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Glama

Request that the user store a credential

secret.store
Destructive

Write a credential to a target destination (env file, GCP Secret Manager, Firestore) without the AI ever seeing its value—the user enters the secret in Veil’s trusted window.

Instructions

Ask the human to provide a credential and have Veil write it to the destination described here. The credential value is never passed through this tool, never returned by it, and never becomes visible to the model: the user enters it in Veil's own trusted window. Share the returned authorization_url with the user, then poll secret.status.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesLogical name of the credential, e.g. STRIPE_SECRET_KEY. This is a label, never the credential value.
targetYesWhere the credential goes. Fields depend on the destination; call secret.destinations for the exact contract.
write_modeNocreate
descriptionNoShort human-readable purpose, shown to the user.
destinationYesWhich destination adapter should receive the credential.
environmentNoEnvironment you believe this destination belongs to. Advisory only: Veil classifies the destination itself and uses the stricter of the two.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description explicitly discloses that the credential value never passes through the tool, is never returned, and never becomes visible to the model—a key behavioral trait. It also outlines the multi-step process involving an authorization_url and polling. Annotations already signal destructive and open-world behavior, and the description complements these without contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the core action, and includes essential security and workflow context. Every sentence earns its place, and there is no redundant or extraneous text.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (nested target, multiple destinations, write modes, environment), the description covers the critical workflow and security aspects, and points to secret.destinations for detailed contracts. It does not explain write_mode or environment semantics, but those are well-documented in the schema. Overall, it is reasonably complete for a tool of this intricacy.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The description does not directly elaborate on any input parameters, but the schema provides extensive descriptions for 83% of fields. It directs users to secret.destinations for the target contract, which covers the remaining nuance. Since the schema already carries the semantic load, the description adds little beyond baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's action: asking the human for a credential and having Veil write it to a specified destination. It distinguishes itself from siblings like secret.status and secret.cancel by focusing on the store action and includes critical security context (credential not visible to model) and subsequent steps (share authorization_url, poll status).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear workflow guidance: ask the user, share the authorization_url, and poll secret.status. It implies this tool is for new credentials but does not explicitly contrast with secret.revise or specify when not to use it. The flow is described well, but alternative exclusions are missing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.