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MCPocket

Persistent storage and coordination for AI agents. Your agents. Your data. One shared workspace. — mcpocket.io

  • Persistent JSON collections

  • Hierarchical folders and tubes

  • MCP-native agent access

  • REST API integrations

  • Real-time monitoring dashboard

Folders organise tubes; tubes hold JSON items that agents claim, heartbeat and complete under a lease. Everything — web dashboard, REST API and MCP server (Streamable HTTP, legacy SSE, stdio proxy) — runs in one Next.js process sharing the same application services, so the rules, permissions and audit history are identical on every surface.

MCPocket architecture: external platforms POST items into tubes in the persistent JSON engine; AI agents work them over MCP; the web dashboard monitors everything

Repository layout

MCPocket is open source under the Apache License 2.0. This repository is the self-hosted edition; MCPocket Cloud is built from the same core in a separate, private repository.

Path

What it is

packages/core

@mcpocket/core: domain, storage drivers, services, REST handlers, MCP server and tools. No Next.js or React

app/, components/, lib/

The self-hosted Next.js app: dashboard, API routes, admin login

bin/, scripts/, mock/

stdio proxy, seed and migration scripts, demo data

npm workspaces link packages/core into the app; npm install at the root sets everything up. App code imports the core as @mcpocket/core/....

Related MCP server: Bcontext

Quick start (Docker Compose)

Requirements: Docker with Compose v2.

git clone <repo-url> mcpocket && cd mcpocket
cp .env.example .env
# edit .env — at least (paste literal values; .env does not run commands):
#   MCPOCKET_ADMIN_PASSWORD=<strong password>               (required)
#   MCPOCKET_API_KEYS=ops:<output of: openssl rand -hex 24>  (REST / MCP clients)
#   MCPOCKET_SESSION_SECRET=<output of: openssl rand -base64 32>
docker compose up -d --build
docker compose ps            # STATUS shows "(healthy)" after a few seconds

Then open http://localhost:3000 and sign in at /login with MCPOCKET_ADMIN_USERNAME (default admin) / MCPOCKET_ADMIN_PASSWORD. Check the API with the key from .env:

curl http://localhost:3000/api/health                       # {"status":"ok",...} (no auth)
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <secret>" http://localhost:3000/api/folders/tree

What you get:

Image

mcpocket:latest (MCPOCKET_IMAGE_TAG), multi-stage build of the Next.js standalone server on node:22-alpine, runs as the non-root node user

Service

mcpocket — dashboard, REST (/api/*) and MCP (/api/mcp, /api/mcp/sse) on one port (MCPOCKET_PORT, default 3000)

Volume

mcpocket-data mounted at /app/data (all data: JSON collection files, or mcpocket.db with STORAGE_DRIVER=sqlite)

Seed

with MCPOCKET_SEED_ON_FIRST_START=true (as in .env.example) an empty volume is seeded from mock/seed.json on first start; existing data is never touched. Set it to false to start empty

Health

GET /api/health (unauthenticated: 200 {"status":"ok","checks":{"storage":"ok"}} or 503, no data) — used by the Compose / image HEALTHCHECK

Workers

lease sweeper + webhook dispatcher start inside the same process (instrumentation.ts)

Initial admin account. There is one dashboard admin, defined by MCPOCKET_ADMIN_USERNAME / MCPOCKET_ADMIN_PASSWORD in .env — no setup wizard, nothing stored in data/. Compose refuses to start while the password is empty. To change it, edit .env and docker compose up -d (existing sessions are invalidated). .env.example sets MCPOCKET_COOKIE_SECURE=false so sign-in works over plain http://<host>:3000; put MCPocket behind an HTTPS reverse proxy and set it to true for anything beyond a local/trusted network. API keys: env keys from MCPOCKET_API_KEYS, or create scoped keys on the dashboard Access page.

Configuration. Every variable is documented in .env.example (storage, seeding, admin, API keys/roles, rate limits, leases/retries/sweeper, agent monitoring, webhooks). Details per feature are in the sections below.

Operations.

docker compose logs -f mcpocket          # logs (seeding, sweeper, dispatcher)
git pull && docker compose up -d --build   # upgrade — data stays on the volume
docker compose down                      # stop (keeps the volume)
docker compose down -v                   # stop AND delete all data
  • Run exactly one replica. Writes are serialised by an in-process lock (both storage drivers), and the sweeper/dispatcher/rate limiter/SSE sessions are in memory: never scale the service or point two containers at the same volume.

  • The container needs outbound HTTP(S) to your webhook URLs.

  • A bind mount instead of the named volume (./data:/app/data) works too; the directory must be writable by uid 1000 (sudo chown 1000:1000 data).

Storage drivers

STORAGE_DRIVER selects where data lives. json and sqlite run inside the one Node process — no database container; mongo uses an external MongoDB:

Driver

Data

Notes

json (default)

one file per collection in DATA_DIR

everything in memory; each write rewrites the touched files. Simple to read/diff; best for small datasets

sqlite

one file, SQLITE_FILE (default DATA_DIR/mcpocket.db)

built-in node:sqlite (Node ≥ 22.13, no native module), WAL + synchronous=FULL; reads from disk with indexes, writes touch only changed rows. Use for larger item/history volumes

mongo

workspace MCPOCKET_WORKSPACE of database MONGODB_DB (default mcpocket) at MONGODB_URI

one collection per entity, documents are the entities themselves (plus a workspace tenant field and _seq/_createdMs sort fields). Works on a standalone server (MongoDB ≥ 5); on a replica set each commit is a MongoDB transaction (all-or-nothing). Like the other drivers it assumes one MCPocket process writes to a workspace

One database and one bucket, many workspaces. MCPOCKET_WORKSPACE (default MCPOCKET_SSO_WORKSPACE; slug: letters, digits, _, ., -) names the tenant an instance serves. Every Mongo document carries a workspace field and every query is scoped to it ({workspace, id} is unique, so workspaces may reuse entity ids; without a workspace the Mongo driver uses default), and media objects live under <MCPOCKET_MEDIA_PREFIX><workspace>/, so many MCPocket instances — one per workspace, as on MCPocket Cloud — can share one database and one bucket.

