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Password strength check

password_check
Read-onlyIdempotent

Estimate how strong a password is by simulating attacker guessing patterns such as common words, keyboard walks, dates, and repeats, and get a 0–4 score with crack-time feedback.

Instructions

Estimate how strong a password really is, the way attackers guess (zxcvbn-style): finds common passwords (1,282-entry list), dictionary words (also reversed, capitalised or l33t), keyboard walks, sequences, repeats, years and dates, then the cheapest way to guess the whole thing. Returns a 0–4 score, entropy bits, guesses, crack time for 4 attack scenarios, the pieces found, and advice. Offline only: no breach lookups, nothing stored or logged. Web version: https://s3eidat.github.io/password-check/

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passwordYesThe password to check (only the first 256 characters are analysed in detail).
showPiecesNoInclude the matched pieces (they contain parts of the password).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/closed-world, and the description adds substantive context beyond them: the detection passes performed, the exact return fields (0–4 score, entropy bits, guesses, crack time across 4 scenarios, pieces, advice), the privacy guarantee, and the 256-character deep-analysis limit. Nothing about the call's behavior is left to guess.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose and return shape are front-loaded, and the trailing privacy note plus demo URL are useful rather than filler. The detection-list clause is dense but each element signals a distinct capability; slightly tighter phrasing would earn a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, yet the description fully enumerates what comes back (score, entropy, guesses, crack times, pieces, advice) and covers the privacy dimension an agent or user would reasonably worry about when submitting a password. Complete for a two-parameter read-only tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both parameters (password, showPieces) and the 256-char analysis note are already documented in the schema. The description's mention of 'the pieces found' as a return element loosely ties to showPieces but adds no new constraint or formatting detail. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the work.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Estimate how strong a password really is') and pins the mechanism (zxcvbn-style, attacker-guess simulation). The detection targets listed — common-password list, dictionary/leetspeak, keyboard walks, sequences, dates — make it unmistakably distinct from the sibling password_generate, which produces passwords rather than scoring them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clear about the use context and sets one real boundary: 'Offline only: no breach lookups, nothing stored or logged' tells the agent not to rely on it for compromised-credential checks. It does not explicitly name password_generate as the alternative for creation, so the routing guidance is implied rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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