MCPGuard
Enables security policy enforcement and audit logging for tool calls initiated by CrewAI agents through the security gateway.
Provides an isolated execution environment for AI agent tool calls, ensuring code is run in a secure sandbox rather than on bare metal.
Routes and secures tool calls from LangChain agents, applying taint tracking and deterministic execution envelopes.
Exports distributed tracing data for intercepted tool calls and policy evaluations to OpenTelemetry-compatible backends for full observability.
Provides operational metrics and performance statistics for tool call activity and security gateway health for monitoring via Prometheus.
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@MCPGuardShow the last 5 blocked tool calls and the security reasons for flagging them"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
MCPKernel — The Security Kernel for AI Agents
Open-source MCP/A2A security gateway that stops tool poisoning, data exfiltration, prompt injection, and rug-pull attacks — with policy enforcement, taint tracking, sandboxed execution, deterministic envelopes, skill auditing, and Sigstore audit for every AI agent tool call. Works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, OpenClaw, and any MCP client. OWASP ASI 2026 compliant.
Quick Start
Option A: Security Gateway (proxy mode)
pip install "mcpkernel[all]"
mcpkernel serve --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000Point your MCP client to http://localhost:8000/mcp instead of targeting tool servers directly. Every tool call is now policy-checked, taint-scanned, sandboxed, and audit-logged.
Option B: MCP Server (tool mode — one command)
pip install mcpkernel
mcpkernel install claude # or: cursor, vscode, windsurf, zed, openclaw, gooseThis adds MCPKernel as an MCP server in your IDE. Your agent can now call mcpkernel_scan_tool, mcpkernel_check_taint, mcpkernel_validate_policy, and more — natively.
Option C: Python API
from mcpkernel import MCPKernelProxy
async with MCPKernelProxy(
upstream=["http://localhost:3000/mcp"],
policy="strict",
taint=True,
) as proxy:
result = await proxy.call_tool("read_file", {"path": "data.csv"})Or secure any function with one decorator:
from mcpkernel import protect
@protect(policy="strict", taint=True)
async def read_data(path: str) -> str:
return Path(path).read_text()Why MCPKernel?
AI agents (LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, Copilot, OpenClaw) call tools autonomously — reading files, executing code, making HTTP requests. The MCP ecosystem has 344+ reported security advisories in projects like OpenClaw alone, with critical vulnerabilities including tool poisoning attacks, privilege escalation, data exfiltration, and rug-pull exploits.
MCPKernel is the missing chokepoint. It sits between your agent and MCP tool servers, enforcing security policies on every single call:
┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐
│ AI Agent │────▶│ MCPKernel │────▶│ MCP Tool │
│ (LangChain, │◀────│ Security Gateway │◀────│ Server │
│ CrewAI, │ └──────────────────────────┘ └─────────────┘
│ OpenClaw, │ │ Policy │ Taint │ Sandbox │
│ Cursor, etc) │ │ DEE │ Audit │ eBPF │
└─────────────┘ │ Skills │ DLP │ Doctor │What happens to every tool call:
Step | What MCPKernel Does |
1. Policy Check | Evaluates against YAML rules with OWASP ASI 2026 mappings — blocks or allows |
2. Taint Scan | Detects secrets (AWS keys, JWTs), PII (SSN, credit cards), and user input in arguments |
3. DLP Guard | Prevents multi-hop data leaks across tool boundaries (PII in → HTTP out = blocked) |
4. Sandbox Execution | Runs code in Docker, Firecracker, WASM, or Microsandbox — never on bare metal |
5. Deterministic Envelope | Hashes inputs/outputs, Sigstore-signs the trace — fully replayable |
6. Audit Log | Writes to tamper-proof append-only log with SIEM export (CEF, JSONL, CSV, SARIF) |
The MCP Security Problem
