verify-mcp
by phun-ky
README.md
# verify-mcp
A sketch of a "trust layer" MCP server: one `verify` tool an agent calls
*before* acting on data it did not produce. It returns an evidence report,
not a checkmark.
Companion to the talk *Invisible Data: Building Trust in the Age of AI*.
## Run
```sh
npm install
npm run build
claude mcp add verify -- node /path/to/verify-mcp/dist/cli.js
```
## The tool
```ts
verify({ target })
```
`target` is one of:
| kind | example input | checks |
| --------- | ----------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| `package` | `{ ecosystem: "npm", name, version }` | OSV.dev advisories |
| `dataset` | `{ schema, records, assetId? }` | JSON Schema contract (incl. `x-unit`), observability adapter |
| `file` | `{ path }` | C2PA manifest (c2patool) |
| `claim` | `{ text, sources: [url, …] }` | independent-source corroboration (heuristic) |
### Units: `x-unit`
A property with `"x-unit": "N*s"` must be sent as `{ "value": 4.45, "unit": "N*s" }`.
A different unit (`lbf*s`) or a bare number is a `high` finding. Only separators are
normalised (`N·s` = `N*s` = `N s`); there are no aliases and no conversion.
Schemas are compiled in Ajv strict mode: an unknown or misspelled keyword makes the
check `error` instead of silently passing. `x-*` keys are allowed as annotations.
### C2PA: `c2patool`
Install [c2patool](https://github.com/contentauth/c2pa-rs/releases) (tested with
0.27.23, verify the release checksum) and point the server at it:
```sh
claude mcp add verify \
-e VERIFY_MCP_C2PATOOL=/path/to/c2patool \
-e C2PATOOL_TRUST_ANCHORS=/path/to/anchors.pem \
-- node /path/to/verify-mcp/dist/cli.js
```
`C2PATOOL_TRUST_ANCHORS`, `C2PATOOL_TRUST_CONFIG` and `C2PATOOL_ALLOWED_LIST` are
c2patool's own settings. Only a `Trusted` manifest passes; `Invalid` fails; a
manifest from an untrusted signer, or no manifest at all, is `skipped`, so the
verdict stays `unknown`.
## The report
```jsonc
{
"verdict": "pass" | "fail" | "unknown",
"summary": "Failed: 1/2 checks completed, 2 finding(s).",
"checks": [{ "id", "kind", "status", "source": { "name", "retrievedAt" }, "findings", "reason" }],
"notChecked": ["Whether values are true, only whether they are well-formed", "…"],
"generatedAt": "…",
"verifier": { "name": "verify-mcp", "version": "0.1.0" }
}
```
## Rules baked in
1. **Evidence, not verdicts.** Every check lists its source and timestamp.
`notChecked` is always present, so limits are never silent.
2. **Deterministic first.** Checks are labelled `deterministic` or
`heuristic`. Heuristics can fail a target but can never pass it alone.
3. **Independent checks.** No LLM "plausibility" scoring. The verifier never
asks the generator to grade itself.
4. **Unknown ≠ verified.** A required check that errors or is skipped makes
the verdict `unknown`. Exceptions become `error`, never a crash or a pass.
5. **Verify the verifier.** This server is a dependency too: pin it, scan it,
and keep it read-only (`readOnlyHint: true`).
## What's stubbed
- `checkObservability`: wire to Monte Carlo, Soda, Elementary, etc. (their
API, or act as an MCP client to their MCP server).
- `checkCorroboration`: fetches nothing yet; only enforces two distinct
source domains.
## Ideas for v0.2
- `verify` over a lockfile or SBOM (OSV batch API).
- A signed report (Sigstore) so downstream systems can trust the verifier's
output, not just the agent's summary of it.
This server cannot be deployed
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