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remove_secret

Deletes a single secret key, or all secrets for a service when the key is omitted, to revoke credentials and remove stored sensitive values.

Instructions

Delete one secret key, or all of a service's secrets when key is omitted.

    Deleting a shared key can break every app still referencing it via
    ``${secrets.shared.KEY}``.
    

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "service": "<service>"
    },
    "name": "remove_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyNoThe one secret key to delete; omit it — null or an empty string — to delete ALL of the scope's secrets at once. Deleting a key that does not exist is a 404.
serviceYesService (app, model or database) whose secrets this call modifies — need not exist yet: a set on an undeployed name reserves it for this token until deployed — or ``shared`` for the global scope (set: unscoped submitter or admin; delete: admin), read by a service only where a ``${secrets.shared.KEY}`` reference is honoured (``ai``/``db``/``edge_auth`` refs, ``token_ref``, a whole-value ``env``).
idempotency_keyNoCaller-chosen key: a retry with the same key replays the first result instead of acting twice. Omit and a fresh key is minted per call, so each call acts.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.9.2
    • changedInput schema / properties / service / description
      Previous value: -"Service (app, model or database) whose secrets this call modifies — need not exist yet: a set on an undeployed name reserves it for this token until deployed — or ``shared`` for the global scope (set: unscoped submitter or admin; delete: admin), read by a service only where a ``${secrets.shared.KEY}`` reference is honoured (``ai``/``db``/``edge_auth`` refs, a git ``token_ref``), never via ``env``."New value: +"Service (app, model or database) whose secrets this call modifies — need not exist yet: a set on an undeployed name reserves it for this token until deployed — or ``shared`` for the global scope (set: unscoped submitter or admin; delete: admin), read by a service only where a ``${secrets.shared.KEY}`` reference is honoured (``ai``/``db``/``edge_auth`` refs, ``token_ref``, a whole-value ``env``)."
  2. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the burden and does so for the most important trait: it is a destructive operation, and deleting a shared key can break every app referencing it via ${secrets.shared.KEY}. That is genuinely valuable risk context beyond the schema. It stops short of stating what is returned or whether the operation is reversible/confirmed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, zero waste, and the destructive capability is front-loaded before the risk warning. Nothing redundant and nothing padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, annotation-free tool with no output schema, the description covers scope and risk but omits return semantics (what happens on partial/successful delete) and permission requirements — the latter only appear buried in the service parameter description. Adequate, but an agent still has gaps before calling confidently.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents key, service, and idempotency_key in depth. The description's 'when key is omitted' clause merely restates what the key parameter description says about null/empty string deleting all. Baseline 3 applies since the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete one secret key') and immediately clarifies the two operating modes: single key vs. all of a service's secrets when key is omitted. The purpose is unmistakable, though it never names or contrasts with siblings like set_secret or list_secret_names, so the agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The single-vs-bulk distinction is spelled out, which is the main selection decision an agent faces, but there is no explicit guidance on when to reach for this tool versus set_secret/list_secret_names, nor any stated preconditions (confirming scope, checking existing keys first). Usage is implied rather than directed.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.