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fortigate-mcp-server

by ry-ops

audit_policy_protection

Check FortiGate accept policies for missing IPS on WAN traffic, disabled security profiles, HTTPS-blind inspection, unlicensed FortiGuard services, and absent logging. Read-only.

Instructions

Check that accept policies are actually protected: traffic from or to a WAN interface with no IPS sensor, profiles attached while security profiles are disabled on the policy, antivirus/DLP/file filter with an inspection profile that can't see inside HTTPS, profiles whose FortiGuard service isn't licensed, and policies that don't log. Read-only.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
vdomNoVDOM (default: FORTIGATE_VDOM, usually root)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.1.3

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it does disclose the key trait ('Read-only') plus the precise detection semantics that determine what the tool reports. It does not mention permission requirements or rate behavior, but the safety profile and detection scope are well covered.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The check scope is front-loaded and the long enumerated clause is dense but each item earns its place by telling the agent what the audit surfaces. 'Read-only' is efficiently separated at the end.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a no-output-schema audit tool, the description conveys enough about scope and detection targets for correct invocation. It could say more about what the results look like, but the coverage of what is audited is strong.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the only parameter (vdom) is fully documented in the schema, including its default. The description adds nothing about the vdom parameter, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Check') and resource ('accept policies are actually protected') and then enumerates the exact misconfigurations it detects (WAN traffic without IPS, disabled profiles, HTTPS-blind inspection, unlicensed FortiGuard, missing logging). This clearly distinguishes it from sibling audit tools like audit_admin_access and audit_hardening.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies the tool's role (security-posture auditing of firewall policies) and flags 'Read-only', but never states when to reach for it versus the other audit tools or list_firewall_policies/get_policy_stats. Usage must be inferred from scope rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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