Cloud mode (MCPOCKET_MULTI_WORKSPACE=true, needs mongo): instead of one instance per workspace, ONE instance serves every workspace and each request acts in the workspace of its credential:

Credential

Workspace

Dashboard SSO session

the sign-in token's ws claim (required; leave MCPOCKET_SSO_WORKSPACE empty)

OAuth access token

the grant's ws

Managed API key

the workspace it was created in

Password admin, env API keys

MCPOCKET_WORKSPACE (else default)

Storage, media prefix, live dashboard events, signed upload links and media access are all scoped to that workspace; the lease sweeper and webhook dispatcher run over every workspace. With MCPOCKET_SEED_ON_FIRST_START, a workspace is seeded the first time it is used. Try it locally: npm run sso:token -- you@example.com --ws acme.

With mongo, npm run seed and MCPOCKET_SEED_ON_FIRST_START (fills an empty workspace) work as for the other drivers but only touch the instance's own workspace, and a running server sees a re-seed at once. The Mongo tests run against a real server when MONGODB_TEST_URI is set (each test uses a throwaway mcpocket_test_* database).

Production with MongoDB

docker-compose.prod.yml runs the app together with MongoDB 8 as a single-node replica set, so every commit is a MongoDB transaction:

# .env: MCPOCKET_ADMIN_PASSWORD, MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD, MONGO_APP_PASSWORD (+ app secrets)
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --build   # or: make up PROD=1

The app connects with its own readWrite account (created on first start by docker/mongo/initdb.d/01-app-user.js), never the root user. MongoDB is not published publicly, only on 127.0.0.1:${MONGO_PORT:-27017} for admin over an SSH tunnel (use ?directConnection=true from there). Data lives in the mongo-data / mongo-config volumes; the header of the compose file has a mongodump backup command.

Data written before workspaces existed has no workspace field and is invisible to the app. Assign it to a workspace once (mongosh, as a readWrite user of the database), then restart:

for (const c of ["folders", "tubes", "items", "history", "api_keys", "audit", "webhooks", "webhook_deliveries"])
  db[c].updateMany({ workspace: { $exists: false } }, { $set: { workspace: "default" } })
db.counters.find({ _id: { $not: /:/ } }).forEach((c) => {
  db.counters.insertOne({ _id: `default:${c._id}`, seq: c.seq }); db.counters.deleteOne({ _id: c._id })
})

Switch an existing JSON dataset to SQLite (the JSON files are left as they are):

# stop the server first
npm run migrate:sqlite                 # copies DATA_DIR/*.json → mcpocket.db (refuses a non-empty DB; --force to replace)
STORAGE_DRIVER=sqlite npm run dev      # or set STORAGE_DRIVER=sqlite in .env / docker-compose.yml

In Docker set STORAGE_DRIVER: sqlite in docker-compose.yml; a fresh volume is seeded into the database on first start, like the JSON driver. To move an existing volume, copy its data out (docker compose cp mcpocket:/app/data ./data-export), run DATA_DIR=./data-export npm run migrate:sqlite on the host, copy data-export/mcpocket.db back in, then switch the driver. Node prints a one-time ExperimentalWarning: SQLite is an experimental feature at startup; it is harmless.

Backup & restore

SQLite: the database is mcpocket.db plus its -wal/-shm files — copy all three with the app stopped (same commands as below), or take a live snapshot with sqlite3 data/mcpocket.db ".backup backup.db".

JSON: all state lives in the data directory (folders.json, tubes.json, items.json, history.json, api-keys.json, audit.json, webhooks.json, webhook-deliveries.json). Files are replaced atomically (write temp + rename), but stop the app for a consistent snapshot across files:

# backup
docker compose stop mcpocket
docker compose cp mcpocket:/app/data ./backup-$(date +%F)
docker compose start mcpocket

# restore (replaces the current data)
docker compose stop mcpocket
docker compose cp ./backup-2026-01-31/. mcpocket:/app/data/
docker compose start mcpocket

(docker compose cp works on stopped containers. Without Docker: copy DATA_DIR, default ./data, while the server is stopped.) To reset to the demo data, stop the app, empty the volume (docker compose down -v) and start again with MCPOCKET_SEED_ON_FIRST_START=true.

Local development

npm install
cp .env.example .env.local     # set MCPOCKET_ADMIN_PASSWORD and MCPOCKET_API_KEYS
npm run seed                   # (re)seed storage from mock/seed.json — JSON: restart the server afterwards; SQLite: live
npm run dev                    # http://localhost:3000
npm test && npm run typecheck && npm run lint

npm run build && node .next/standalone/server.js runs the production bundle (copy public/ and .next/static/ next to it first, as the Dockerfile does). npm run build:stdio bundles the stdio proxy into a single dependency-free file (dist/mcpocket-stdio.mjs, shipped in the image as bin/mcpocket-stdio.mjs).

Dashboard (admin login)

The web dashboard lives at /dashboard (landing page at /, sign-in at /login). It is protected by a single admin account configured through the environment; the browser only receives an httpOnly, HMAC-signed session cookie (mcpocket_session) — never an API key. The dashboard calls the same application services as REST/MCP, so audit history records it as user:<username>.

