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SignDocs Brasil MCP Server

SignDocs Brasil MCP Server

Official

SignDocs Brasil — MCP Server

A Model Context Protocol server for the SignDocs Brasil e-signature API. It lets MCP-capable AI clients (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, …) create signing sessions, manage multi-signer envelopes, upload/download documents, verify signatures, and manage webhooks — the same action catalog as the official n8n, Zapier, and Make.com integrations.

It is a thin adapter over the official @signdocs-brasil/api SDK, which owns OAuth2 token exchange, caching, retries, and error handling.

Install

npm install -g @signdocs-brasil/mcp-server   # or run on demand with npx

Related MCP server: Assinafy MCP Server

Credentials

Create an API credential in the SignDocs dashboard (app.signdocs.com.br → API) and expose it as environment variables:

Variable

Required

Default

Notes

SIGNDOCS_CLIENT_ID

yes

—

OAuth2 client id

SIGNDOCS_CLIENT_SECRET

yes

—

OAuth2 client secret

SIGNDOCS_ENVIRONMENT

no

hml

hml (staging) or production

SIGNDOCS_BASE_URL

no

derived

override the resolved base URL

SIGNDOCS_SCOPES

no

full set

space-separated scope override

Start in hml. HML data expires after ~7 days and is safe for testing. Switch to production only when you intend to create real, legally-binding signatures.

Connect an AI client

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "signdocs": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@signdocs-brasil/mcp-server"],
      "env": {
        "SIGNDOCS_CLIENT_ID": "your_client_id",
        "SIGNDOCS_CLIENT_SECRET": "your_client_secret",
        "SIGNDOCS_ENVIRONMENT": "hml"
      }
    }
  }
}

Claude Code:

claude mcp add signdocs \
  -e SIGNDOCS_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id \
  -e SIGNDOCS_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret \
  -e SIGNDOCS_ENVIRONMENT=hml \
  -- npx -y @signdocs-brasil/mcp-server

Tools

Tool

Action

Safety

create_signing_session

Create single-signer session, returns signingUrl

⚠️ binding + quota

get_signing_session_status

Poll session status

read

get_signing_session

Full session bootstrap

read

list_signing_sessions

List by status

read

cancel_signing_session

Cancel a session

⚠️ irreversible

resend_signing_session_otp

Resend OTP

write

create_envelope

Multi-signer envelope

⚠️ binding + quota

get_envelope

Envelope details

read

add_session_to_envelope

Add a signer, returns signingUrl

⚠️ binding + quota

get_envelope_combined_stamp

Combined stamped PDF URL

read

upload_document

Attach a PDF to a transaction

write

download_document

Presigned download URLs

read

list_transactions

Search/list transactions

read

get_transaction

Transaction details

read

cancel_transaction

Cancel a transaction

⚠️ irreversible

get_evidence

Cryptographic evidence

read

verify_evidence

Public evidence verification

read

verify_envelope

Public envelope verification

read

verify_document

Detect signatures in a PDF

⚠️ PROD-only + quota

register_webhook / list_webhooks / delete_webhook / test_webhook

Webhook management

mixed

⚠️ tools carry destructiveHint annotations and a warning in their description so compliant clients prompt the human before invoking them. Annotations are only hints — review your client's auto-approval settings.

Not yet exposed

Trust sessions (/v1/trust-sessions) and resend-invite are not in @signdocs-brasil/api v1.6.1 yet; they'll be added when the SDK supports them. Digital ICP-Brasil A1 signing runs through the lower-level transaction/advance flow rather than a hosted-session profile.

Resources

The server exposes grounding resources the model can read on demand:

  • signdocs://quickstart — the minimal signing flow + safety notes

  • signdocs://policy-profiles — valid policyProfile values and CUSTOM steps

  • signdocs://webhook-events — all subscribable event types

Remote HTTP transport (multi-tenant)

The same tools are also served over Streamable HTTP so a single deployment can serve many AI agents/tenants — each authenticates per session with its own SignDocs credentials (no shared secret baked into the server).

npm run start:http        # or: signdocs-mcp-http   (listens on PORT, default 3000)
# or containerized:
docker build -t signdocs-mcp . && docker run -p 3000:3000 signdocs-mcp

Endpoint: POST /mcp (Streamable HTTP). Auth is required on the MCP initialize request, via the Authorization header:

  • Authorization: Bearer <token> — a SignDocs OAuth2 access token (from /oauth2/token), passed straight through to the API.