The MCP ecosystem is growing fast — but security hasn't kept pace. Here are the real-world threats MCPKernel defends against:
Threat | How It Works | Real-World Impact | MCPKernel Defense |
Tool Poisoning | Hidden | Cursor, Claude Desktop, any MCP client — credentials exfiltrated silently | Poisoning Scanner detects hidden instructions, Unicode obfuscation, |
Tool Shadowing | Malicious MCP server injects behavior that overrides trusted servers (e.g., redirects all emails to attacker) | Agent sends data to attacker while appearing to use trusted tools | Cross-server policy isolation + taint labels block data from flowing to untrusted sinks |
MCP Rug Pulls | Server changes tool descriptions after user approves installation | Trusted tool becomes malicious overnight — no detection | DEE envelope hashing pins tool descriptions; drift detection catches changes |
Privilege Escalation | Auth reconnect self-claims | 2 critical CVEs in OpenClaw (GHSA-9hjh, GHSA-fqw4) — RCE via scope widening | Policy engine enforces least-privilege; no implicit admin escalation |
Data Exfiltration | Agent reads secrets then passes them as hidden parameters to outbound tools | PII, API keys, SSH keys leaked via side-channel in tool arguments | Taint tracking + DLP chain detection blocks tainted data from reaching sinks |
Skill Supply Chain | Malicious OpenClaw/ClawHub skills contain | User installs skill that backdoors their system | Skill Scanner audits SKILL.md for 25+ dangerous patterns before installation |
Sandbox Escape | Exec runs on host when sandbox is off (OpenClaw default: | Agent code runs with full OS privileges | 4 sandbox backends (Docker, Firecracker, WASM, Microsandbox) — sandbox-first by design |
No Audit Trail | No tamper-proof record of what agents did, when, or why | Impossible to investigate incidents or prove compliance | Sigstore-signed append-only logs with SIEM export (CEF, JSONL, CSV, SARIF) |
OpenClaw has 344+ security advisories including 2 critical RCE vulnerabilities, scope bypass issues, and webhook authentication gaps. MCPKernel is the security layer that platforms like OpenClaw need but don't have built in.
Features
Core Security Pipeline
YAML Policy Engine — define allow/deny/audit/sandbox rules per tool, argument pattern, or taint label
Taint Tracking — automatic detection of secrets, PII, API keys, JWTs in tool call arguments
DLP Chain Detection — prevents multi-hop data leaks across tool boundaries (database → HTTP blocked)
4 Sandbox Backends — Docker, Firecracker microVMs, WASM, Microsandbox
Deterministic Execution Envelopes (DEE) — every execution is hashed and Sigstore-signed for replay
OWASP ASI 2026 Compliance — built-in policy sets mapping to ASI-01 through ASI-08
Append-Only Audit Logs — SQLite-backed, content-hashed, with CEF/JSONL/CSV/SARIF SIEM export
Threat Detection & Scanning
Tool Poisoning Scanner — detects hidden instructions, Unicode obfuscation, and prompt injection in MCP tool descriptions
Skill Scanner — audits OpenClaw/ClawHub SKILL.md files for dangerous shell commands, exfiltration patterns, and hidden instructions
MCP Config Discovery — auto-discovers MCP configurations across Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Zed, OpenClaw, Goose
Snyk Agent Scan Bridge — run Snyk's
agent-scanCLI and auto-generate policy rules from findings
Multi-Client Integration
One-Command Install —
mcpkernel install claudeadds security tools to any supported IDEMCPKernel as MCP Server — expose scan, validate, taint-check, and doctor as native agent tools
7 Supported Clients — Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Zed, OpenClaw, Goose
OpenClaw Security Skill — installable skill package for the OpenClaw/ClawHub ecosystem
Developer Experience
Python API —
MCPKernelProxyclass and@protectdecorator for programmatic usePolicy Presets — built-in
permissive,standard, andstrictpresets — zero-config securityDoctor Diagnostics —