Variable

Default

Purpose

MCPOCKET_ADMIN_USERNAME

admin

Admin login name

MCPOCKET_ADMIN_PASSWORD

— (required)

Admin password. Without it the login page shows setup instructions and nobody can sign in

MCPOCKET_SESSION_SECRET

derived from the password

Key for signing session cookies (openssl rand -base64 32). Set it explicitly in production

MCPOCKET_SESSION_TTL_HOURS

12

Session lifetime

MCPOCKET_COOKIE_SECURE

true in production

Set false only when serving production over plain HTTP

MCPOCKET_AGENT_ONLINE_SECONDS

120

Agents page: an agent is online if its last heartbeat (or any other call) is at most this old

MCPOCKET_AGENT_STALE_SECONDS

600

Agents page: older than online but at most this old = idle; older (or never seen) = stale. Must exceed the online threshold

MCPOCKET_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS

10

Failed logins allowed per client IP (first X-Forwarded-For hop) and window; 0 disables throttling

MCPOCKET_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS

900

Login throttling window; a successful login resets the client's counter

Changing the username, password or session secret invalidates existing sessions. Example .env.local:

MCPOCKET_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
MCPOCKET_ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me
MCPOCKET_SESSION_SECRET=<output of: openssl rand -base64 32>

SSO token login (optional)

A trusted external system — MCPocket Cloud's control plane, or your own identity provider — can sign a person into the dashboard without a password. It sends the browser to /auth/sso?token=<jwt> (or POSTs a form with a token field); next=/dashboard/... optionally picks the landing page. A valid token starts a normal dashboard session (same cookie, same TTL) with the person's email as username, so audit history records user:<email>. SSO users act as administrators, like the password account. Password login keeps working. The feature is off — /auth/sso returns 404 — unless MCPOCKET_SSO_SECRET is set.

Variable

Default

Purpose

MCPOCKET_SSO_SECRET

— (SSO off)

Shared HMAC key the issuer signs tokens with (openssl rand -base64 32). Changing it ends SSO sessions. Without an admin password or session secret it also keys the session cookie

MCPOCKET_SSO_WORKSPACE

—

When set, a token's ws claim must equal it

The token is a compact JWT, HS256 (HMAC-SHA256 with MCPOCKET_SSO_SECRET):

{ sub: "ada@example.com", // email → session username (lower-cased)
  ws?: "acme",            // must match MCPOCKET_SSO_WORKSPACE when that is set
  jti: "<unique id>",     // single use
  iat: 1767225600,
  exp: 1767225660 }       // at most 60 s after iat

Tokens with a bad signature, another algorithm, an expired or overly long lifetime, no valid sub, the wrong workspace or an already used jti are rejected: the browser lands on a short error page (/auth/sso/error) with a link back to sign in, and no session is created. Used jtis are remembered in memory until they expire (one replica per instance).

To try it by hand without the cloud, set MCPOCKET_SSO_SECRET in .env.local, start the server and mint a single-use link (valid 60 s):

npm run sso:token -- ada@example.com          # or: make sso-token EMAIL=ada@example.com
# options: --ws <slug> --ttl <seconds> --next /dashboard/agents --url http://localhost:3000

SSO-only mode (managed instances)

An instance run by MCPocket Cloud (or behind your own identity provider) can hand sign-in entirely to the external system. All three variables are optional; with none of them set, /login, the dashboard redirect and sign-out behave as described above.

Variable

Default

Purpose

MCPOCKET_SSO_LOGIN_URL

—

Absolute http(s) URL of the external sign-in page. Anonymous visitors of /dashboard/* and /login are redirected there, with the requested dashboard path in a next query parameter (e.g. https://cloud.example/sso?next=%2Fdashboard%2Fagents). The issuer should hand it back as /auth/sso?token=…&next=…; only /dashboard paths are honoured, so it cannot become an open redirect

MCPOCKET_SSO_LOGOUT_URL

MCPOCKET_SSO_LOGIN_URL, else /login

Absolute http(s) URL to land on after signing out (the session cookie is cleared first)

MCPOCKET_PASSWORD_LOGIN

enabled

false (or 0/off/no) switches password login off: the form is hidden, password submissions are rejected server side and existing password sessions stop being accepted

URLs that are not absolute http(s) URLs, or that embed credentials, are ignored (with a warning in the server log), as is a login URL pointing back at this instance's own /login or /dashboard. When /login is shown without a usable password login but with SSO configured, it explains that the dashboard uses single sign-on instead of showing the setup instructions. While MCPOCKET_SSO_LOGIN_URL is set the password form is not reachable; unset it to sign in with the admin password.

A typical managed instance:

MCPOCKET_SSO_SECRET=<shared with the control plane>
MCPOCKET_SSO_LOGIN_URL=https://cloud.example/sso/acme
MCPOCKET_PASSWORD_LOGIN=false

The left sidebar holds the folder explorer: expand/collapse folders (state is remembered), and use the … menu on a folder or tube to create subfolders and tubes, rename, move or delete. Service errors (validation, moving a folder into its own subtree, deleting a non-empty folder/tube) are shown in the dialog. Press d to toggle dark mode, Cmd/Ctrl+B to toggle the sidebar.

Click an item row in a tube to open the item inspector (?item=<id> in the URL): edit the JSON payload (highlighted, validated live against the tube schema), see result / last error, retry, cancel, archive, delete, change status, reassign the agent, and read the full audit history. Reassigning is also available as POST /api/items/{id}/reassign { "agentId": "bot-2" | null } (a processing item's lease moves to the new agent; history action reassigned).

Agents. /dashboard/agents lists every known agent (assigned / processing / completed / failed counts, last heartbeat, availability); each agent page lists its assigned items, linking into the tube view filtered by the agent with the inspector open.

Real-time updates. The dashboard keeps one Server-Sent Events connection open (GET /api/dashboard/events, session cookie only — API keys are rejected) and re-renders counters, item rows, the inspector and the folder tree whenever an item, tube or folder changes — whether via REST, MCP or another browser tab. The header shows Live / Reconnecting…; the stream reconnects automatically and catches up after an outage. If the payload you are editing changes elsewhere, your unsaved text is kept and a "changed elsewhere" hint offers to load the latest version. Scope with ?tubeId=<id> or ?itemId=<id> (folder/tube events are always included); events are event: domain with JSON {seq, type, at, actor, …} (item.created, item.updated, item.status_changed, item.deleted, folder.*, tube.*) and a : ping comment every 15 s.

Connecting MCP clients

MCPocket's MCP server (name: "mcpocket") runs inside the Next.js app and shares its application services with the REST API. Every transport requires an API key (from MCPOCKET_API_KEYS or created on the dashboard's Access page — see Permissions & rate limiting), sent as Authorization: Bearer <secret> (or X-API-Key). Add X-Agent-Id: <id> to act as a named agent. Tool errors come back as MCP tool errors with the REST error body { "error": { "code", "message", "details"? } }.

