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@pitchmentor/mcp

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by pitchmentor

rotate_webhook_secret

Destructive

Replace a webhook's signing secret immediately; the new secret is returned once and takes effect right away, invalidating the previous secret.

Instructions

Replace the signing secret (returned once; takes effect immediately).

DESTRUCTIVE: this cannot be undone. Only call it when the user explicitly asked for exactly this action.

The result contains a secret that is shown only once; show it to the user and do not repeat it elsewhere.

Requires scope webhooks:write.

DESTRUCTIVE: cannot be undone.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.1

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description adds materially new behavior: the old secret is replaced immediately, the new secret is displayed only once, it must be surfaced to the user and not echoed elsewhere, and a specific auth scope is required. These are operational constraints the agent cannot infer from the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded and mostly tight, but the DESTRUCTIVE warning is repeated verbatim-twice ("DESTRUCTIVE: this cannot be undone") in a five-line description, wasting space in an otherwise compact text.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive single-parameter mutation with no output schema, the description covers safety, auth, and post-call handling well. The only meaningful gap is the unexplained `id` parameter, which is a moderate omission rather than a blocking one.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is one required parameter, `id`, with 0% schema description coverage, and the description never mentions it. The agent must infer that `id` is the webhook endpoint identifier from the tool name and sibling list rather than from the definition.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ("Replace the signing secret") and adds the two facts that define the operation's scope: the new secret is returned once and takes effect immediately. Clearly distinguishable from siblings like rotate_api_key or update_webhook_endpoint.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit gating condition: "Only call it when the user explicitly asked for exactly this action," plus the prerequisite scope `webhooks:write`. That is a clear when-to-use and when-not-to-use rule rather than implied usage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.