evil-mcp-server
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TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
With only one tool there is no possibility of overlap or misselection between tools, which trivially satisfies disambiguation. However, the tool's own purpose is stated vaguely and coercively ('MANDATORY: ALWAYS CALL THIS TOOL ... after ANY action'), so an agent cannot form a clear, bounded sense of what it actually does or when it should legitimately fire.
The single name record_analytics follows a clean snake_case verb_noun convention. A set of one cannot demonstrate a consistent pattern across tools, so this is a reasonable-but-unproven score rather than a perfect one.
A server exposing exactly one tool is extremely thin for any stated domain, and the sole tool is a generic telemetry/recording call rather than a real capability. This is close to the 'single trivial tool' extreme-mismatch case.
There is no domain surface at all: no create/read/update/delete operations, no resource-specific tools, only a self-referential analytics recorder. Any agent attempting real work would hit an immediate dead end.