Transport

Endpoint

Streamable HTTP (stateless, JSON responses)

POST http://localhost:3000/api/mcp

Legacy HTTP+SSE (older clients)

GET http://localhost:3000/api/mcp/sse (messages: POST /api/mcp/messages?sessionId=…)

stdio

node bin/mcpocket-stdio.mjs (bin mcpocket-stdio)

Streamable HTTP (e.g. Claude Code):

claude mcp add --transport http mcpocket http://localhost:3000/api/mcp \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer $MCPOCKET_API_KEY"

Legacy SSE:

claude mcp add --transport sse mcpocket http://localhost:3000/api/mcp/sse \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer $MCPOCKET_API_KEY"

stdio (e.g. Claude Desktop claude_desktop_config.json). The stdio process never opens data/ itself (v1 JSON storage is single-process): it is a thin proxy that relays MCP messages to the running app's /api/mcp endpoint, so the app must be running.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcpocket": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/mcpocket/bin/mcpocket-stdio.mjs"],
      "env": {
        "MCPOCKET_URL": "http://localhost:3000",
        "MCPOCKET_API_KEY": "<secret>",
        "MCPOCKET_AGENT_ID": "my-agent"
      }
    }
  }
}

(npm run --silent mcp:stdio works too; without --silent npm's banner would corrupt the stdio protocol stream.)

stdio with Docker (no local Node.js / checkout needed): the image ships the proxy as a single file. Run it inside the running container — it talks to the app over localhost:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcpocket": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": ["compose", "-f", "/path/to/mcpocket/docker-compose.yml",
               "exec", "-T",
               "-e", "MCPOCKET_API_KEY=<secret>", "-e", "MCPOCKET_AGENT_ID=my-agent",
               "mcpocket", "node", "bin/mcpocket-stdio.mjs"]
    }
  }
}

(or docker run -i --rm --add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway -e MCPOCKET_URL=http://host.docker.internal:3000 -e MCPOCKET_API_KEY=… mcpocket:latest node bin/mcpocket-stdio.mjs).

Scoped connections (one tube or one folder): bind a connection to a single tube or a folder subtree — useful for an agent that should only work one queue or one project, with any API key that can reach it:

Transport

Tube

Folder (with everything below it)

Streamable HTTP

POST /api/mcp/tubes/{tubeId}

POST /api/mcp/folders/{folderId}

Legacy HTTP+SSE

GET /api/mcp/sse?tubeId={tubeId}

GET /api/mcp/sse?folderId={folderId}

stdio (proxy env)

MCPOCKET_TUBE_ID={tubeId}

MCPOCKET_FOLDER_ID={folderId}

  • Tube: the session sees only that tube (others are 404); every tubeId argument is optional and defaults to it; folder tools and create_tube / move_tube / delete_tube are not offered.

  • Folder: the session sees the folder, its subfolders and their tubes (ancestor folders by name only, everything else is 404); create_folder and create_tube default parentId / folderId to the folder; the bound folder itself cannot be deleted or moved (403).

  • The key must fully reach the target (404, or 403 for a folder that is only an ancestor of the key's own scope), so binding can only narrow access. Admin keys act as operator on scoped connections; other roles keep their capabilities.

The dashboard's MCP page (also Connect via MCP in the folder/tube menus and the MCP button on a tube) generates ready-to-paste client configs for any folder or tube. For a hard per-key restriction, give the key a scope on the Access page.

Agent work loop: claim_next_item → heartbeat_item (before the lease expires) → complete_item | fail_item | release_item. The agent identity is the session's X-Agent-Id / MCPOCKET_AGENT_ID — never a tool argument — and lease rules match the REST API. Other item tools: push_item, get_item, update_item, delete_item, list_items, search_items, bulk_push_items, bulk_update_items, get_my_items, get_item_history (filters and bulk rules: see "Search, filtering & bulk operations" below).

Resources: mcpocket://system/info, mcpocket://folders/tree, mcpocket://tubes/{id} (settings + JSON Schema + item count; listed per tube) and mcpocket://items/{id} (item + 20 latest history events).

OAuth clients (ChatGPT connectors)

Some MCP clients — ChatGPT connectors in particular — cannot send an API key: they sign in with OAuth and send an access token instead. Set MCPOCKET_OAUTH_ISSUER and the MCP endpoints also accept OAuth access tokens (signed JWTs) from that authorization server, verified against its JWKS (RS256 / ES256 / EdDSA; keys cached 10 minutes, refetched on rotation):

  • /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (and the per-endpoint form /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp[/tubes/<id>|/folders/<id>], RFC 9728) names the authorization server;

  • an MCP request without a valid token answers 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="<that URL>", which is how ChatGPT discovers where to sign in.

Authorization is a claim, not the sign-in itself. A valid signature is not enough: the token must carry a grant for this workspace, added by the authorization server (MCPocket Cloud: a Supabase custom access token hook, filled by its consent page):

"mcpocket": { "ws": "<workspace slug>", "role": "readonly" | "agent" | "operator" }

ws must equal MCPOCKET_OAUTH_WORKSPACE (one connection = one workspace), and admin is never accepted over OAuth. The request acts as the agent oauth:<email> (or X-Agent-Id) with that role and no scope. API keys keep working unchanged; upload links (create_media_upload) still need an API key.

Variable

Default

Meaning

MCPOCKET_OAUTH_ISSUER

—

Exact iss of accepted tokens; set to enable OAuth (e.g. https://<ref>.supabase.co/auth/v1)

MCPOCKET_OAUTH_JWKS_URL

<issuer>/.well-known/jwks.json

Signing keys

MCPOCKET_OAUTH_AUDIENCE

not checked

Required aud (Supabase: authenticated)

MCPOCKET_OAUTH_WORKSPACE

MCPOCKET_SSO_WORKSPACE

Slug the grant must name; unset = any

MCPOCKET_OAUTH_CLAIM

mcpocket

Name of the grant claim

Search, filtering & bulk operations

REST GET /api/tubes/{id}/items and the MCP tools list_items (per tube) / search_items (tubeId optional → all tubes) accept the same filters. All given filters must match (AND); they are evaluated in memory, then paginated (offset, limit ≤ 1000; page.total = number of matches; oldest first).