mcpkernel doctorchecks Python, dependencies, config, exposed secrets, permissionsVS Code Extension — TreeView for discovered servers, security findings panel, integrated commands
Platform & Observability
Kong-Style Plugin Pipeline —
pre_execution → execution → post_execution → logwith prioritiesRate Limiting — per-identity token bucket with LRU eviction
Prometheus Metrics + OpenTelemetry — full observability out of the box
Optional eBPF Probes — kernel-level syscall monitoring at MCP boundaries
Agent Manifest Integration — load
agent.yaml, convert compliance (FINRA/SEC) to policy rules, block undeclared toolsLangfuse Observability Export — async batched export to Langfuse for LLM-level analytics
Guardrails AI Validation — enhanced PII, secret, and toxicity detection via Guardrails hub validators
MCP Server Registry — discover, search, and validate upstream MCP servers from the official registry
Causal Trust Graph (CTG) — Novel Research Contribution
Adaptive Trust Decay — tool/server trust erodes exponentially: T(t) = T₀ · e^{-λ(t-t₀)} · Π w(vᵢ)
Retroactive Taint Invalidation — when a source is compromised, all downstream data is retroactively tainted
Behavioral Fingerprinting — detects anomalous tool-call patterns via graph topology z-scores
Minimum Privilege Computation — derives provably minimal permissions from observed causal chains
Causal Chain Analysis — trace any tool output back to its root data sources
Security Protections (MCP Spec 2025-11-25)
Confused Deputy Defense — prevents cross-server delegation attacks with tool/server allowlists
Token Passthrough Guard — blocks credential leakage (OpenAI keys, GitHub PATs, AWS keys, JWTs) in args and results
SSRF Guard — blocks private networks, cloud metadata (169.254.169.254), with domain allowlists
Session Hijacking Defense — HMAC-bound sessions with client fingerprint verification and expiry
Memory Poisoning Defense — detects self-reinforcing injection (Zombie Agents) with repetition scoring
Unified Security Pipeline — run all checks in a single
pipeline.check_tool_call()invocation
Compliance Presets
One-Line Activation —
apply_preset("hipaa", settings)configures all security controls5 Built-in Presets — HIPAA, SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, GDPR Article 25, FedRAMP High
YAML Configurable — set
compliance.preset: hipaain your config file
Getting Started
# Install with all backends
pip install "mcpkernel[all]"
# Start the security gateway
mcpkernel serve --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000Point your MCP client to http://localhost:8000/mcp instead of targeting tool servers directly.
Add MCPKernel as an MCP Server (agent-callable security tools)
# Install into your IDE — one command
mcpkernel install claude # Claude Desktop
mcpkernel install cursor # Cursor IDE
mcpkernel install vscode # VS Code + Copilot
mcpkernel install windsurf # Windsurf
mcpkernel install zed # Zed
mcpkernel install openclaw # OpenClaw
mcpkernel install goose # GooseOnce installed, your agent can call these security tools natively:
MCP Tool | What It Does |
| Scan a tool's description for poisoning, shadowing, and prompt injection |
| Validate a YAML policy file for syntax and logic errors |
| Find all MCP configurations on the system |
| Check text for leaked secrets, PII, and API keys |
| Audit an OpenClaw/ClawHub SKILL.md for dangerous patterns |
| Run health diagnostics on the MCPKernel installation |
Run Health Diagnostics
mcpkernel doctorChecks: Python version, dependencies, config file validity, exposed secrets in environment, tool availability, and file permissions.
Scan Skills Before Installing
# Scan a single skill
mcpkernel scan-skill path/to/SKILL.md
# Scan a directory of skills
mcpkernel scan-skill skills/ --jsonDetects: curl|bash pipes, rm -rf, exfiltration endpoints, hardcoded API keys, hidden instructions, undeclared environment variables, and more.