  • Authorization: Basic base64(clientId:clientSecret) — the server runs the client_credentials exchange for you.

  • X-SignDocs-Client-Id + X-SignDocs-Client-Secret — the same client credentials as two plain headers (no base64), for header-only clients that can't transform values.

Pick the environment per session with X-SignDocs-Environment: hml|production (defaults to the server's configured default).

The server behaves as an OAuth 2.0 Resource Server: it serves GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728, pointing at the SignDocs authorization server) and answers an unauthenticated initialize with 401 + WWW-Authenticate. The SignDocs API remains the authoritative token validator. GET /healthz is an unauthenticated health probe.

Example client config (Bearer):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "signdocs-remote": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://your-host.example/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer <signdocs_access_token>",
        "X-SignDocs-Environment": "hml"
      }
    }
  }
}

Server env vars: PORT, HOST, SIGNDOCS_ENVIRONMENT (default env), MCP_PUBLIC_URL (for resource metadata behind a proxy), MCP_CORS_ORIGIN, MCP_DNS_REBINDING_PROTECTION=true + MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS / MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS (recommended in production).

Sessions are held in process memory, so run a single instance or use sticky routing. For multi-instance/serverless, front it with sticky sessions or swap the session map for a shared store + EventStore (resumability). Deploying onto the existing external-api Lambda + API Gateway as a NestedStack is the intended production path.

AWS Lambda

For serverless hosting, @signdocs-brasil/mcp-server/lambda exports createLambdaHandler — an API Gateway HTTP API v2 handler that runs the MCP transport statelessly (one server per invocation, no session store), with the same Bearer/Basic auth. SignDocs hosts this on mcp-hml.signdocs.com.br / mcp.signdocs.com.br.

import { createLambdaHandler } from '@signdocs-brasil/mcp-server/lambda';
export const handler = createLambdaHandler({ defaultEnvironment: 'hml' });

Development

npm install
npm run build      # tsc → dist/
npm test           # vitest (pure unit tests, no network)
npm run inspect    # build + launch MCP Inspector against the stdio server

Roadmap

  • v0.1: local stdio server, full tool catalog, env credentials.

  • v0.2 (this release): remote Streamable-HTTP transport with per-session, per-tenant auth (Bearer passthrough or Basic client-credentials) and OAuth Resource Server discovery. Tool layer is shared between both transports.

  • Next: deploy the HTTP transport onto external-api (Lambda + API Gateway NestedStack); optional edge JWT validation + shared-store sessions for horizontal scale.

Available Tools

24 tools
add_session_to_envelopeAdd signer to envelopeA
Destructive
Inspect

⚠️ This performs a consequential, possibly irreversible action (legally-binding signature request and/or quota consumption). Confirm with the human before calling. Add a signing session for one signer to an envelope. Returns IDs plus a ready-to-share signingUrl.

Inputs: signer (required), envelopeId (required), signerIndex (required), policyProfile (required), +4 more.

cancel_signing_sessionCancel signing sessionA
Destructive
Inspect

⚠️ This performs a consequential, possibly irreversible action (legally-binding signature request and/or quota consumption). Confirm with the human before calling. Cancel an active signing session. This cannot be undone.

Inputs: sessionId (required).

cancel_transactionCancel transactionA
Destructive
Inspect

⚠️ This performs a consequential, possibly irreversible action (legally-binding signature request and/or quota consumption). Confirm with the human before calling. Cancel a low-level transaction. This cannot be undone.

Inputs: transactionId (required).

create_envelopeCreate envelopeA
Destructive
Inspect

⚠️ This performs a consequential, possibly irreversible action (legally-binding signature request and/or quota consumption). Confirm with the human before calling. Create a multi-signer envelope around one PDF. After creating, add each signer with add_session_to_envelope. Consumes quota.

Inputs: signingMode (required), totalSigners (required), owner, locale, +9 more.

create_signing_sessionCreate signing sessionA
Destructive
Inspect

⚠️ This performs a consequential, possibly irreversible action (legally-binding signature request and/or quota consumption). Confirm with the human before calling. Create a single-signer "express" signing (or action-authentication) session and return its IDs plus a ready-to-share signingUrl (url + embed token). Consumes signature quota.

