mimikatz_sekurlsa_kerberos
List Kerberos credentials and tickets extracted from Windows memory for security auditing.
Instructions
List Kerberos credentials and tickets
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
List Kerberos credentials and tickets extracted from Windows memory for security auditing.
List Kerberos credentials and tickets
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v1.0.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, but it only states 'List.' It does not mention required privileges, whether this operation reads from LSASS memory, or any side effects. The description is not contradictory, but it is too thin to reveal meaningful behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single concise sentence with no filler, and the action is front-loaded. It earns its place, though its terseness limits how much structural value it provides.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no annotations, no output schema, and many closely related sibling tools, the description leaves major gaps: when to prefer it, what rights are needed, and how it differs from other Kerberos-related commands. It is minimally sufficient for a human who already knows the tool, but not complete enough for an AI agent choosing among siblings.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
There are zero parameters and an empty input schema, so there is no parameter behavior for the description to document. The baseline of 4 applies because no parameter semantics are needed beyond what the schema already shows.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a clear verb ('List') with a concrete resource ('Kerberos credentials and tickets'), so the core operation is understandable. It does not differentiate itself from sibling tools such as *kerberos_list, which could plausibly also list Kerberos ticket material.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance about when to choose this command versus mimikatz_sekurlsa_logonpasswords, mimikatz_sekurlsa_msv, or mimikatz_kerberos_list. The only implied context is that the agent wants Kerberos credential or ticket information, which is not sufficient for reliable tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.