Use Cases — Guided Setup
1. Secure AI Coding Assistants (Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf)
Prevent your coding assistant from exfiltrating secrets or overwriting critical files.
pip install "mcpkernel[all]"
mcpkernel initAdd a policy to block sensitive file access:
# .mcpkernel/policies/coding_assistant.yaml
rules:
- id: CA-001
name: Block secret file reads
action: deny
tool_patterns: ["read_file", "file_read"]
arg_patterns:
path: ".*\\.(env|pem|key|credentials)$"
- id: CA-002
name: Block outbound HTTP with tainted data
action: deny
tool_patterns: ["http_post", "http_request", "fetch"]
taint_labels: [secret, pii]Start the gateway and point your MCP client to it:
mcpkernel serve --port 8000
# In your editor's MCP config: http://localhost:8000/mcp2. Autonomous Agent Frameworks (LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen)
Sandbox every tool call your agents make — no code runs on bare metal.
pip install "mcpkernel[docker]"
mcpkernel initConfigure Docker sandboxing:
# .mcpkernel/config.yaml
sandbox:
backend: docker
timeout_seconds: 30
policy:
default_action: audit # log everything, deny dangerous callsRoute your framework through MCPKernel:
import httpx
# Instead of calling tools directly, route through MCPKernel
result = httpx.post("http://localhost:8000/mcp", json={
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {"name": "execute_code", "arguments": {"code": "print('hello')"}}
})See full examples: LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen
3. Enterprise MCP Deployments (OWASP ASI Compliance)
Deploy MCPKernel as the central chokepoint with strict OWASP ASI 2026 policies.
pip install "mcpkernel[all]"
mcpkernel init
# Apply the strict OWASP policy set
cp policies/owasp_asi_2026_strict.yaml .mcpkernel/policies/# .mcpkernel/config.yaml
policy:
default_action: deny # deny-by-default for production
policy_paths:
- .mcpkernel/policies/owasp_asi_2026_strict.yaml
observability:
metrics_enabled: true
otlp_endpoint: "http://your-otel-collector:4317"Export audit logs to your SIEM:
mcpkernel audit-query --format cef > siem_export.log
mcpkernel audit-verify # verify tamper-proof chain4. Research Reproducibility (Deterministic Execution)
Every tool call is hashed and Sigstore-signed — replay any execution exactly.
pip install mcpkernel
mcpkernel serveAfter running your experiment through MCPKernel:
# List all traces
mcpkernel trace-list
# Export a trace for your paper's appendix
mcpkernel trace-export <trace-id> > experiment_trace.json
# Replay and verify — detects any drift
mcpkernel replay <trace-id>The Deterministic Execution Envelope (DEE) ensures reviewers can verify your results independently.
5. Multi-Agent Workflows (Cross-Tool Taint Tracking)
Prevent PII from leaking across tool boundaries in multi-agent pipelines.
# .mcpkernel/policies/taint_isolation.yaml
rules:
- id: TAINT-001
name: Block PII in outbound calls
action: deny
tool_patterns: ["http_post", "send_email", "slack_message"]
taint_labels: [pii, secret]
- id: TAINT-002
name: Audit all user input propagation
action: audit
taint_labels: [user_input]MCPKernel tracks taint labels (secrets, PII, user input) across tool calls — if Agent A's database query returns SSNs, Agent B's HTTP POST is automatically blocked from sending them.
6. Regulated Industries (FINRA, SEC, Federal Reserve)
Use agent manifests for automated compliance enforcement.
