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seafile_libraries

DestructiveIdempotent

Manage self-hosted Seafile libraries: list, create, inspect, update, or delete libraries, plus configure tokens, webhooks, and settings, with dry-run previews for writes.

Instructions

seafile_libraries covers the libraries toolset (39 route operations). Auth header Authorization Token. Self-hosted Seafile only. seafile.com hosts are refused. Writes, including side-effect GETs, need confirm true and SEAFILE_ALLOW_WRITES=true. Omit confirm for a dry-run preview of method, path, and redacted body. Delete, purge, expire, revert, trash clean, move, copy, and overwrite previews name the library id and path. Actions: create_monitored_repos: POST /api/v2.1/monitored-repos/. POST /api/v2.1/monitored-repos/ (MonitoredRepos). Body and query are free-form. create_repo: POST /api2/repos/. Create a library. Form body field name is required. Encrypted libraries need passwd. The sync token in the response is redacted. create_repos_repo_api_tokens: POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/repo-api-tokens/. Create a library API token. Credential-minting. Library tokens cannot delete, move, or copy. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. create_repos_webhooks: POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/. POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. delete_monitored_repos: DELETE /api/v2.1/monitored-repos/{repo_id}/. DELETE /api/v2.1/monitored-repos/{repo_id}/ (MonitoredRepo). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. delete_repo: DELETE /api2/repos/{repo_id}/. Delete a library. Destructive. The preview names repo_id. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. delete_repos: DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/. DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/ (RepoView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. delete_repos_repo_api_tokens: DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/repo-api-tokens/{app_name}/. DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/repo-api-tokens/{app_name}/ (RepoAPITokenView). Path params: repo_id, app_name. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. delete_repos_webhooks: DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/. DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. delete_repos_webhooks_repo_id_webhook_id: DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/. DELETE /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id, webhook_id. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. get_default_repo: GET /api2/default-repo/. GET /api2/default-repo/ (DefaultRepoView). Body and query are free-form. get_repo: GET /api2/repos/{repo_id}/. Read one library. get_repos: GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/. GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/ (RepoView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. get_repos_auto_delete: GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/auto-delete/. GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/auto-delete/ (RepoAutoDeleteView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. get_repos_download_info: GET /api2/repos/{repo_id}/download-info/. GET /api2/repos/{repo_id}/download-info/ (DownloadRepo). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. get_repos_history_limit: GET /api2/repos/{repo_id}/history-limit/. GET /api2/repos/{repo_id}/history-limit/ (RepoHistoryLimit). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. get_repos_owner: GET /api2/repos/{repo_id}/owner/. GET /api2/repos/{repo_id}/owner/ (RepoOwner). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. get_repos_public: GET /api2/repos/public/. GET /api2/repos/public/ (PubRepos). Body and query are free-form. get_repos_webhooks: GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/. GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id, webhook_id. Body and query are free-form. list_repo_tokens: GET /api2/repo-tokens/. GET /api2/repo-tokens/ (RepoTokensView). Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. list_repos: GET /api2/repos/. List libraries visible to the token. list_repos_get: GET /api/v2.1/repos/. GET /api/v2.1/repos/ (ReposView). Body and query are free-form. list_repos_repo_api_tokens: GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/repo-api-tokens/. List library API tokens. Token values are redacted. list_repos_webhooks: GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/. GET /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. post_default_repo: POST /api2/default-repo/. POST /api2/default-repo/ (DefaultRepoView). Body and query are free-form. post_repo: POST /api2/repos/{repo_id}/. Library password or rename. Query op is rename, setpassword, or checkpassword. Form fields repo_name and repo_desc for rename. post_repos_archive: POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/archive/. POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/archive/ (RepoArchiveView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. post_repos_batch: POST /api/v2.1/repos/batch/. POST /api/v2.1/repos/batch/ (ReposBatchView). Body and query are free-form. post_repos_public: POST /api2/repos/public/. POST /api2/repos/public/ (PubRepos). Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. post_repos_send_new_password: POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/send-new-password/. POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/send-new-password/ (RepoSendNewPassword). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. post_repos_set_password: POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/set-password/. POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/set-password/ (RepoSetPassword). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. post_repos_webhooks: POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/. POST /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id, webhook_id. Body and query are free-form. update_repos_auto_delete: PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/auto-delete/. PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/auto-delete/ (RepoAutoDeleteView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. update_repos_history_limit: PUT /api2/repos/{repo_id}/history-limit/. PUT /api2/repos/{repo_id}/history-limit/ (RepoHistoryLimit). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. update_repos_owner: PUT /api2/repos/{repo_id}/owner/. PUT /api2/repos/{repo_id}/owner/ (RepoOwner). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. update_repos_repo_api_tokens: PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/repo-api-tokens/{app_name}/. PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/repo-api-tokens/{app_name}/ (RepoAPITokenView). Path params: repo_id, app_name. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. update_repos_set_password: PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/set-password/. PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/set-password/ (RepoSetPassword). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change. update_repos_webhooks: PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/. PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id. Body and query are free-form. update_repos_webhooks_repo_id_webhook_id: PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/. PUT /api/v2.1/repos/{repo_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/ (WebhooksView). Path params: repo_id, webhook_id. Body and query are free-form.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "action": "<action>"
    },
    "name": "seafile_libraries"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNoFree-form JSON or form body. /api2 routes are sent as form fields. /api/v2.1 routes are sent as JSON. Secrets are redacted in previews.
queryNoQuery parameters, such as p for a library path or q for search.
actionYesSeafile operation to call.
paramsNoPath parameters, such as repo_id or group_id.
confirmNoSet to the boolean true to execute the write. Omit this field for a dry-run preview. false and the string true are rejected.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing the two-factor write gate (confirm plus SEAFILE_ALLOW_WRITES), the dry-run preview contract for omitted confirm, exactly what a preview reveals for dangerous operations ('name the library id and path'), and secret redaction ('The sync token in the response is redacted', 'Token values are redacted'). It also flags special hazards the annotations cannot express, such as 'Credential-minting' tokens and the restriction that 'Library tokens cannot delete, move, or copy'. This is genuinely useful behavioral context for a destructive, open-world tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

