ad_get_delegated_permissions

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full disclosure burden, and it does very little beyond the '[READ]' tag implying a non-mutating query. It says nothing about required privileges (delegation auditing often needs elevated rights), scan scope or cost on large directories, or pagination/limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single short sentence with no filler; the domain/read tags are front-loaded. It is efficient, though the Portuguese prose inside an otherwise English toolset slightly hurts scannability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be described, but for a security-audit tool with zero annotation coverage and undocumented parameters the one-line description leaves too much unknown: what object types are accepted, what privileges are needed, and what the audit surface covers.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% for both parameters, and the description only vaguely gestures at 'objetos' without explaining what the required 'identity' accepts (DN, sAMAccountName, GUID, OU path) or what 'correlation_id' is for. The description does not compensate for the schema gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb+resource ('Auditar delegacoes de permissoes em objetos'), so an agent knows it retrieves permission-delegation (ACL/ACE) data on AD objects. The '[Security & Audit] [READ]' tags reinforce the domain and the read-only nature. It lacks sibling differentiation, but no other ad_* tool covers delegated permissions, so ambiguity is low.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to call this versus adjacent audit tools such as ad_run_compliance_assessment, ad_generate_security_audit_report, or ad_get_security_group_changes. No prerequisites, no scope restrictions (which object types are supported), and no exclusions are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.