# Validate your agent's compliance declarations
mcpkernel manifest-validate /path/to/agent-repo
# Import and generate policy rules from agent.yaml
mcpkernel manifest-import /path/to/agent-repo > compliance_rules.yamlMCPKernel reads your agent.yaml and auto-generates policy rules for:
Risk tier classification and supervision requirements
Data governance and communications monitoring
Segregation of duties enforcement
Recordkeeping and audit trail requirements
Framework-specific rules (FINRA, SEC, Federal Reserve)
Append-only audit logs with integrity verification provide the evidence trail regulators require:
mcpkernel audit-query --event-type policy_violation --format cef
mcpkernel audit-verifyIntegration Pipeline
MCPKernel fits into a full agent security pipeline. It integrates with tools at every stage:
DISCOVER SCAN PROTECT CONNECT OBSERVE TEST
discover ──▶ poison-scan ──▶ MCPKernel ──▶ AI Agents ──▶ Langfuse ──▶ promptfoo
scan-skill agent-scan (runtime gate) (LangChain, (traces, (prompt
doctor Snyk CLI mcp-serve CrewAI, etc) metrics) testing)
install OpenClaw,
Cursor, etc...Built-in Integrations
Integration | What It Does | CLI Command |
Langfuse Export | Ships audit entries + DEE traces to Langfuse for analytics |
|
Guardrails AI | Enhanced PII/secret/toxicity detection via Guardrails hub validators | Plugs into taint pipeline automatically |
MCP Server Registry | Discover, search, validate upstream MCP servers |
|
Snyk Agent Scan | Static security scan → auto-generated policy rules |
|
Tool Poisoning Scanner | Detect hidden instructions and shadowing in tool descriptions |
|
Skill Scanner | Audit OpenClaw/ClawHub SKILL.md files for supply chain attacks |
|
MCP Config Discovery | Find all MCP configs across IDEs (Claude, Cursor, VS Code, etc.) |
|
Multi-Client Installer | Install MCPKernel as MCP server in any supported IDE |
|
Doctor Diagnostics | Health check: Python, deps, config, secrets, permissions |
|
Example: Full Pipeline in 7 Commands
# 1. Install MCPKernel into your IDE
mcpkernel install claude
# 2. Run health diagnostics
mcpkernel doctor
# 3. Discover all MCP configurations on this system
mcpkernel discover
# 4. Scan for tool poisoning and shadowing attacks
mcpkernel poison-scan
# 5. Scan skills before installing them
mcpkernel scan-skill downloaded-skills/
# 6. Start the security gateway (PROTECT phase)
mcpkernel serve -c .mcpkernel/config.yaml
# 7. Export traces to Langfuse for analytics (OBSERVE phase)
mcpkernel langfuse-export --limit 100Example: Registry Search Output
$ mcpkernel registry-search filesystem
Found 3 server(s) matching 'filesystem':
@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ✓
Secure file system access for AI agents
Transports: stdio
Install: npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem
@anthropic/files
Read and write files with permission controls
Transports: stdio, streamable_http
community/local-fs
Lightweight local file system server
Transports: stdioExample: Agent Scan Output
$ mcpkernel agent-scan .mcpkernel/
Found 2 issue(s):
🔴 [CRITICAL] Prompt injection vulnerability
Server: filesystem
Tool: read_file
Fix: Add input validation for path arguments
🟡 [MEDIUM] Tool shadowing detected
Server: custom-tools
Tool: execute
Fix: Rename tool to avoid shadowing built-in
Generated 2 policy rule(s) from findings.
Exported to .mcpkernel/policies/scan_rules.yamlExample: Langfuse Export Output
$ mcpkernel langfuse-export --limit 50
✓ Exported 50 audit entries to Langfuse (https://cloud.langfuse.com)Configure Langfuse with environment variables:
export MCPKERNEL_LANGFUSE__ENABLED=true
export MCPKERNEL_LANGFUSE__PUBLIC_KEY=pk-lf-...
export MCPKERNEL_LANGFUSE__SECRET_KEY=sk-lf-...Or in YAML:
# .mcpkernel/config.yaml
langfuse:
enabled: true
public_key: pk-lf-...
secret_key: sk-lf-...
