signer-mcp
The signer-mcp server enables AI agents to securely sign and manage orders on cryptocurrency exchanges within an AWS Nitro Enclave, keeping private keys isolated and never exposed.
list_venues— Discover all supported trading venues (Binance, OKX, Asterdex, KuCoin, Bybit, Hyperliquid). Read-only; works even if the Signer gateway is unreachable.get_attestation— Retrieve the AWS Nitro attestation document (PCR0/1/2 measurements + AWS signature) to cryptographically verify the enclave running your trades matches the published source code.get_account— Fetch a real-time account snapshot for a given venue: equity (USD), free margin (USD), and open positions (symbol, quantity, entry price). Requires an API token.place_order— Submit a market or limit order on a supported venue. The enclave signs the order server-side within pre-configured policy caps (per-asset/per-period limits). Supports buy/sell sides and base-asset quantity input. Destructive — results in a real or testnet trade.cancel_order— Cancel an outstanding order by its venue-native order ID. Idempotent: cancelling an already-filled or non-existent order returns a soft failure (ok: false) with a reason rather than an error.
All order signing happens inside the attested enclave with policy enforcement configured via the usenami.io/signer platform. The server integrates with MCP-aware AI agents such as Claude Desktop and ElizaOS, and is configured via environment variables for the gateway URL, API token, and request timeout.
Allows placing and canceling orders on Binance perpetual futures (USD-M) through MCP tools, with account read capability.
Provides order placement and cancellation for KuCoin Futures (perp) with HMAC authentication, including account information retrieval.
Enables trading on OKX perpetual swap contracts via MCP tools, supporting market and limit orders, and account queries.
@usenami/signer-mcp
Sign CEX orders from any MCP-aware AI agent — keys never leave an AWS Nitro Enclave.
signer-mcp is the public face of Usenami Signer. It gives Claude Desktop, Cursor, ElizaOS, and any other MCP-aware client a six-tool surface for trading real CEX/DEX perp accounts (Binance, OKX, Asterdex, KuCoin, Bybit, Hyperliquid) without ever loading a private key into the agent's process — or yours.
Status: v0 (alpha), invite-based pilot. Venue manifest, attestation, account read, place/cancel order, and a two-leg hedge. ⚠️ Orders are real: which venue and network your orders hit is decided by the policy bound to your token, and on Binance the hosted deployment signs mainnet orders with real funds (it has since 2026-07-27). There is no implicit testnet safety net — read place_order before sending anything.
Why this exists
Every agent framework that touches a CEX today loads the API key into the agent process. That puts the secret on disk, in env vars, in npm packages, in prompt-engineered tool calls, and in your shell history. One prompt injection, one supply-chain compromise, one accidental log line, one curious co-worker — and the key leaks.
Signer takes the opposite approach. The signing key is generated inside an AWS Nitro Enclave attested by AWS itself. The enclave's measurement (PCR0) is published on https://usenami.io/signer/attestations. The MCP server you install here can ask the enclave to sign a specific order — bounded by an explicit policy (per-asset cap, per-period cap, allowed venues) — but it cannot read the key. Neither can the agent, your laptop, your IaC, or our own engineers.
If the agent gets compromised, the worst it can do is place orders inside your policy window. The key itself stays attested.
Related MCP server: Openterms-mcp
Quick start (Claude Desktop)
Get a token. Access is invite-based during the pilot — there is no self-serve signup yet; request access via usenami.io/signer (contact link at the bottom) and your token is provisioned at onboarding, bound to a policy with per-venue caps. No token yet? Steps 2–4 still work:
list_venuesandget_attestationneed no token.Edit
claude_desktop_config.json. Path is~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.jsonon macOS.{ "mcpServers": { "signer": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@usenami/signer-mcp"], "env": { "SIGNER_GATEWAY_URL": "https://signer-demo.usenami.io:8443", "SIGNER_API_TOKEN": "sk_live_..." } } } }Restart Claude Desktop and look for the 🔌 plug icon. You should see six tools listed under
signer.Try the read-only tools first. Ask Claude:
"List the venues available through Signer, then return the current attestation document."
No funds at risk — these don't sign anything, and neither needs a token.
Once you have a token and trust the attestation, you can place a first order — knowingly. ⚠️ This signs a real order on the venue your token's policy allows. For Binance in the hosted deployment that means mainnet, real money — 0.001 BTC is a real position, not a testnet exercise. Check
list_venuesstatus/notesfor the venue first, start with the smallest size your policy allows, and only then:"Get my Binance account, then if I have at least $20 of free margin, place a market buy for 0.001 BTC."
If anything looks wrong, the agent can call cancel_order immediately.
Quick start (ElizaOS)
ElizaOS has a native plugin:
@usenami/plugin-signer
(same gateway contract — a token issued for one works with the other). Prefer it:
actions land directly in the agent, plus an attestation provider that keeps the
current PCR0 in context.
