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sdebruyn

fabric-dw-mcp-cli

by sdebruyn

revoke_permission

Revoke SQL permissions from a principal on a Fabric warehouse or SQL endpoint. Supports database, schema, and object-level revocation with cascade and grant option control.

Instructions

Revoke permissions on a securable from a principal.

Executes REVOKE <permissions> ON <scope> FROM <principal>. Blocked by FABRIC_MCP_READONLY. Requires FABRIC_MCP_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE=1 because revoke removes an existing permission (destructive operation).

Args: workspace: Workspace name or GUID. item: Warehouse or SQL endpoint name or GUID. permissions: Comma-separated permission tokens (e.g. "SELECT,INSERT"). principal: Principal name to revoke from (Entra UPN, app GUID, or role name). scope: Securable class -- "DATABASE" (default), "SCHEMA", or "OBJECT". schema: Schema name (required when scope is "SCHEMA"). object_name: Qualified object name <schema>.<object> (required when scope is "OBJECT"). columns: Optional list of column names for column-level security (OBJECT scope only; permissions must be SELECT, UPDATE, or REFERENCES). Pass None (omit) for no column restriction. Passing an empty list raises a ToolError. grant_option_only: When True, revokes only the grant option (adds GRANT OPTION FOR), leaving the base permission in place. cascade: When True, cascades the revocation to principals the grantee has granted the permission to (adds CASCADE).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
itemYes
scopeNoDATABASE
schemaNo
cascadeNo
columnsNo
principalYes
workspaceYes
object_nameNo
permissionsYes
grant_option_onlyNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations provided, but the description explains the SQL execution, destructive nature, and effects of parameters like grant_option_only and cascade. This compensates for missing annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Well-structured with a summary followed by parameter list. Every sentence adds value, though it is slightly lengthy. Front-loads the main purpose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the complexity (10 params, destructive, output schema exists), the description covers all necessary aspects: purpose, security, parameter details, and special behaviors. Output schema likely documents return values.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 0% description coverage, but the description provides detailed explanations for all 10 parameters, including allowed values, defaults, and dependencies (e.g., schema required for SCHEMA scope). Fully compensates.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states it revokes permissions using a SQL REVOKE command. It identifies the resource (securable) and action, but does not explicitly distinguish from sibling tools like grant_permission or deny_permission.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides important environmental conditions (FABRIC_MCP_READONLY block, FABRIC_MCP_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE requirement) and notes it is destructive. However, lacks when-to-use vs alternatives like deny_permission.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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