Sealbridge
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TDQS
Scored across 14 tools
Most tools target distinct ACP lifecycle actions, but acp_list_connections and acp_list_connection_requests have essentially identical descriptions, so an agent cannot tell which list to use. The single-vs-multi delegation pair is adequately distinguished, and the remaining invite, revocation, pending, status, and audit tools are reasonably separable.
All names use a consistent acp_ snake_case prefix with mostly verb_noun phrasing (list_invites, revoke_token, delegate_task, inspect_revocations). The only notable deviation is acp_message_status, which is noun-based rather than verb_noun, but the overall convention is predictable.
Fourteen tools is well within the appropriate range and maps cleanly onto the protocol surface: invites, connections, discovery, delegation, pending requests, status, revocations, and audit verification. Each tool appears to earn its place without obvious redundancy in count.
The surface covers the main lifecycle areas: invite creation/listing/removal, revocation inspection, worker discovery, connection listing, single and multi delegation, pending request handling, message status, and audit verification. Some operations such as accepting invites and approving connection requests are explicitly delegated to the CLI or human action, so the gaps are mostly intentional.