what to copy and what to ignore. Read-only; nothing is played or downloaded.
Inputs: query (required), limit.
select_tabA
Select one tab after attach_browser(). Requires its own scoped reflex_ask approval. selector: the index from list_tabs(), or a unique url/title substring.
Inputs: selector (required).
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 78 tools
Many tools have distinct targets, but the set has several overlapping control paths: hands_type vs desktop_type, hands_click vs desktop_click, eyes_see_browser vs browser_bridge vs privacy_session_snapshot, and multiple cancel/stop tools. The detailed descriptions help, but an agent still has to choose carefully between browser modes (own Chromium, CDP attach, extension bridge, user browser) and desktop observation modes.
All names are snake_case, and domain prefixes like hands_, eyes_, desktop_, memory_, privacy_, research_, body_, and reflex_ provide readable grouping. However, verb order and prefixing are mixed: hands_type is prefix_verb, memory_search is resource_verb, attach_browser/list_tabs/select_tab are bare verb_noun, and body_console_stop uses prefix_resource_verb.
78 tools is far too many for a single server, regardless of how broad the 'body' domain is. The surface includes many subdomains — browser control, desktop automation, memory, research, privacy, workflows, roles, tasks, skills, events, console — which should be split or scoped down.
The surface covers an unusually broad lifecycle: browser/desktop perception and action, memory CRUD/search/export, privacy sessions, research collection, background tasks, workflows, skills, roles, approvals, and undo. Minor gaps exist, such as no task listing and no skill deletion/update, but most workflows have enough coverage to avoid hard dead ends.
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