host: https://cloud.langfuse.com # or self-hostedExample: Guardrails AI Enhanced Taint Detection
When guardrails_ai.enabled: true, MCPKernel augments its built-in regex patterns with Guardrails AI validators for higher-accuracy detection:
# .mcpkernel/config.yaml
guardrails_ai:
enabled: true
pii_validator: true # DetectPII from guardrails hub
secrets_validator: true # SecretsPresent from guardrails hub
toxic_content: false # ToxicLanguage (optional, needs model)
on_fail: noop # noop = detect only, exception = block# Install Guardrails AI + hub validators
pip install guardrails-ai
guardrails hub install hub://guardrails/detect_pii
guardrails hub install hub://guardrails/secrets_presentArchitecture
src/mcpkernel/
├── proxy/ # FastAPI MCP/A2A gateway — auth (OAuth2, mTLS), rate limiting, plugin pipeline
├── policy/ # YAML rule engine with OWASP ASI 2026 mappings
├── taint/ # Source/sink taint tracking — secrets, PII, user input + DLP chain detection
├── sandbox/ # Docker, Firecracker, WASM, Microsandbox execution backends
├── dee/ # Deterministic Execution Envelopes — hash, sign, replay, drift detect
├── audit/ # Append-only Sigstore-signed audit logs + SIEM export (CEF, JSONL, CSV, SARIF)
├── context/ # Token-efficient context reduction via TF-IDF + AST pruning
├── ebpf/ # Optional kernel-level syscall monitoring (BCC probes)
├── observability/ # Prometheus metrics, OpenTelemetry tracing, health checks
├── agent_manifest/ # agent.yaml loader, compliance-to-policy bridge, tool schema validator
├── integrations/ # Third-party pipeline integrations
│ ├── langfuse.py # Async audit/trace export to Langfuse
│ ├── guardrails.py # Guardrails AI PII/secret/toxicity validators
│ ├── registry.py # MCP Server Registry client
│ ├── agent_scan.py # Snyk agent-scan bridge + policy rule generation
│ ├── discovery.py # Auto-discover MCP configs across IDEs
│ ├── poisoning.py # Tool poisoning & shadowing attack scanner
│ ├── skill_scanner.py # OpenClaw/ClawHub SKILL.md security auditor
│ ├── installer.py # Multi-client MCP server installer (7 IDE targets)
│ └── doctor.py # Health diagnostics (deps, config, secrets, permissions)
├── mcp_server.py # MCPKernel as MCP server — 6 security tools over stdio/HTTP
├── api.py # Programmatic Python API — MCPKernelProxy, protect() decorator
├── presets.py # Built-in policy presets (permissive, standard, strict)
├── config.py # Pydantic v2 hierarchical config (YAML → env → CLI)
├── cli.py # Typer CLI — 35+ commands for security, scanning, install, audit
└── utils.py # Hashing, exceptions, structured loggingPolicy Rules
MCPKernel ships with three policy sets:
owasp_asi_2026_strict.yaml— Full OWASP ASI 2026 coverage (ASI-01 through ASI-08)minimal.yaml— Lightweight defaults for developmentcustom_template.yaml— Copy and customize for your environment
Example rule:
rules:
- id: ASI-03-001
name: Block PII in outbound calls
description: Prevent PII-tainted data from reaching HTTP sinks
action: deny
priority: 10
tool_patterns:
- "http_post"
- "send_email"
taint_labels:
- pii
- secret
owasp_asi_id: ASI-03CLI Reference
Command | Description |
Security Gateway | |
| Start the proxy gateway |
| Run MCPKernel as an MCP server (agent-callable tools via stdio) |
Setup & Config | |
| Initialize config and policies in a project |
| Install MCPKernel as MCP server in Claude/Cursor/VS Code/Windsurf/Zed/OpenClaw/Goose |
| Remove MCPKernel from a target client |
| Run health diagnostics (Python, deps, config, secrets, permissions) |
| Show effective configuration |
| One-command demo — init, show config, verify pipeline |
| List available policy presets and their rules |
| Show current config, hooks, policy, and upstream servers |
Scanning & Detection | |
| Static taint analysis on Python code |
| Scan MCP configs for tool poisoning and shadowing attacks |
| Audit OpenClaw/ClawHub SKILL.md files for dangerous patterns |
| Auto-discover all MCP configurations across installed IDEs |
| Run Snyk agent-scan, generate policy rules from findings |
Policy & Compliance | |
| Validate policy YAML files |
| Import agent.yaml, convert to policy rules |
| Validate agent.yaml + tool schemas, report compliance |
Tracing & Audit | |
| List recent execution traces |
| Export a trace as JSON |
| Replay a trace and check for drift |
| Query audit logs with filters |
| Verify audit log integrity |
Integrations | |
| Export audit entries to Langfuse |
| Search the MCP Server Registry |
| List available servers from the MCP Registry |
Configuration
Config loads hierarchically: YAML → environment variables → CLI flags.
