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kali-mcp-server

kali-mcp-server

by rangta10

hydra_bruteforce

Brute-force passwords for SSH, FTP, and HTTP services using Hydra to test credentials against a target with a configurable wordlist.

Instructions

Use Hydra for password brute forcing (SSH, FTP, HTTP, etc.)

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "target": "<target>",
      "service": "<service>",
      "username": "<username>"
    },
    "name": "hydra_bruteforce"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
targetYesTarget IP or hostname
serviceYesService to attack (ssh, ftp, http-get, http-post, etc.)
usernameYesUsername to test (or 'wordlist' to use file)
wordlistNoPath to password wordlist/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure and largely fails. It does not state that this is an active, potentially disruptive credential attack, that it may lock accounts or trigger IDS, that it requires authorization, or that run time scales with wordlist size. An agent gets only the bare fact that Hydra is used.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single short sentence with the action front-loaded and no filler. It is efficient, though its brevity is partly a symptom of under-specification rather than tight editing.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a four-parameter, unannotated, no-output-schema security tool, the description leaves too much unsaid: no expected output, no indication of duration, no safety or authorization context, and no explanation of the 'wordlist' sentinel value for username. The rich schema compensates only for the parameter dimension.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters are already documented, and the description adds no syntax, format, or interpretation beyond that. The protocol examples it lists duplicate the schema's own 'service' enumeration, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb (brute forcing) and resource (passwords via Hydra) and gives concrete protocol examples (SSH, FTP, HTTP). It is distinguishable from siblings like nmap_scan or sqlmap_scan, which serve different phases, though it does not explicitly contrast itself with any of them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives no when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no exclusions — nothing about authorization requirements, lockout risk, or when a targeted scan would be preferable. The only hint of an alternative is the vague 'etc.' in the protocol list, which is not actionable.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.