Alternatively, ElizaOS can reach this MCP server through the generic bridge
@elizaos/plugin-mcp over stdio:
npm install @elizaos/plugin-mcpThen in your character / agent config:
{
"plugins": ["@elizaos/plugin-mcp"],
"settings": {
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"signer": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@usenami/signer-mcp"],
"env": {
"SIGNER_GATEWAY_URL": "https://signer-demo.usenami.io:8443",
"SIGNER_API_TOKEN": "sk_live_..."
}
}
}
}
}
}The agent now exposes the same six tools (list_venues, get_attestation,
get_account, place_order, place_hedge, cancel_order). Same trust model: the signing key
never enters the Eliza process — start the agent on the read-only tools
(list_venues / get_attestation) and verify the attestation before letting it
place orders.
Configuration
Environment variables passed via the env block of claude_desktop_config.json (or your client's equivalent):
Variable | Required | Default | Notes |
| no |
| The hosted attested demo enclave. Override for self-hosted deployments. |
| yes (for account/order tools) | — | Bearer token provisioned at onboarding (invite-based pilot). |
| no |
| Per-request fetch timeout in ms. Lower for CI / smoke tests; raise on slow links. Must be positive integer. |
The MCP server itself stores nothing on disk. Tokens are read from environment on startup and held in memory for the lifetime of the process — kill the agent, the token goes with it.
Tool reference
list_venues
Returns the static manifest of venues this Signer can sign for. Read-only, does not contact the gateway, works without a token. Call this first to discover what's supported.
{
"venues": [
{
"venue": "binance",
"asset_class": "perp",
"auth_scheme": "hmac_sha256",
"status": "live",
"notes": "..."
}
],
"count": 7
}Every entry carries a status: live (the enclave will sign for it) or denied
(the enclave refuses by policy — supplying credentials will not change it). Some
entries add a network field (bsc, hyperliquid-testnet, …). Read status
and notes before choosing a venue.
Supported venues
| status | asset class | auth scheme | symbol example | notes |
| live | perp | hmac_sha256 |
| Binance USD-M futures. ⚠️ Mainnet, real funds in the hosted deployment (since 2026-07-27) |
| live | perp | hmac_sha256 |
| OKX perpetual swap. Signs only where an OKX key is provisioned — the hosted deployment has none today, so there it signs nowhere |
| live | perp | eip712 (bsc) |
| Asterdex on-chain perp (BSC) |
| live | perp | hmac_sha256 |
| KuCoin Futures (HMAC + encrypted passphrase); qty in contracts |
| live | perp | hmac_sha256 |
| Bybit V5 linear ( |
| live | perp | eip712 (hyperliquid) |
| The Hyperliquid path that actually signs. Same enclave code as mainnet, testnet phantom-agent source |
| denied | perp | eip712 (hyperliquid) |
| Denied inside the enclave — a policy denial, not a missing configuration; supplying credentials will not change it. Account read is the public |
The agent config block is identical for every venue — point SIGNER_GATEWAY_URL at your Signer and set SIGNER_API_TOKEN. Which venues a given token may trade is bound server-side to that token's policy; list_venues reports the full set the gateway can sign, not your per-token allow-list.
get_attestation
Returns the Nitro attestation document for the currently-running enclave. The PCR0 measurement here is what AWS signed when it booted the enclave; you can verify it matches the published build by hashing the corresponding EIF and comparing.
{
"pcr0_sha384": "...sha384 hex...",
"attestation_doc_b64": "...base64 COSE_Sign1, signed by AWS Nitro...",
"registered_onchain": true,
"timestamp_ms": 1785847208571
}pcr0_sha384 is a convenience copy; the evidence is attestation_doc_b64 — the
AWS-signed COSE document containing all PCRs. Trust the document, not the field
printed beside it.
Read-only, works without a token.
get_account
Returns equity, free margin, and open positions for a venue.
{
"venue": "binance",
"equity_usd": 145.32,
"free_margin_usd": 92.10,
"positions": [
{ "symbol": "BTCUSDT", "qty": 0.002, "entry_price": 67120.5 }
],
"updated_at": "2026-05-31T18:01:11Z"
}Read-only. Requires SIGNER_API_TOKEN.
place_order
Place a single market or limit order. The enclave signs the payload after checking policy caps.