# .mcpkernel/config.yaml
proxy:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 8000
# Upstream MCP servers to proxy to
upstream:
- name: filesystem
url: http://localhost:3000/mcp
transport: streamable_http
sandbox:
backend: docker # docker | firecracker | wasm | microsandbox
timeout_seconds: 30
taint:
mode: light # full | light | off
policy:
default_action: deny # deny-by-default for production
policy_paths:
- policies/owasp_asi_2026_strict.yaml
observability:
log_level: INFO
metrics_enabled: true
otlp_endpoint: "" # Set for OpenTelemetry export
# Third-party integrations
langfuse:
enabled: false
public_key: "" # Set via MCPKERNEL_LANGFUSE__PUBLIC_KEY
secret_key: "" # Set via MCPKERNEL_LANGFUSE__SECRET_KEY
guardrails_ai:
enabled: false
pii_validator: true
secrets_validator: true
toxic_content: false
registry:
enabled: true
registry_url: https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io
agent_scan:
enabled: true
binary_name: agent-scan
auto_generate_policy: trueEnvironment variable override: MCPKERNEL_SANDBOX__BACKEND=wasm
Docker Deployment
# Build and run
docker compose up -d
# With Prometheus monitoring
docker compose --profile monitoring up -dDevelopment
# Clone and install
git clone https://github.com/piyushptiwari1/mcpkernel.git
cd mcpkernel
pip install -e ".[dev]"
# Run tests (718 tests, ~86% coverage)
pytest tests/ -v --cov=mcpkernel
# Lint
ruff check src/ tests/
ruff format src/ tests/Examples
Integration examples for popular AI agent frameworks:
LangChain — route LangChain tool calls through MCPKernel
CrewAI — secure CrewAI agent tool usage
AutoGen — protect AutoGen multi-agent conversations
Copilot Guard — intercept Copilot/Cursor tool calls
mcp-agent — route mcp-agent framework through MCPKernel
Planned — The Road to Agent Sovereignty
1. Inter-Agent Proof of Intent (Zero-Knowledge Tooling)
Today agents trust the gateway. Tomorrow, Agent A (Company X) will call a tool on Agent B (Company Y) — across organizational boundaries.
Problem: How does Agent B verify that Agent A's call was authorized by a specific policy without revealing the underlying data?
Plan: Add a ZK-Policy module to MCPKernel. Agents will produce zero-knowledge proofs of policy compliance, enabling cross-org tool calls with cryptographic "sovereignty" — no private code or data is ever exposed.
2. Physical-World Safety Layer (Robotic MCP)
As MCP expands into IoT and Robotics (Digital Twins), the "sandbox" isn't just a VM — it's a physical constraint.
Problem: If an agent calls
move_arm(), the gateway must simulate the physics impact before allowing the tainted command to reach the actuator.Plan: Deterministic execution for hardware — a physics-aware sandbox that models real-world consequences (collision, force limits, safety envelopes) before any command reaches a physical device.
3. Automated Red-Teaming ("Immune System" Mode)
Instead of being a passive gatekeeper, the gateway should attack itself.
Problem: New prompt injection techniques and policy bypasses appear daily. Static rules can't keep up.
Plan: A Shadow LLM module that continuously attempts prompt injections against MCPKernel's own policies in real-time, discovering 0-day vulnerabilities in agent logic before adversaries do.
