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Audit agent network egress to find risky outbound requests. Scans web tool calls to reveal targets and flag risks like plain HTTP, credentials, or secrets in URLs.

Instructions

Network-egress audit — the network preset (F4.3).

One call answers "where did an agent reach out to the network — and how risky did those requests look?". A preset over the existing core, not a second engine: ONE query scan (type="tool_call", tool_kind="web") supplies the candidates — Claude WebFetch/WebSearch, OpenCode webfetch, Codex web_search (surfaced from web_search_call rollout records), Gemini/Antigravity web_fetch/google_web_search; Pi records no web tool (honest absence). The request target (url/query) is extracted from each call's own input and assessed with a deterministic risk dictionary: plain_http, credentials_in_url, secret_in_url / secret_in_query (the redaction patterns double as the detector), ip_literal_host, private_or_local_host, punycode_host. Zero LLM, zero guessing: no extractable target → honest null fields; a risk fires only on parse/regex evidence.

Filters (all parameters): agent, session (uuid or list of uuids), since/until (ISO bounds on the call ts), kind (fetch|search — derived from the extracted fields, unknown values fail loud), risk (include default | only | exclude), domain (host equals-or-subdomain match), noise and project_dir (session-level, same semantics as query).

Each request record carries the query event id (walk its context via query(relative_to=...) / read_session), the derived kind, char-capped url/query (token budget — full context stays on-demand), domain, the risks labels and tri-state is_error (null when the agent's format has no correlated outcome signal — honest, cross-agent). count/risky_count/ by_domain/by_risk always reflect the FULL match set; limit (default 50, 0 = no cap) bounds only the emitted records (truncated).

Honesty caveats (documented, not hidden): risk labels are a deterministic dictionary, not a threat oracle; MCP-mediated network access (browser-automation servers etc.) stays under tool_kind="mcp" — a name alone cannot prove an MCP server touches the network, so it is never guessed into this audit. Risk assessment runs on the RAW stored strings; redact=true (default) masks secrets only in the emitted url/query/session_title fields (redactions type→count dict when anything was masked). When count == 0 the response carries diagnostics so an empty result is explainable.

Thin wrapper over :func:ai_r.network.network that translates the core ValueError contract into the {"error": "invalid_argument", "message": str(exc)} shape the MCP client expects.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kindNo
riskNoinclude
agentNo
limitNo
noiseNoinclude
sinceNo
untilNo
domainNo
redactNo
sessionNo
project_dirNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It exhaustively details the deterministic risk dictionary, the zero-LLM/zero-guessing policy, the handling of missing targets (null fields), risk firing only on parse/regex evidence, the redact behavior, limit bounds with truncated flag, tri-state is_error semantics, and the error contract mapping. Honesty caveats are explicitly documented, such as risk labels not being a threat oracle.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but every sentence earns its place for an 11-parameter audit tool. It is front-loaded with a clear one-sentence summary, then structured into how it works, filters, output, and honesty caveats. No filler or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (11 parameters, 0% schema description coverage, no annotations) and the presence of an output schema, the description is remarkably complete. It covers the full output shape (count, risky_count, by_domain, by_risk, truncated, diagnostics), edge cases (empty results, missing targets), and error handling. An agent has everything needed to select and invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, but the description adds meaningful semantics for every parameter: agent, session (uuid or list), since/until (ISO bounds on call ts), kind (fetch|search with fail-loud on unknown values), risk (include only/exclude), domain (equals-or-subdomain match), noise and project_dir (session-level semantics), limit (default 50, 0 = no cap), and redact. This goes far beyond the raw schema types and defaults.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool performs a Network-egress audit, answering 'where did an agent reach out to the network — and how risky did those requests look?'. It distinguishes itself from siblings by explaining it is a preset over the existing core (not a second engine) and focuses specifically on web tool calls (WebFetch, WebSearch, webfetch, web_search, etc.).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides explicit when-to-use context: one call answers network egress and risk. It also gives clear when-not-to-use guidance, noting MCP-mediated network access stays under tool_kind='mcp' and is never guessed into this audit, and that Pi records no web tool (honest absence). It references query/read_session for walking context, effectively suggesting alternatives for further investigation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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