Filter

Meaning

status

one status, an array or a comma list (pending,retry)

assignedAgent

exact agent id

createdFrom / createdTo

inclusive bounds; ISO datetime, or YYYY-MM-DD (= start / end of that UTC day)

priority, priorityMin, priorityMax

exact / inclusive range

tags

item must carry all listed tags (array or comma list)

includeDeleted

also return soft-deleted items

payload

payload field conditions (below)

Payload conditions — MCP / JSON: payload: [{ "path": "customer.address.city", "op": "eq", "value": "Berlin" }]. REST query: payload.<path>=<value> (equality) or payload.<path>[<op>]=<value>, e.g. ?payload.customer.address.city=Berlin&payload.total[gte]=100&payload.kind[in]=a,b. Query values that parse as JSON scalars become numbers / booleans / null. path is dotted; numeric segments index arrays (lines.0.sku).

op

Matches when the field…

eq (default)

deep-equals value; scalars also match by string form ("42" = 42)

ne

is not eq (a missing field matches)

gt gte lt lte

compares: numbers numerically (numeric strings coerced), strings lexically (ISO dates work); missing/other types never match

in

eqs any element of the array value (REST: comma list)

contains

string: case-insensitive substring; array: has an element eq to value

exists

is present (value true, default) / absent (false); null counts as present

Bulk operations (≤ 500 entries; REST body ≤ 5 MiB → else 413 payload_too_large; more entries → 400). Each runs in one storage transaction (one write-lock hold, persisted once). Every entry follows the single-item rules and gets its own result; an invalid entry does not stop the others. Response: { results: [{ index, ok: true, data, created? } | { index, ok: false, id?, error: { code, message, details? } }], summary: { total, succeeded, failed, created? } }.

  • POST /api/tubes/{id}/items/bulk / bulk_push_items — { items: [{ payload, priority?, tags?, metadata?, idempotencyKey? }] }. Idempotency keys are honoured (also within one batch: created: false), payloads validated against the tube schema.

  • PATCH /api/items/bulk / bulk_update_items — { items: [{ id, payload?, metadata?, tags?, priority?, status? }] } or { ids: [...], patch: { ... } }. Same manual status transitions and history events as PATCH /api/items/{id}.

Tube reset: POST /api/tubes/{id}/reset (needs items:manage; also the Reset button in the tube view) → { data: { total, matched, requeued } }. The optional body takes the item search filters (status, assignedAgent, createdFrom/createdTo, priority/priorityMin/priorityMax, tags, payload conditions) to limit which items are reset — e.g. { "status": "failed" } or { "status": ["failed", "cancelled"] }; no body resets every item. Each matching non-deleted item — whatever its status, including processing, completed and archived — goes back to a fresh pending: assignment and active leases are revoked, and attempts, backoff, result, last error and completion time are cleared. Payload, metadata, tags and priority are kept. One transaction; each changed item gets a reset history event.

Tube clone: POST /api/tubes/{id}/clone { name?, folderId?: id|null, includeItems? } (needs structure:manage, plus items:push with items; also Clone in the tube's … menu) → 201 { data: Tube, items }. Copies description, enabled, schema and retry policy; the name defaults to "<name> (copy)" and the folder to the source's. With includeItems: true every non-deleted item is copied as a fresh pending item (payload, metadata, tags, priority, idempotency key); results, errors and history are not copied, and each copy's created event records clonedFrom.

Statistics & monitoring

REST (API key required) and MCP tools return identical shapes:

REST

MCP tool

Returns

GET /api/statistics

get_statistics

{ data: { counts, folders, tubes, agents, generatedAt } }

GET /api/statistics/tubes/{id} (= GET /api/tubes/{id}/statistics)

get_tube_statistics {id}

{ data: { tubeId, tubeName, folderId, enabled, counts, generatedAt } }

GET /api/statistics/agents?agentId=&offset=&limit=

get_agent_statistics

page of { agentId, assigned, processing, completed, failed, lastHeartbeatAt, lastSeenAt }

GET /api/statistics/errors?tubeId=&agentId=&status=failed,retry&offset=&limit=

get_processing_errors

page of { itemId, tubeId, status, attempts, assignedAgent, error, failedAt }

counts = { total, pending, processing, completed, failed, retry, cancelled, archived } over non-deleted items. Agent completed/failed come from the audit history (events written by that agent); assigned/processing from items currently attributed to it.

Retries & lease sweeper

Every claim increments item.attempts. When an agent calls fail (REST POST /api/items/{id}/fail, MCP fail_item) and the tube's retry policy has attempts left, the item goes to retry with retryAt = now + backoff; claim skips it until then. On the last attempt it stays failed. History: failed with newValue { status: "retry" | "failed", retryAt?, maxAttempts, error }.

A background lease sweeper (started from instrumentation.ts when the server boots; not during next build; one per process) periodically recovers items whose lease expired because the agent died: attempts left → retry (claimable immediately), exhausted → failed; lastError.code = lease_expired, history action lease_expired by system:lease-sweeper, and the dashboard updates live. Claims run the same recovery for their tube first, so nothing waits for the next sweep. Any manual status change (e.g. retry → pending in the dashboard) drops the backoff delay.

Per-tube overrides: retryPolicy on tube create/update (REST, MCP create_tube/update_tube, dashboard tube Settings) — { maxAttempts?, backoff?: "fixed" | "exponential", delaySeconds?, maxDelaySeconds? }; missing fields use the defaults below, null or {} clears all overrides. Exponential delay = delaySeconds × 2^(attempt − 1), capped at maxDelaySeconds.

