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create_threat_model

Create a new threat model to identify and document potential security risks in your system architecture.

Instructions

Create a new threat model

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYes
collection_idYes
descriptionNo
other_propertiesYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Implementation Reference

  • MCP tool handler function for 'create_threat_model'. Decorated with @mcp.tool() to register and execute the tool logic: constructs threat model data from parameters and calls the API client to create it via POST to Devici API.
    @mcp.tool()
    async def create_threat_model(name: str, collection_id: str, description: str = None, **other_properties) -> str:
        """Create a new threat model"""
        async with create_client_from_env() as client:
            threat_model_data = {
                "name": name,
                "collection_id": collection_id
            }
            if description:
                threat_model_data["description"] = description
            threat_model_data.update(other_properties)
            result = await client.create_threat_model(threat_model_data)
            return str(result)
  • Supporting API client method that handles the actual HTTP POST request to the '/threat-models' endpoint on the Devici API to create the threat model.
    async def create_threat_model(self, threat_model_data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Create new threat model."""
        return await self._make_request("POST", "/threat-models", json_data=threat_model_data)
Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure but fails to do so. It states 'Create' implies a write operation but does not cover permissions, side effects, error handling, or response format. This is inadequate for a mutation tool with zero annotation coverage.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is extremely concise with a single sentence, 'Create a new threat model', which is front-loaded and wastes no words. However, this conciseness comes at the cost of under-specification, but it earns full credit for brevity and structure.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given a mutation tool with 4 parameters, 0% schema coverage, no annotations, and an output schema (which helps but isn't described), the description is incomplete. It lacks essential details like parameter meanings, usage context, and behavioral traits, making it insufficient for effective tool invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters1/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, meaning parameters are undocumented in the schema. The description adds no information about parameters like 'name', 'collection_id', 'description', or 'other_properties', failing to compensate for the coverage gap. This leaves all 4 parameters semantically unclear.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose2/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description 'Create a new threat model' is a tautology that restates the tool name without adding meaningful context. It specifies the verb ('Create') and resource ('threat model') but lacks differentiation from siblings like 'create_collection' or details about what a threat model entails in this system.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines1/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives. The description does not mention prerequisites (e.g., needing a collection_id), exclusions, or comparisons to sibling tools like 'create_collection' or 'get_threat_models', leaving usage entirely ambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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