Args:
venue— one ofbinance | okx | asterdex | kucoin | bybit | hyperliquid_testnet | hyperliquid_main. ⚠️ v0 has structured order routes forbinance | okxonly — other venues return a clear error (they expose read-only account access); and checklist_venuesstatusfirst —hyperliquid_mainis denied in-enclavesymbol— canonical (BTC,BTCUSDT,BTC/USDT) or venue-native (BTC-USDT-SWAP,XBTUSDTM, …). The client translates to the venue's native format and echoes it back.side—buy|sellqty— always base-asset quantity (e.g. 0.001 for 0.001 BTC). Not USD-notional, not venue contracts. Contract-denominated venues (okx: 1 contract = 0.01 BTC onBTC-USDT-SWAP) are converted automatically; sizes off the venue's contract grid are rejected, never silently rounded.type—market|limitprice— required iftype=limit, ignored iftype=marketpolicy_id— optional override; defaults to the policy bound to your token
The result includes a translation echo — check translation.sent to see the exact venue-native symbol + size that hit the exchange:
{
"requested": { "symbol": "BTC", "qty": 0.01, "unit": "base_asset" },
"sent": { "symbol": "BTC-USDT-SWAP", "qty": "1", "unit": "contracts", "ctVal": "0.01" }
}{
"venue": "binance",
"order_id": "...",
"status": "FILLED",
"filled_qty": 0.001,
"avg_fill_price": 67128.9,
"policy_id": "default",
"attested_at": "..."
}Destructive. Requires SIGNER_API_TOKEN. ⚠️ Orders go where your token's
policy sends them — there is no implicit testnet routing. On Binance the hosted
deployment signs mainnet orders with real funds (since 2026-07-27); OKX signs
only where an OKX key is provisioned (the hosted deployment has none today);
Hyperliquid signs on hyperliquid_testnet and is denied on hyperliquid_main.
An earlier revision of this section said "v0 routes Binance/OKX to testnet" —
that was wrong, see CHANGELOG 0.6.0.
place_hedge
Places a 2-leg hedge with atomic signing: both legs are signed inside the
enclave all-or-nothing (a policy denial on either leg means nothing is even
sent), then the gateway fires both venue calls server-side in parallel — the
leg gap collapses to the venues' own latency spread and the signed auth headers
never transit through your client. ⚠️ Venue execution is not atomic: the
partial and unknown statuses below exist precisely because an exchange can
accept one leg and lose or reject the other.
Args:
legs— exactly 2, each{venue, symbol, side, qty, type}. v1 constraints:type: "market"only (a resting limit leg would let "executed" hide an unfilled leg — useplace_orderfor limits) and venues limited tobinance | okx. Typical hedge: same symbol, opposite sides, equal base-asset qty on two venues.Symbols and
qtyuse the same canonical/base-asset translation asplace_order; per-legtranslationsare echoed back.
Read the result's status before anything else:
executed— both legs live.partial— 🔴 exactly one leg live: the position is NAKED. Repair by closing the live leg or re-placing therejectedone. Never re-place a leg whose outcome isunknown.unknown— 🔴 a leg's receipt was lost (timeout / venue 5xx) — that order may be live. Do NOT retryplace_hedge; reconcile first viaget_accounton both venues.failed— both legs definitively rejected, nothing live, safe to fix and retry.
Destructive (moves real positions on two venues at once). Requires
SIGNER_API_TOKEN. Gateways older than the /hedge endpoint return a clear
"use two place_order calls" error.
cancel_order
Cancels an outstanding order by its venue order id. Idempotent — cancelling an already-filled or non-existent order returns ok: false with a venue reason instead of erroring.
Available for binance | okx in v0 — other venues have no structured cancel
route yet and return a clear error (same limitation as place_order).
Args:
venue—binance | okxorder_id— the venue id returned byplace_ordersymbol— required (canonicalBTCor venue-native; translated exactly likeplace_order) — both venues' REST cancel routes need it alongsideorder_id
Requires SIGNER_API_TOKEN.
Verifying the attestation
A trustworthy Signer is one whose enclave measurement matches a build you can audit. The workflow:
Call
get_attestationand copy the returnedpcr0_sha384(or, stricter, read PCR0 out of the signedattestation_doc_b64itself).Cross-reference the PCR0 against the published build for the current production version.
Optionally rebuild the EIF from source and verify the measurement yourself — step-by-step instructions: VERIFY-SIGNER-YOURSELF.
If the published PCR0 doesn't match what get_attestation returns, don't trade. Open an issue.
What v0 deliberately does NOT do
v0 keeps the surface deliberately tight:
No multi-tenant: one account per venue per token.
No UPL editing UI: policies are set out-of-band on usenami.io/signer.
No WebSocket / streaming tools — REST only.
No cross-venue routing (
place_ordertakes one venue; the only multi-venue tool is the fixed 2-legplace_hedge).No leverage configuration (
set_leverage) — uses account defaults.No withdrawals / transfers (closest is
cancel_order).No TWAP / iceberg — single-shot orders only.
stdio transport only — no SSE or remote HTTP.
If you need any of the above, file an issue describing the use case. v0 keeps the surface tight on purpose.
Development
# install deps
npm install
# typecheck + build
npm run build
# run from source against the hosted demo enclave
SIGNER_GATEWAY_URL=https://signer-demo.usenami.io:8443 \
SIGNER_API_TOKEN=sk_test_... \
npm run devThe transport is stdio; you'll need an MCP-aware client to actually exercise the tools. The Anthropic mcp-inspector is the fastest way to poke at it locally.
License
MIT. See LICENSE.
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