4. Parallel Taint Analysis (Cold-Start Latency < 50 ms)
In 2026, latency is everything. If the gateway adds more than 50 ms to a tool call, developers will disable it.
Plan: Run taint sink checking concurrently with code execution rather than sequentially — analyze while the sandbox is running, abort only if a violation is detected, keeping the hot path near zero additional latency.
5. Context Minimization as a Cost Weapon
Security matters, but saving money sells faster. The context/ module already prunes tokens via TF-IDF + AST analysis.
Plan: Productize context minimization to deliver ≥ 30 % token reduction while maintaining safety guarantees. When the gateway pays for itself in reduced LLM costs, adoption becomes a no-brainer.
Competitive Landscape
MCPKernel is a runtime security gateway + agent-callable security toolkit — it sits in the live request path intercepting every tool call AND exposes security tools that agents can call directly. This is fundamentally different from the scanners, config auditors, and personal AI assistants in the ecosystem:
Project | What It Does | How MCPKernel Differs |
OpenClaw (338k⭐) | Personal AI assistant with 25+ channel integrations, skills platform, Gateway WS control plane | OpenClaw is a consumer of MCP tools. MCPKernel is the security layer OpenClaw needs — it has 344+ security advisories, sandbox off by default, no taint tracking, no policy engine. MCPKernel plugs directly into OpenClaw as a security skill. |
Cloud-hosted MCP server with browser automation, OAuth 2.1, multi-client setup | Cloud SaaS product. MCPKernel is self-hosted, open-source, and provides the security infrastructure kernel.sh doesn't — policy enforcement, taint tracking, sandboxing. | |
AI agent security scanning — discovered Tool Poisoning Attacks | Research + SaaS guardrails. MCPKernel is the self-hosted runtime enforcement layer that implements their recommended mitigations (tool pinning, cross-server isolation, taint control). | |
Skill directory (72k+ skills) | Discovery platform. MCPKernel's skill scanner audits skills from any marketplace before installation. | |
Static/dynamic vulnerability scanner (CVSS v4.0 + AIVSS) | Scanner finds bugs before deployment; MCPKernel enforces policy at runtime. Complementary. | |
aryanjp1/mcpguard (PyPI | MCP config static scanner — audits config for OWASP MCP Top 10 | Config linter, no runtime component. MCPKernel includes discovery + runtime enforcement. |
Database security gateway for AI agents (Postgres, MySQL, Redis) | DB-only scope with SaaS dependency. MCPKernel covers any MCP tool call, self-hosted. | |
Transport bridge (stdio ↔ SSE/StreamableHTTP) | Pure transport, zero security features. |
Bottom line: No existing project provides the full stack MCPKernel delivers — policy engine + taint tracking + DLP + sandboxing + skill auditing + multi-client installer + agent-callable tools + deterministic envelopes + Sigstore audit + eBPF, all in one open-source package.
Contributing — You're Welcome Here
MCPKernel is built in the open and we actively welcome contributions of all kinds — bug reports, feature ideas, documentation improvements, policy templates, and code.
Ways to contribute:
What | How |
Report a bug | Open an issue with steps to reproduce |
Suggest a feature | Open an issue describing your use case |
Add a policy template | Create a YAML file in |
Add a framework example | Add to |
Improve documentation | Docs, README, and inline comments always need help |
Write tests | We target >90% coverage — every new test helps |
Fix a bug or add a feature | Fork → branch → test → PR (see below) |
Getting started in 60 seconds:
git clone https://github.com/piyushptiwari1/mcpkernel.git
cd mcpkernel
python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev,all]"
pytest # 718 tests, all should passSee CONTRIBUTING.md for the full development workflow, commit conventions, and PR process.
Not sure where to start? Look for issues labeled good first issue or help wanted, or just open a discussion — we're happy to point you to something that fits your interest.
License
Apache 2.0 — see LICENSE.
Documentation
Full tutorial-style documentation with examples, API reference, and guides:
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