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Create DNSSEC Record

create_dnssec_record
DestructiveIdempotent

Submit a DNSSEC DS record to the registry for a domain. Use when you sign DNS yourself (custom nameservers running BIND/Knot/PowerDNS/etc.) and need to publish the chain-of-trust at the parent zone.

Instructions

Submit a DNSSEC DS record to the registry for a domain. Use when you sign DNS yourself (custom nameservers running BIND/Knot/PowerDNS/etc.) and need to publish the chain-of-trust at the parent zone. Required: keyTag, algorithm, digestType, digest. Optional key-data fields for registries that require full DNSKEY (rare). Algorithms and digest types are validated per registry, not globally: registries are retiring the values deprecated by RFC 9904/9905/9906 on their own schedules, so a value one registry has already dropped may still be accepted by another. A refused value returns DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_DEPRECATED naming a replacement, and retrying the same values will not help. Use alg 8 (RSA/SHA-256) or 13 (ECDSA/SHA-256) with digestType 2 (SHA-256) to be accepted everywhere. A SUCCESS response may carry a warnings array when a value still works but is being retired: the record WAS created. Deprecation never affects list_dnssec_records or delete_dnssec_record.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
algYesAlgorithm number, e.g. `13` for ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, `8` for RSA SHA-256. Algorithms 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 12 are deprecated (RFC 9904/9905/9906) and are already refused by some registries.
digestYesHex-encoded DS digest value.
domainYesDomain to add the DS record to.
keyTagYesDNSSEC key tag (16-bit identifier of the key).
digestTypeYesDigest type, e.g. `2` for SHA-256, `4` for SHA-384. Digest types 1 (SHA-1) and 3 (GOST R 34.11-94) are deprecated and are being refused registry by registry; 2 is accepted everywhere.
maxSigLifeNoMaximum signature lifetime in seconds (registry-specific, optional).
keyDataAlgoNoDNSKEY algorithm (optional).
keyDataFlagsNoDNSKEY flags (optional — typically 256 or 257).
keyDataPubKeyNoBase64-encoded public key (optional).
keyDataProtocolNoDNSKEY protocol (optional — almost always 3).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv0.39.4
    • changedInput schema / properties / alg / description
      Previous value: -"Algorithm number, e.g. `13` for ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, `8` for RSA SHA-256."New value: +"Algorithm number, e.g. `13` for ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, `8` for RSA SHA-256. Algorithms 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 12 are deprecated (RFC 9904/9905/9906) and are already refused by some registries."
    • changedInput schema / properties / digestType / description
      Previous value: -"Digest type, e.g. `2` for SHA-256, `4` for SHA-384."New value: +"Digest type, e.g. `2` for SHA-256, `4` for SHA-384. Digest types 1 (SHA-1) and 3 (GOST R 34.11-94) are deprecated and are being refused registry by registry; 2 is accepted everywhere."
  2. First observedv0.4.1

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly=false, destructive=true, idempotent=true and openWorld=false, so the bar is lower, yet the description adds substantial context: per-registry (not global) algorithm validation, the DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_DEPRECATED refusal code, the futility of retrying the same values, and the warnings array on a SUCCESS response meaning the record WAS created. That is exactly the kind of failure-mode and return-value nuance structured fields cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and the required fields, then layered with caveats; each clause carries operational information. It is on the long side and repeats the deprecation theme across several sentences, but no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 10-parameter mutation tool with no output schema, the description covers prerequisites, required vs optional fields, validation behavior, error semantics, and the shape of a success response (warnings array). An agent has everything needed to call it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description does add value beyond the schema: it recommends alg 8/13 with digestType 2 as universally accepted and frames validation as registry-specific with independent retirement schedules. It explains the 'why' behind the deprecated values rather than restating them.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Submit a DNSSEC DS record to the registry for a domain') and explicitly names the sibling tools it is not (list_dnssec_records, delete_dnssec_record). The agent can distinguish it from create_dns_record and the DNSSEC list/delete siblings without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit when-to-use condition ('when you sign DNS yourself ... and need to publish the chain-of-trust at the parent zone') and names the tools that are unaffected by the deprecation behavior. Nothing about tool selection is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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