AgentBridge
Allows AI agents to work on a macOS machine, including reading and writing files in a jailed workspace, executing approved commands such as Xcode builds, and requiring human approval for risky operations.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@AgentBridgebuild my Xcode project and run the tests"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
AgentBridge — Let any AI agent work on your Mac, safely
One terminal command connects your Mac to any cloud AI agent. The agent can build, read files, and run commands on your Mac — and every risky action needs your approval first.
Quickstart · How it stays safe · SECURITY.md · Issues
Status (Oct 2026): Three rounds of independent security review are done — every finding fixed at the root, with 244 adversarial test cases, 10 end-to-end tests, and 21 installer end-to-end checks passing. Treat this as release-candidate software.
What it is
Your Mac, remote-controlled by an AI agent — without handing over the keys.
AgentBridge runs a small, secure server on your Mac. Point your cloud agent (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Instinct, HappyCapy, or your own) at it, and the agent can do real work on your machine: run Xcode builds, read and write files, execute commands — all inside strict limits you control.
One command to install — no Homebrew, no npm install, zero dependencies beyond Node (which the installer sets up for you)
You approve the risky stuff — commands outside a strict allowlist and all deletions wait for your yes on the Mac itself, bound to the exact argv and the SHA-256 of every workspace file named in it
Files stay in a jail — the agent only sees the folder you choose, never your whole disk. Writes are versioned and deletes go to a trash folder, so mistakes are recoverable
Every action is logged — a tamper-evident audit trail of who did what, when
Works with any agent — speaks MCP-style JSON-RPC (
initialize,tools/list,tools/call). If your agent can call tools, it can use AgentBridge
Related MCP server: macos-sys-assist
Install in one command
curl -fsSL https://github.com/ndpvt-web/agent-bridge/releases/latest/download/install-agent-bridge.sh | bashThen pair your agent:
agent-bridge pairThis prints a tunnel URL and a one-time pairing code (valid 10 minutes). Paste both into your cloud agent. Done — the bridge now runs 24/7 in the background via launchd.
Prefer to build from source? bash scripts/build-installer.sh builds the installer locally. npm test builds the installer first, then runs every suite.
Two permission modes
Pick at install (the installer asks, or pass --mode limited|full); switch anytime:
agent-bridge mode full # v1-style: full control. Loud warning, asks to confirm.
agent-bridge mode limited # back to the hardened defaultLIMITED (default, recommended) — the hardened mode this README describes: filesystem jail, command allowlist, and your on-device approval for anything risky.
FULL — the old v1 behavior: no jail, no allowlist, no approvals, shell access on. Any paired agent can run anything as you. Choose it only if you trust every paired agent completely; the bridge prints a loud warning every time it starts in FULL mode, and every switch is written to the audit log.
Both modes keep Ed25519-signed requests, per-agent keys you can revoke, and the tamper-evident audit log.
What your agent can do
Read, write, and list files inside your chosen folder
Run approved commands — builds, tests, and a curated set of safe dev tools without asking
Work while you're away — the bridge stays up, you stay in control
Get its own identity — each agent pairs with its own Ed25519 key, so you can see and revoke each one separately
How it stays safe
Signed requests — every call is Ed25519-signed by a paired agent key. No key, no access. Captured requests can't be replayed.
Strict command allowlist — per-program argument rules, not patterns an agent can talk its way around.
Filesystem jail — realpath-checked; symlink escapes and writes through links are refused.
Human approval gate — anything outside the allowlist pings your Mac for a yes/no. The approval binds the exact argv plus the SHA-256 of every workspace file named in it (which must exist when you approve), and re-checks those hashes before anything runs. One honest limit: interpreters and build tools read files beyond the argv (imports, Makefiles) that can't be enumerated — the approval line warns you when that's the case.
Tamper-evident audit log — hash-chained; edits to history show up as tampering.
The installer's downloads are version-pinned and SHA-256-verified against hashes embedded in the script, fail-closed on mismatch. Full details in SECURITY.md and the threat model.
Day-to-day
Command | What it does |
| Pair a new agent (prints one-time code) |
| Is the bridge running, and who's connected |
| Cut off an agent |
| Show or switch the permission mode |
| Review the audit log |
| Remove the bridge (keeps your workspace unless |
For agent developers
AgentBridge speaks MCP-style JSON-RPC over the tunnel. Call initialize, list tools with tools/list, and invoke them with tools/call. See the docs for the tool catalogue and pairing handshake.
License
MIT
This server cannot be deployed
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