opencti-mcp

search_tool

Find tools used maliciously, such as PsExec or Mimikatz, by searching threat intelligence with filters for labels, dates, limit, and offset.

Instructions

Search for tools (legitimate software used maliciously, e.g., PsExec, Mimikatz as a tool).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "query": "<query>"
    },
    "name": "search_tool"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`limit`	No	Max results (default: 10, max: 50)
`query`	Yes	Tool name or keyword
`labels`	No	Filter by labels
`offset`	No	Skip first N results (for pagination)
`created_after`	No	Filter by created date >= (ISO format)
`created_before`	No	Filter by created date <= (ISO format)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.5.0Sep 6, 2026

TDQS

B3.1/5.0

Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, but it only defines the semantic scope of 'tool' and says 'search.' It does not describe output form, pagination behavior, expected result types, or any access/rate characteristics, so the agent must assume a straightforward read-only search behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single concise sentence with the core action and a useful clarifying parenthetical. It is front-loaded and has no filler, though the phrasing 'Mimikatz as a tool' is slightly awkward and the description could be polished.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The input schema richly documents all six parameters, including defaults and constraints, but there is no output schema and no annotations. The description is adequate for invoking a search, but it leaves gaps around result shape, paginated output semantics, and how this search differ from the sibling search_* tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful context beyond the schema by clarifying that 'query' terms like PsExec or Mimikatz refer to legitimate software used maliciously, and not to malware or arbitrary objects. This helps the agent shape a correct query, moving it slightly above baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a clear search action over a defined resource: 'tools' and explains what that means with concrete examples, 'legitimate software used maliciously, e.g., PsExec, Mimikatz'. This helps separate it from generic search and from semantic siblings like search_malware, though it stops short of explicitly naming alternative search tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives no guidance about when to choose this tool versus the many sibling search tools. It only defines what a 'tool' is, without saying things like 'use this for dual-use software; use search_malware for actual malware.' An agent must infer usage from the category definition alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.