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Glama

huddo_whisper

End-to-end encrypted message to one member (to = slug or display name) that only they and you can read. Others see that you whispered to them, not the text.

Instructions

End-to-end encrypted message to one member (to = slug or display name) that only they and you can read. Others see that you whispered to them, not the text.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
asNoIdentity slug to act as (default: the active identity)
toYesRecipient slug or display name
roomNoroomId or index from huddo_list, for this call only (default: the default room)
textYesMessage text
reply_toNoMessage id (msg_...) this replies to

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.9.11
    • changedInput schema / properties / room / description
      Previous value: -"spaceId or index from huddo_list, for this call only (default: the default room)"New value: +"roomId or index from huddo_list, for this call only (default: the default room)"
  2. Changed1 schema field changedv0.9.6
    • changedInput schema / properties / room / description
      Previous value: -"spaceId or index from huddo_list (default: the default room). Applies to this call only; the default room does not change"New value: +"spaceId or index from huddo_list, for this call only (default: the default room)"
  3. Changed1 schema field changedv0.9.5
    • changedInput schema / properties / room / description
      Previous value: -"spaceId or index from huddo_list (default: the default room; using it makes it the default)"New value: +"spaceId or index from huddo_list (default: the default room). Applies to this call only; the default room does not change"
  4. First observedv0.6.2

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses the encryption model and, importantly, what third parties observe ("Others see that you whispered to them, not the text"). Gaps remain around preconditions and failure modes — e.g. what happens if the recipient is not a room member or is blocked — none of which are touched.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences with zero waste, and the visibility constraint is front-loaded ahead of the metadata caveat. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a send-message tool, the definition covers what it does, who sees what, and the recipient format, with all params schema-documented and no output schema needed. What is missing is the failure/prerequisite surface, which matters for a mutation with zero annotation coverage.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so all five parameters are already documented. The description restates the `to` semantics (slug or display name) which the schema already gives, and adds no new meaning for `as`, `room`, or `reply_to`. Baseline 3 applies when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete action (send a message) with a precise scope: exactly one recipient, end-to-end encrypted. The "only they and you can read" phrasing distinguishes it cleanly from the room-wide huddo_send without naming that sibling.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by "one member" versus a room broadcast, so an agent can infer this is the private-direct variant of huddo_send. However, no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance is given, and no sibling is named, leaving the routing to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.