qseow-mcp

An MCP server for Qlik Sense Enterprise on Windows (client-managed).

The glue layer for a Qlik support agent. Qlik Cloud ships a native MCP endpoint; the client-managed estate — where a large share of enterprise Qlik still runs — has nothing equivalent. This server exposes the on-prem API surface (Repository/QRS, Engine/QIX, Proxy) as Model Context Protocol tools, so an agent can do what a support engineer does when a number is wrong: walk KPI → object → sheet → app → script → source, evaluating definitions at every step — plus govern, query, and build against the site.

Status: 0.5.2, pre-release. All 44 tools exercised end-to-end against Qlik Sense May 2026 (15.13.8) on a single-node site, in BOTH certificate and JWT auth modes (including the full mutation lifecycle: copy → set_script → reload → publish → delete, and task start-to-finish). Tool names and shapes may still change.

qseow-mcp is an independent open-source project by Terenzi LLC. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by QlikTech International AB. Qlik®, Qlik Sense®, and related marks are trademarks of QlikTech International AB, used here only to identify the software this server interoperates with.

Install

Claude Desktop — one-click. Download qseow-mcp-<version>.mcpb from the latest release and double-click it. Claude Desktop prompts for your hostname and certificate paths; there is no JSON to edit and no npm install to run.

Any MCP client — via npx. No clone, no build:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "qseow": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "qseow-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "QSEOW_HOST": "sense.example.com",
        "QSEOW_CERT_PATH": "/absolute/path/to/client.pem",
        "QSEOW_CERT_KEY_PATH": "/absolute/path/to/client_key.pem",
        "QSEOW_ROOT_CERT_PATH": "/absolute/path/to/root.pem"
      }
    }
  }
}

Claude Code, same thing in one line:

claude mcp add qseow --scope user \
  -e QSEOW_HOST=sense.example.com \
  -e QSEOW_CERT_PATH=/absolute/path/to/client.pem \
  -e QSEOW_CERT_KEY_PATH=/absolute/path/to/client_key.pem \
  -- npx -y qseow-mcp

Certificates come from QMC → Certificates → Export (choose PEM). For JWT instead of certificates, see Authentication.

It starts read-only. Mutating tools are not registered at all until you set QSEOW_ALLOW_MUTATIONS=true, so the tool list a client sees is genuinely read-only until you decide otherwise.

Related MCP server: Qlik MCP Server

Tools by persona

Expose only what a given deployment needs with QSEOW_TOOL_GROUPS.

Analyst — ask questions of data (Engine/QIX)

Every value-returning analytics tool ships a trust envelope: expression validation warnings (a misspelled field returns null/0 without erroring — the engine's worst habit) and the active selections the value was computed under, so a filtered number can never masquerade as the unfiltered truth.

Inspector — the troubleshooting loop (ships with the analyst group)

Published-app caveat: the engine hides a published app's script and lineage from user identities (internal certificate identities bypass this). The support-agent pattern is copy_app → trace the owned copy — the copy carries the same script and definitions.

Developer — build and ship apps (Engine + QRS)

Admin — govern the site (QRS)

Mutating tools (set_script, reload_app, create_app, copy_app, publish_app, delete_app, start_task, end_user_sessions, create_sheet, add_sheet_object) are gated at registration: unless QSEOW_ALLOW_MUTATIONS=true, they are never registered, so a read-only deployment advertises a genuinely read-only tool surface in tools/list. Default is read-only.

Every tool carries MCP tool annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) so clients that honor them can apply their own policy — e.g. reload_app/set_script/start_task are flagged destructive; selection tools are non-destructive session-state mutations.

Credential redaction applies to every QRS egress path: list_data_connections and generic qrs_search (any entity type, condensed or full:true) recursively mask credential-bearing fields (password, passphrase, clientsecret, ...) and secrets embedded in connection strings (PWD=..., apikey=...). Empty/null credential fields pass through unmasked — "no credential present" is a legitimate signal.

All list tools are paged (offset/limit, envelope {total, offset, returned, truncated, items}) so a site with thousands of apps or users cannot blow the client's context window.

Render verification

Modern Sense visualizations are nebula.js supernovas rendered by the client, not the engine — a hypercube the engine accepts and evaluates perfectly still renders blank if the supernova's default property blocks are missing (it throws Cannot read properties of undefined in the browser; the engine never knows). The builder ships those blocks per type, and validate_sheet flags objects that lack them.

Because engine-side validation cannot prove pixels, two scripts close the loop: scripts/viz_matrix.mjs builds one of every supported type against a live site, and scripts/render_proof.mjs drives a real headless browser over the result at sheet-tile sizes and reports what actually drew.

All 12 supported types are render-verified on Qlik Sense May 2026, at sheet-tile sizes, in a real browser client: kpi, gauge, barchart, linechart, combochart, piechart, scatterplot, treemap, table, pivot-table, listbox, text-image.

