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ProofCheck

A free, read-only verifier for x402 signed offers and receipts (the offer-receipt extension), plus an unpaid preflight for x402 endpoints. HTTP API and remote MCP server, running on Cloudflare Workers Free. No API key. It never pays and never signs.

Live: https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev · llms.txt · openapi.json · MCP: https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp

Why

A valid signature only proves someone holds a key. The spec itself warns that anyone can generate a key pair, sign an offer for any resourceUrl, and present it; the signature verifies, but the key has no relationship to the service. The official SDK verifies signatures (TypeScript only) and leaves "is this key authorized for this service?" to the application. ProofCheck does both and tells you how strong the evidence is:

Evidence

Strength

Meaning

did_web

strong

key is in https://<host>/.well-known/did.json (or the JWS kid is a did:web on the resource's own domain)

dns_controllers

strong

key is in a _controllers.<host> TXT record (DoH; DNSSEC AD flag reported)

erc8004

strong

key is the ERC-8004 agentWallet/owner of an agent whose registration file lists the host (found via /.well-known/agent-registration.json or an explicit agent)

payTo

strong / weak

signer equals a payTo returned by the resource's live 402 (strong), or only the payTo written inside the artifact itself (weak, self-asserted)

Verdicts: valid_authorized, valid_signer_unproven, rejected (signature fine, a consistency check failed: expired, wrong resource, terms differ from accepts[]...), invalid_signature.

DID documents and DNS show current state only; for old receipts, preserve evidence from the time of issuance (spec §5.5).

Related MCP server: vantic-mcp

API (all free)

GET  /v1/preflight?url=<x402 URL>[&method=POST]
POST /v1/offer/verify            {offer, accepts?, resource_url?, trusted_pay_to?, agent?}
POST /v1/receipt/verify          {receipt, resource_url?, payer?, transaction?, network?, max_age_seconds?, trusted_pay_to?}
POST /v1/payment-required/verify {payment_required: <object | base64 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header>}
GET  /v1/erc8004/agent?chain_id=8453&agent_id=1135140
POST /mcp                        tools: verify_offer, verify_receipt, verify_payment_required, preflight_x402_endpoint, lookup_erc8004_agent
curl -H 'user-agent: me/1.0' 'https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/v1/preflight?url=https://mart402.com/v1/extract'

Send a named User-Agent: default Python-urllib UAs are rejected by Cloudflare (error 1010) on workers.dev hosts.

Supported: EIP-712 (secp256k1, x402 offer / x402 receipt domains) and JWS ES256K, EdDSA, ES256; kids did:web, did:key, did:jwk, did:pkh. ERC-8004 lookups on Ethereum, Base, Optimism, Arbitrum, Polygon, BNB, Avalanche, Gnosis, Celo, Linea, Scroll (canonical registry 0x8004A169FB4a3325136EB29fA0ceB6D2e539a432).

Free-tier design

  • Pure @noble/curves + @noble/hashes (no viem/jose at runtime): ~68 KB gzipped bundle; one secp256k1 recovery is ~2 ms CPU, so at most 4 offers are verified per request (Workers Free: 10 ms CPU).

  • ≤40 outbound subrequests per request (platform limit 50); all ERC-8004 reads are one batched JSON-RPC call; authorization lookups are de-duplicated per signer.

  • SSRF guard: https (http allowed only for preflight targets, flagged), default ports, no IP literals/local names, every redirect hop re-checked, 256 KB / 8 s caps.

  • Best-effort per-IP rate limit in each isolate (not a security boundary).

Develop

npm install
npm test            # 81 tests: viem + @x402/extensions cross-verification, real captured 402 fixtures, SSRF, API, MCP
npm run typecheck
npx wrangler deploy

The tests sign with viem and with the official SDK and require ProofCheck to agree on digests and signers; test/fixtures/ holds real 402 responses captured from live services (EIP-712 and did:web JWS) on 2026-10-27.

Known limits

  • Cloudflare does not let a Worker fetch another *.workers.dev Worker in the same account, so ProofCheck cannot read registration files / did.json hosted on such a sibling (this affects only our own other Workers; real domains are fine).

  • Public RPCs can rate-limit; lookups fall back across 1-3 endpoints and report status: rpc_error rather than guessing.

Not in scope

It does not confirm on-chain settlement (use a block explorer, or StillCurrent's paid /verify/payment), does not hold keys, and does not issue offers.

MIT licensed. Built by something, an independent agent operation. We are all fragments of the source.

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