DeadBolt
Related Servers
Alternatives to DeadBolt
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables developers to wrap existing MCP servers with a deterministic policy enforcement gate that intercepts tool discovery and tools/call requests over stdio, allowing only authorized calls to reach the downstream server. It supports dynamic tool exposure or hiding, allow/deny/approval-required decisions, configurable error disclosure modes, and Ed25519-signed retry credentials for approved workflows.Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceA transparent MCP stdio proxy that sits between an agent client and a real MCP server, intercepting tools/call requests to enforce runtime guardrails derived from the same YAML rules used for CI regression testing. It blocks forbidden, out-of-whitelist, looping, or non-idempotent tool invocations with JSON-RPC errors and writes every decision to an audit log.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceA least-privilege enforcement proxy for MCP servers. It sits between MCP clients and upstream servers, enforcing tool policies, hiding denied tools, requiring human approval for risky actions, and providing a structured audit trail.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityAmaintenanceA policy-enforcing sandbox proxy that sits between an agent and an upstream MCP server, letting tool visibility, file paths, hostnames, credentials-looking arguments and timeouts be governed by a single TOML policy file before anything reaches the server. It exposes only the allowed tools, rejects disallowed calls with readable reasons, and writes one audit line per decision without logging argument values.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceProxies MCP traffic between a client and a downstream server to enforce runtime policies on tool declarations, call arguments, and results, including allowlisting, sandboxing, secret and egress controls, and injection detection. It also includes a deterministic benchmark for measuring which security controls stop which attacks.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceSits in front of any MCP server to enforce allow/ask/block policies on tool calls, paths, shell commands, and network domains, with local approval prompts and an audit log.MIT
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools have clearly distinct purposes: one returns human-readable setup guidance, the other computes bundle integrity/hash metadata. Their descriptions explicitly state what each does and does not do, leaving no realistic room for misselection.
Both names use the same server prefix plus a consistent verb_noun pattern (deadbolt_get_integration_guide, deadbolt_check_bundle), with no mixed casing or style drift.
Two tools is thin even for a narrow, read-only pre-configuration surface; an agent will likely need more than guidance plus a bundle check. The count is not wrong, but it is borderline minimal.
The surface covers the two advertised functions (setup guidance, bundle verification) but has notable gaps: no way to enumerate supported integration routes, validate a candidate placeholder config, or confirm host prerequisites beyond the bundle hash. Agents hitting those needs have no tool path.