Getting a chart's real property contract

When a supernova refuses to draw, do not reverse-engineer its properties from error messages — some charts throw nothing useful. Instead ask the client what it writes:

node scripts/harvest_client_props.mjs treemap ./truth.json

This scans every readable app for client-authored objects of that type and dumps their properties. Qlik's shipped monitoring apps (Content / Operations / License Monitor) are a good source. This is how the last two broken types were fixed, each in a single pass after repeated guesswork had failed:

• treemap needed qMode: "K" (tree mode — the same class of trap as pivot-table needing "P") plus a far leaner property set than the generic builder produced. Harvested from Qlik's shipped Content Monitor app.

• gauge needed gaugetype, angle, autoOrientation, paletteProgressColor and segmentInfo — properties no error message ever named, because gauge fails silently. Harvested from a gauge authored in the Sense client for the purpose.

If a chart you build renders blank or errors, author one in the client, harvest it, and mirror it. That loop is minutes; reverse-engineering from crash messages is hours and does not terminate when the chart fails quietly.

Three methodology notes worth stealing if you build something similar:

1. Objects render at sheet-tile size, not full viewport — a chart that paints at 900×620 can refuse in a 640×150 tile.

2. Counting painted SVG nodes is not proof. A broken chart still draws its legend; that is how an earlier version of this proof reported a false PASS for treemap.

3. Automated verdicts are advisory; the screenshot is the authority. Qlik draws some error states as SVG text inside a shadow root that neither DOM scraping nor Playwright text locators matched reliably — treemap displayed "This chart cannot be displayed." while every automated probe called it rendered. Run render_proof.mjs with SHOTS=<dir> and look at the images.

Authentication

Two modes, both standard QSEoW patterns. Header-authentication virtual proxies are deliberately not supported: any client that can reach the proxy can assert any identity, which is not a footing to build an agent tool on.

certificate — QMC-exported client certificates against QRS :4242 and Engine :4747. The service-to-service path; full tool coverage. Export via QMC, or POST /qrs/certificatedistribution/exportcertificates.

jwt — a signed, expiring token through a JWT virtual proxy on :443. Carries a real per-user identity, so it's the right mode when the agent should act as a person and inherit that person's section-access and security rules.

One platform exception: the Proxy Service REST API (:4243, behind list_user_sessions/end_user_sessions) only speaks certificate auth — Qlik exposes no JWT route to it. Those two tools register whenever certificate material is configured (QSEOW_CERT_PATH/QSEOW_CERT_KEY_PATH), in either auth mode, and are absent from tools/list otherwise. Every other tool has identical coverage in both modes.

JWT and the engine WebSocket (CSWSH)

Both modes have full tool coverage apart from the two certificate-only QPS session tools noted above. Getting JWT working against the engine takes a specific handshake, documented here because it is easy to get wrong and the failure mode is an opaque 403 with an empty body.

A virtual proxy guards WebSocket upgrades with Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking protection. Presenting the JWT as a bearer token on the upgrade fails — the proxy expects what a browser sends:

1. GET /{prefix}/qps/csrftoken with Authorization: Bearer <jwt>. The response carries the token in a qlik-csrf-token response header (not a cookie) plus the session in Set-Cookie.

2. Open the WebSocket at wss://host/{prefix}/app/engineData?qlik-csrf-token=<token> sending that session cookie — not the bearer token.

The server handles this automatically and caches the result. Caching is not just an optimization: every bearer-authenticated request mints a new Qlik session, and users have a parallel-session limit, so re-authenticating per call eventually gets you OnMaxParallelSessionsExceeded from the engine.

Things that are not the cause, in case you are debugging a similar 403: Origin (a browser sends one with a port and is accepted), Host, ports, tunnels or port-forwards, xrfkey, or entries in the virtual proxy's websocketCrossOriginWhiteList — that list takes bare hostnames and did not affect the outcome either way.

One genuine misconfiguration worth checking on any scripted setup: a virtual proxy created through the QRS API comes up with an empty loadBalancingServerNodes, so no engine is reachable through it until a server node is attached.

To debug proxy authentication generally, enable debug logging: create %ProgramData%\Qlik\Sense\Proxy\LocalLogConfig.xml with a QSRollingFileAppender at threshold=debug bound to the Audit.Proxy, System.Proxy, and Security.Proxy loggers, then restart the proxy. It logs every request header the proxy actually received, which is the fastest way to compare a working browser upgrade against your client.

Minting a test JWT

JWT mode is bring-your-own-token: you supply a signed JWT via QSEOW_JWT (or QSEOW_JWT_PATH), and your JWT virtual proxy's config decides which claims map to the Qlik identity. In the common setup the VP maps sub → user id and a directory claim → user directory, and validates the signature against the certificate pasted into the VP. To generate a short-lived token for testing, sign with the matching private key (RS256):

// mint-jwt.mjs — node >=20, no deps. Usage: node mint-jwt.mjs > token.jwt
import { createSign } from "node:crypto";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";

const key = readFileSync(process.env.JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, "utf8"); // PEM the VP trusts
const b64u = (o) => Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(o)).toString("base64url");
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const header = { alg: "RS256", typ: "JWT" };
const payload = {
  sub: process.env.QLIK_USER_ID || "svc_agent",          // → VP "User ID" claim
  directory: process.env.QLIK_USER_DIRECTORY || "QSEOW",  // → VP "User directory" claim
  iat: now,
  exp: now + 3600,
};
const unsigned = `${b64u(header)}.${b64u(payload)}`;
const sig = createSign("RSA-SHA256").update(unsigned).sign(key).toString("base64url");
process.stdout.write(`${unsigned}.${sig}`);

Match the claim names to your virtual proxy's attribute mapping — they are configurable in the QMC. The identity you mint for must hold a Professional (or appropriate) license allocation, or the engine rejects OpenDoc with an opaque socket close.