Inputs: signer (required), purpose (required), policyProfile (required), owner, +12 more.

delete_webhookDelete webhookA
Destructive
Inspect

⚠️ This performs a consequential, possibly irreversible action (legally-binding signature request and/or quota consumption). Confirm with the human before calling. Delete a registered webhook. Event delivery to it stops immediately.

Inputs: webhookId (required).

download_documentDownload documentA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Get presigned download URLs for a transaction’s document and signed artifacts.

Inputs: transactionId (required).

get_envelopeGet envelopeA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Get envelope details including per-signer session summaries and completion counts.

Inputs: envelopeId (required).

get_envelope_combined_stampGet envelope combined stampA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Generate the combined stamped PDF (all signers) for a COMPLETED envelope and return a download URL.

Inputs: envelopeId (required).

get_evidenceGet evidenceA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Retrieve the cryptographic evidence (hashes, step proofs, evidenceId) for a completed transaction.

Inputs: transactionId (required).

get_signing_sessionGet signing session detailsA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Get full bootstrap data for a signing session (signer, steps, document, appearance).

Inputs: sessionId (required).

get_signing_session_statusGet signing session statusA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Poll the current status of a signing session (ACTIVE/COMPLETED/CANCELLED/EXPIRED/FAILED).

Inputs: sessionId (required).

get_transactionGet transactionA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Get full details of a single transaction, including its steps and results.

Inputs: transactionId (required).

list_signing_sessionsList signing sessionsA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

List signing sessions filtered by status, with cursor pagination.

Inputs: status (required), limit, cursor.

list_transactionsList / find transactionsA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Search transactions by status, signer external ID, document group, or date range (cursor pagination). Use this to find a transaction or check signing history.

Inputs: limit, status, endDate, nextToken, +3 more.

list_webhooksList webhooksA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

List all registered webhooks for the tenant.

Inputs: no named parameters.

register_webhookRegister webhookAInspect

Register an HTTPS endpoint to receive event notifications. The response returns a signing secret — store it to verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature on incoming payloads.

Inputs: url (required), events (required).

request_document_uploadRequest a document upload linkAInspect

Get a one-time drag-and-drop upload page URL to give the user so they can upload a PDF directly to SignDocs (file bytes never pass through the chat). Use this when the document is a local file or a private Google Drive file — the user downloads it and drops it on the page. After they confirm the upload, pass the returned uploadToken to create_signing_session, create_envelope, or upload_document.

Inputs: filename.

resend_signing_session_otpResend signing session OTPAInspect

Resend the OTP challenge for a signing session, optionally over a specific channel (email/sms).

Inputs: sessionId (required), channel.

test_webhookTest webhookAInspect

Send a sample payload to a registered webhook and return the delivery result.

Inputs: webhookId (required).

upload_documentUpload documentAInspect

Upload a base64-encoded PDF to an existing transaction (≤10MB inline; use presign for larger).

Inputs: transactionId (required), filename, documentUrl, uploadToken, +1 more.

verify_documentVerify document signaturesA
Destructive
Inspect

⚠️ This performs a consequential, possibly irreversible action (legally-binding signature request and/or quota consumption). Confirm with the human before calling. Inspect an uploaded PDF for embedded electronic/digital signatures. Requires PRODUCTION credentials + the verification:write scope and CONSUMES verification quota. Not available in HML.

Inputs: documentBase64 (required), filename.

verify_envelopeVerify envelope (public)A
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Publicly verify all signers of an envelope and get consolidated download URLs.

Inputs: envelopeId (required).

verify_evidenceVerify evidence (public)A
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Publicly verify a completed signature by its evidenceId. Returns status, document/evidence hashes, steps and signer display info. No authentication needed.

Inputs: evidenceId (required).

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A4/5.0

    Scored across 24 tools

    Disambiguation4/5

    Most tools have distinct purposes, but there is potential confusion between create_signing_session (single-signer express) and add_session_to_envelope (adds to envelope). Descriptions are clear enough to differentiate.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    All tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (e.g., create_envelope, list_transactions, cancel_signing_session). No mixed conventions or inconsistent styles.

    Tool Count4/5

    24 tools is on the higher side but justified for a comprehensive electronic signature service covering envelopes, sessions, transactions, documents, webhooks, and verification. Each tool addresses a specific need.

    Completeness4/5

    The surface covers most lifecycle operations: create, read, cancel, list for envelopes and sessions; upload/download documents; webhook management; verification. Minor gaps like updating envelope details or removing a session are not critical.

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