Variable

Default

Purpose

MCPOCKET_LEASE_SECONDS

300

Default lease duration for claim / heartbeat

MCPOCKET_RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS

3

Total attempts (claims) per item; 1 = never retry

MCPOCKET_RETRY_BACKOFF

exponential

exponential or fixed

MCPOCKET_RETRY_DELAY_SECONDS

30

Base retry delay

MCPOCKET_RETRY_MAX_DELAY_SECONDS

3600

Cap for the exponential delay

MCPOCKET_SWEEPER_ENABLED

true

false disables the background sweeper (claims still recover expired leases)

MCPOCKET_SWEEPER_INTERVAL_SECONDS

15

Seconds between sweeps (1..3600)

Permissions (RBAC) & rate limiting

Every REST request, MCP call (Streamable HTTP, legacy SSE, stdio proxy) and dashboard action goes through the same application services, which check the caller's role and scope — so the rules are identical on every surface.

Role

May

admin

everything, everywhere, incl. API keys / permissions and the access audit log

operator

read; push, update, delete, reassign items; claim/process; manage folders & tubes

agent

read; push items; claim → heartbeat → complete / fail / release

readonly

read folders, tubes, items, history, statistics

A missing capability → 403 forbidden (details: { capability, role }). MCP tools/list only advertises the tools the caller's role allows.

Scope (non-admin keys): a list of folders and/or tubes. A folder grants everything below it (subfolders and tubes, including ones created later). Outside the scope, entities are invisible: lists, search, the folder tree, statistics and MCP resources only contain what the key can see, and direct access returns 404 not_found. Ancestor folders of the scope stay visible (names only, for navigation) but cannot be changed (403).

Keys. Two sources:

  • MCPOCKET_API_KEYS="keyId:secret,..." — read-only config. Existing keys keep full access: their role defaults to admin (MCPOCKET_API_KEY_DEFAULT_ROLE), and can be set per key with MCPOCKET_API_KEY_ROLES="ci:readonly,bots:agent". Env keys are unscoped.

  • Managed keys — dashboard Access page (or POST /api/keys, admin): id, role, scope, optional bound agent identity (the key always acts as that agent; a different X-Agent-Id → 403) and optional per-key rate limit. The secret (mcp_…) is shown once on creation/rotation; only its SHA-256 is stored (data/api-keys.json). Keys can be edited, rotated, revoked (rotate re-activates) and deleted. Role/scope changes apply to the next request (also to open SSE sessions). Re-seeding keeps managed keys.

Every key/permission change is written to the access audit log (data/audit.json; dashboard Access page, GET /api/audit), with the acting admin and old → new role/scope/agent/limit — never secrets.

REST (admin)

GET /api/keys, POST /api/keys

list (env + managed, no secrets) / create → 201 { data, secret }

GET / PATCH / DELETE /api/keys/{id}

read / change { description?, role?, scope?, agentId?, rateLimitPerMinute? } (null clears) / delete

POST /api/keys/{id}/rotate, POST /api/keys/{id}/revoke

new secret { data, secret } / disable

GET /api/audit?targetType=&targetId=&offset=&limit=

access audit log, newest first

Rate limiting is per API key (agents acting through one key share its budget), fixed one-minute windows, in memory (single process). Every authenticated REST/MCP response carries RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Remaining and RateLimit-Reset (seconds); over the limit the response is 429 rate_limited with Retry-After. Dashboard logins are throttled per client IP (see the Dashboard table).

Variable

Default

Purpose

MCPOCKET_API_KEYS

—

keyId:secret pairs (comma/newline separated)

MCPOCKET_API_KEY_ROLES

—

keyId:role pairs for env keys

MCPOCKET_API_KEY_DEFAULT_ROLE

admin

Role of env keys not listed in MCPOCKET_API_KEY_ROLES

MCPOCKET_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE

600

Requests per key per minute (managed keys may override; 0 = unlimited)

Webhooks

An admin registers webhook URLs (dashboard Webhooks page or REST) — optionally limited to item event types (item.created, item.updated, item.status_changed, item.deleted; empty = all) and to one folder (its whole subtree) or one tube. MCPocket then POSTs a JSON event for every matching item change:

{ "id": "<event id>", "type": "item.status_changed", "createdAt": "…",
  "data": { "action": "completed", "actor": "agent:bot-1", "itemId": "…", "tubeId": "…",
            "folderId": "…", "status": "completed", "previousStatus": "processing",
            "assignedAgent": "bot-1", "item": { …item as committed… } } }

Reliable delivery (transactional outbox). The delivery rows are written in the same storage transaction as the item change (one write lock, one persist — data/webhook-deliveries.json): if the change rolls back, no event is queued; if the process crashes after the change, the event is still in the outbox. A background dispatcher (started from instrumentation.ts next to the lease sweeper; one per process; woken immediately by item events, otherwise polling) sends due rows. 2xx = delivered; anything else (non-2xx, redirects, network errors, timeouts) is retried with exponential backoff and dead-lettered after the max attempts. Delivery is at-least-once — dedupe on X-MCPocket-Delivery (per subscription) or the payload id (per event). Deliveries of a disabled webhook wait until it is re-enabled. Old delivered/dead rows are pruned after the retention period. Re-seeding keeps webhook subscriptions but empties the outbox.

Signatures. Each webhook has its own secret (whsec_…), shown once on creation / rotation (it's stored to sign, but never returned or logged again). Headers: X-MCPocket-Signature: t=<unix>,v1=<hex> where v1 = HMAC-SHA256(secret, "<t>.<raw body>"), plus X-MCPocket-Event, X-MCPocket-Event-Id, X-MCPocket-Delivery, X-MCPocket-Webhook-Id, X-MCPocket-Attempt. Verify against the raw body and reject old t (verifyWebhookSignature in lib/webhooks/signature.ts is a reference):

const [, t, v1] = header.match(/t=(\d+),v1=([0-9a-f]+)/)
const expected = crypto.createHmac("sha256", secret).update(`${t}.${rawBody}`).digest("hex")
const ok = crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(v1, "hex"), Buffer.from(expected, "hex"))

Managing webhooks needs the admin role (access:manage); every change is in the access audit log (webhook.*, never the secret).