Trust model — read this before you point it at production. A JWT virtual proxy verifies every token against the certificate you paste into it; a token is accepted only if it was signed by the matching private key. That private key is therefore a master credential: whoever holds it can mint a token asserting any identity the proxy will map, exactly as any SAML/OIDC identity provider can. This is inherent to JWT SSO, not something this server adds — qseow-mcp is only a client presenting a token, and it can impersonate nothing against a proxy whose private key it does not hold. The snippet above is harmless to publish for the same reason: it can only sign against a proxy you already control. Security therefore rests on four things, in order: (1) guard the signing key like the crown jewel it is — a secret store or HSM, never a repo, rotate on suspicion; (2) authentication is not authorization — a minted identity is still bound by that user's security rules, stream access, and section access, so scope the agent by scoping the Qlik user (the reason to prefer JWT over certificate mode, which runs as an internal identity that bypasses security rules); (3) the identity needs a license allocation to do anything; (4) keep tokens short-lived (the example expires in an hour) so a leaked token, unlike a leaked key, expires on its own. The server itself is read-only by default, so even a valid identity cannot mutate unless you enable it.

Architecting JWT for production

The natural next question — "so how does a real user get a token, as themselves and no one else?" — has an answer that lives outside Qlik. The JWT proxy does not authenticate anybody; it trusts whoever holds the signing key to have done that. So the identity guarantee is enforced by a token issuer that (a) authenticates the human by real credentials — your corporate IdP, MFA, whatever you already run — and (b) is built to stamp only that authenticated user's identity into the claims. Users authenticate to the issuer; the issuer, and only the issuer, holds the key; the user never sees it. Pick the shape that fits:

• Interactive humans → don't use JWT at all. Point people at an OIDC or SAML virtual proxy and let your existing IdP (Entra ID / Okta / Google / ADFS) authenticate them with their own login and MFA. Adding a user is then an IdP + Qlik-license task, not a token task — no minting, no key handling. This is the right default for humans.

• A service or agent → a dedicated Qlik identity. Provision one governed service user (e.g. svc_support_agent), scope it with security rules, and issue tokens for that one identity. The agent acts as itself, not as a person. Cleanest pattern for an always-on agent.

• An agent acting on behalf of a specific person → a trusted middle-tier. A small service authenticates the human (via your IdP), then mints a short-lived, per-user JWT so the agent inherits exactly that person's section access. This is the pattern to reach for only when per-user data scoping through the agent is a hard requirement.

Standing up the issuer, the IdP wiring, and the scoping correctly is the part worth getting right the first time — Terenzi LLC does exactly this as part of a support-agent deployment.

Run from source

For development, or to build the Claude Desktop bundle yourself (node mcpb/build.mjs → mcpb/qseow-mcp-<version>.mcpb).

npm install && npm run build
cp .env.example .env      # fill in host + auth
node dist/index.js        # stdio MCP server

The server reads ./.env automatically if present (or the file named by QSEOW_ENV_PATH); variables already set in the environment always win. When registering with an MCP client (Claude Desktop / Claude Code), either pass the variables in the client's env block or set QSEOW_ENV_PATH to an absolute path — the client controls the working directory, so a relative ./.env may not be found.

Demos

Three runnable demos live in examples/ (GitHub repo only — not part of the npm package). Each has a runbook and an assertion-backed trace.mjs, so the claims are verifiable rather than illustrative:

Run any of them with cd examples/<demo> && node trace.mjs — a non-zero exit means an assertion failed.

Integration smoke test against a live site (creates a small demo app, needs QSEOW_ALLOW_MUTATIONS=true):

npm run smoke

Notes

• Engine sessions are cached per server process with a 5-minute idle reap, so selections persist across tool calls within a conversation.

• QRS calls generate a fresh xrfkey per request.

• QSEOW_TLS_VERIFY=false exists for self-signed lab certificates; leave it on in production.

Commercial support

qseow-mcp is free and open-source, and stays that way. If you want a Qlik troubleshooting/support agent running against your own estate — the server plus agent configuration, playbooks, and team enablement, deployed and validated — that's what Terenzi LLC does. There's a fixed-fee, read-only assessment to start.

Terenzi LLC is a Qlik partner; this project is independent and is not a Qlik product (see the trademark note above).

License

Apache-2.0 — Copyright 2026 Terenzi LLC. See LICENSE and NOTICE.