After two useful opening sentences the text becomes a flat, repetitive catalog: 'Body and query are free-form' is repeated for roughly two dozen actions and 'Warning: destructive, exposure, or credential change' is pasted onto nearly every mutating route. The boilerplate crowds out the few high-value sentences (create_repo, post_repo, API token caveats) that an agent actually needs front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 39-action mega-tool with no output schema, the definition does cover every action with its HTTP method and path, plus real semantics for the most consequential ones (create_repo, post_repo, token minting). Many read-side actions remain opaque beyond their endpoint, but an agent can still match action names to intent, which is close to the most this description can practically supply.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, and the description exceeds it by adding per-action parameter meaning the generic schema cannot carry: 'Form body field name is required. Encrypted libraries need passwd' and 'Query op is rename, setpassword, or checkpassword. Form fields repo_name and repo_desc for rename'. The remaining gap is that most actions are dismissed with 'Body and query are free-form', leaving their payloads undocumented.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence states the resource domain precisely ('seafile_libraries covers the libraries toolset (39 route operations)') and the action list makes clear it manages libraries rather than files, search, or server admin, which distinguishes it from the named siblings. It stops short of an explicit statement of what the tool is for versus seafile_files_and_dirs, relying on the reader to infer the boundary from the action names.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is solid operational guidance about how to invoke writes ('Writes, including side-effect GETs, need confirm true and SEAFILE_ALLOW_WRITES=true. Omit confirm for a dry-run preview') and an environment constraint ('Self-hosted Seafile only. seafile.com hosts are refused'). However, nothing tells an agent when to pick this tool over seafile_files_and_dirs or seafile_search, and no per-action when-not guidance is given beyond the destructive warnings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.