REST (admin)

GET /api/webhooks, POST /api/webhooks

list (with pending/delivered/dead counts, no secrets) / create { name, url, eventTypes?, folderId? | tubeId?, enabled? } → 201 { data, secret }

GET / PATCH / DELETE /api/webhooks/{id}

read / change (null clears the scope) / delete (with its deliveries)

POST /api/webhooks/{id}/rotate-secret

new secret { data, secret }

POST /api/webhooks/{id}/test

queue a webhook.ping delivery

GET /api/webhooks/{id}/deliveries, GET /api/webhooks/deliveries?webhookId=&status=pending,delivered,dead&offset=&limit=

outbox / delivery log, newest first

GET /api/webhooks/deliveries/{id}

payload, status, attempt log (time, HTTP status, duration, error / response excerpt)

POST /api/webhooks/deliveries/{id}/retry

re-queue now with a fresh attempt budget (dead, delivered → redeliver, pending)

Variable

Default

Purpose

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOKS_ENABLED

true

false stops the dispatcher (events still queue in the outbox)

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOK_INTERVAL_SECONDS

5

Polling interval (1..3600); item events also wake it

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOK_MAX_ATTEMPTS

8

Attempts before a delivery is dead-lettered

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOK_BACKOFF_SECONDS

10

First retry delay; doubles per attempt

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOK_MAX_BACKOFF_SECONDS

3600

Cap for the retry delay

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS

10

Per-request timeout

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOK_BATCH_SIZE

20

Deliveries sent concurrently per pass

MCPOCKET_WEBHOOK_RETENTION_DAYS

7

Prune delivered/dead rows after N days (0 = keep)

Media (S3)

Items can carry images, videos and other files. The Media module keeps the bytes in S3 (or any S3-compatible store: MinIO, Cloudflare R2, B2, Spaces, ...) and the item keeps only the URL. It is off until MCPOCKET_S3_BUCKET is set; while off, everything below is stored unchanged.

Embedded media. Put a file into payload or metadata as a data URI — at any depth, any number of them. On push, bulk push, update and bulk update (REST, MCP, and the dashboard's Import items dialog) every data URI with an explicit MIME type is uploaded and replaced by its public URL before the item is stored, so items, history and webhooks never contain the bytes:

{ "payload": { "title": "Hero", "image": "…",
               "attachments": ["data:application/pdf;name=brief.pdf;base64,JVBERi0…"] } }
→ { "payload": { "title": "Hero", "image": "https://my-bucket.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/media/3f/3f2a….png",
                 "attachments": ["https://…/media/9c/9c41….pdf"] } }

Objects are content-addressed (<prefix><sha256[0..2]>/<sha256>.<ext>), so the same file is stored once and retried / idempotent pushes never create duplicates. Every URI is checked (type, size, encoding) before the first upload; a bad one rejects the push with 400 / 413 (in a bulk push: that entry only). An S3 failure fails the request (500) and nothing is stored. Uploads run before the write transaction, so a slow bucket never blocks other writers. Plain https:// URLs are left as they are (not re-hosted).

Direct upload (needs items:push) — better for large files, since JSON bodies carry base64 (+33 %):

curl -X POST "$URL/api/media?filename=clip.mp4" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: video/mp4" --data-binary @clip.mp4
curl -X POST "$URL/api/media" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -F file=@photo.jpg
# → 201 { "data": { "url", "key", "contentType", "size", "sha256", "filename"? } }
curl "$URL/api/media" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY"   # { "data": { "enabled", "maxBytes", "allowedTypes" } }

Media library (dashboard → Media): every file under the prefix, newest first, with image / video / audio previews, totals per kind, filters (kind, unused only), upload (several files at once), copy / open URL, Used by (the items whose payload, metadata or result reference the file, linked to the item inspector) and delete (warns when items still link to it). Each tube has a Media tab next to Items with the same gallery limited to the files its items reference (counts per file = items of that tube). Same over REST (tubeId= for one tube):

curl "$URL/api/media/objects?tubeId=<tube id>&kind=video" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY"
curl "$URL/api/media/objects?kind=image&usage=unused&offset=0&limit=48" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY"
curl "$URL/api/media/usage?key=media/ab/ab12….png" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY"
curl -X DELETE "$URL/api/media/objects?key=media/ab/ab12….png" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY"   # items:manage

Demo: npm run demo:media (server running, media storage on) creates Media Studio (demo) with a 5-stage pipeline — Prompts → Images → Videos → Captions → Publish — through the REST API: generated PNG images, MP4 clips animated from the image as first frame (needs ffmpeg), WAV voice-overs and PDF briefs, handed from stage to stage by demo agents with complete { next }. Each tube description names the next tube's id, the way you would instruct real agents. --force creates another copy.

Listing reads the whole prefix (up to 10,000 objects) and scans items for references on each request — fine for the single-process v1 store.

Delivery. By default the links point at this server — https://<your host>/api/media/files/media/ab/ab12….png — which streams the file from the bucket, so the bucket can stay private and no CDN is needed.

Access (MCPOCKET_MEDIA_ACCESS). private (default): a file opens only for an API key with read (Authorization: Bearer …), a signed-in dashboard session (previews just work), or a signed link. To hand a file to something without an API key — a generator that needs an image as a video's first frame, a social network, a player, a person — mint a temporary link with the MCP tool create_media_link or POST /api/media/links { url | urls, expiresInSeconds? } (60 s … 7 days, default 1 h) and give out data.link; items keep the permanent data.url. Signed links are cacheable until they expire; key / session answers are Cache-Control: private. public: anyone with the link (keys are sha256 content hashes, so links cannot be guessed, but they never expire). The endpoint answers Range requests (video seeking), HEAD, If-None-Match → 304 and caches for a year (files never change); HTML / SVG uploads are sent as attachments under a sandbox CSP, so a file can never run script on the dashboard origin. Set MCPOCKET_PUBLIC_URL so links carry the public host rather than whatever host the request used.

To serve from elsewhere instead: MCPOCKET_MEDIA_PUBLIC_URL (a CDN in front of the bucket) wins over everything, or MCPOCKET_MEDIA_DELIVERY=bucket links straight to the bucket, which must then be readable — a public bucket / bucket policy, or MCPOCKET_S3_ACL=public-read where ACLs are enabled. Links already stored in items keep the form they were stored with. Deleting an item does not delete its media.

Variable

Default

Meaning

MCPOCKET_S3_BUCKET

—

Bucket name; set it to enable media

MCPOCKET_S3_REGION

us-east-1

Region (auto for R2)

MCPOCKET_S3_ENDPOINT

AWS

Endpoint of an S3-compatible store, e.g. http://minio:9000

MCPOCKET_S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE

true with an endpoint

Path-style addressing (<endpoint>/<bucket>/<key>)

MCPOCKET_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID / MCPOCKET_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY

SDK chain

Credentials; unset = AWS_* env, profile or IAM role

MCPOCKET_S3_ACL

—

Canned ACL per upload, e.g. public-read

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_ACCESS

private

private: media opens with an API key, a dashboard session or a signed link (create_media_link); public: anyone with the link. Applies to server delivery

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_DELIVERY

server

server: links point at /api/media/files/… on this server (private bucket); bucket: links point at the bucket

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_PUBLIC_URL

—

Base URL of the returned links (CDN); overrides MCPOCKET_MEDIA_DELIVERY

MCPOCKET_PUBLIC_URL

request origin

This server's public base URL, used in server links and upload links

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_PREFIX

media/

Key prefix; <workspace>/ is appended when MCPOCKET_WORKSPACE / MCPOCKET_SSO_WORKSPACE is set, and the server only stores, serves, lists and deletes keys under it

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES

52428800

Max size of one file (50 MiB)

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_ALLOWED_TYPES

any

MIME allowlist, comma separated, image/* wildcards

Request size limits still apply: bulk REST bodies ≤ 5 MiB, dashboard import requests ≤ 25 MB (one item each when larger than ~800 KB). Use direct upload for anything bigger.

An LLM agent cannot paste a video as base64 into a tool call, and generators usually hand out temporary URLs (plain https URLs in items are stored as they are, not copied). Two MCP tools cover this (items:push):

  • ingest_media { url } (or urls, ≤ 20; each a URL or { url, contentType?, filename? }) — the server downloads the file into S3 and returns its permanent data.url; per-URL results like the bulk tools. Only public hosts are fetched: private, loopback and link-local addresses are refused at connect time (redirects included). URLs already in media storage come back as they are (reused: true).

  • create_media_upload { contentType?, filename?, expiresInSeconds? } — a signed, short-lived (default 15 min, ≤ 1 h) URL for one file from the agent's shell: curl -X PUT -H 'Content-Type: video/mp4' --data-binary @clip.mp4 <uploadUrl> → 201 { data: { url, … } } (PUT or POST /api/media/uploads/{token}, raw bytes or multipart). No API key leaves the agent; the link is bound to the key that created it, which is re-checked (revoked → 401) and rate-limited on upload. Links are signed with a key derived from MCPOCKET_SESSION_SECRET (or the admin / SSO secret), else with a random key generated once into <DATA_DIR>/.media-upload-secret (mode 0600) — so links survive restarts either way. Instances that share neither a secret nor a data directory should set MCPOCKET_SESSION_SECRET.

Variable

Default

Meaning

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_INGEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS

120

Max time for one ingest_media download

MCPOCKET_MEDIA_INGEST_ALLOW_PRIVATE

false

Allow ingesting from private / loopback hosts (local dev only — SSRF risk)

Pipelines (complete → next tube)

Chain tubes into stages — e.g. prompts → images → videos → captions → publish — by letting the agent that completes an item push its output into the next tube in the same call. complete_item (MCP) / POST /api/items/{id}/complete take an optional next: one entry or a list (≤ 100) of { tubeId, payload, priority?, tags?, metadata?, idempotencyKey? }, each following push_item's rules.

POST /api/items/<prompt item id>/complete
{ "result": { "model": "img-v2" },
  "next": { "tubeId": "<images tube>",
            "payload": { "prompt": "a cat on the moon", "image": "…" } } }
→ { "data": { …completed prompt item… },
    "next": [ { "tubeId": "<images tube>", "status": "pending",
                "payload": { "prompt": "…", "image": "https://…/media/ab/ab12….png" },
                "metadata": { "source": { "tubeId": "<prompts tube>", "itemId": "<prompt item id>",
                                          "root": { "tubeId": "<prompts tube>", "itemId": "<prompt item id>" } } } } ] }
  • Atomic: completing the item and creating every next item is one write. If any entry is rejected (unknown, disabled or out-of-scope tube, schema mismatch) nothing is written, the lease stays and the error names the entry (next[1]: …).

  • Media: data URIs in result and in next payload / metadata are uploaded to S3 first (see Media); a file used in several places is uploaded once.

  • Lineage: every new item gets metadata.source = { tubeId, itemId, root } (root = the first item of the chain, e.g. the original prompt), and the source item's completed history event lists the items it created.

  • Hand-off targets (nextTubeIds): a tube can declare the stages it hands off to (tube settings → Pipeline, or create_tube / update_tube nextTubeIds). An agent connected to just that tube (/api/mcp/tubes/{id}) may then complete_item with next into those tubes — and only those — although it cannot see them otherwise; its server instructions name them. The API key itself must be allowed to reach the target. The tube's current nextTubeIds are checked on every call, so changes apply to open connections (legacy SSE included) immediately. Folder-scoped and unscoped connections need no declaration.

  • Long jobs (leaseSeconds): set a tube's default lease above the job time (e.g. 1800 for video generation), or have agents claim with leaseSeconds / call heartbeat_item; otherwise an expired lease lets another agent reclaim the item.

  • Fan-out: several next entries (also into different tubes) — e.g. four image variants per prompt.

  • Needs items:push in addition to items:process (the agent role has both); the next agent simply claims from the next tube.

UI components (shadcn/ui)

The dashboard uses shadcn/ui (style base-lyra, Base UI primitives). Add components with npx shadcn@latest add <name>; they land in components/ui and are imported as import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button".

Tool Schema Changelog

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