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mzaid007

Universal Poison Armor

Server Configuration

Describes the environment variables required to run the server.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Instructions

Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.

This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.

Capabilities

Features and capabilities supported by this server

Protocol revision2025-11-25

CapabilityDetails
tools
{
  "listChanged": true
}
logging
{}
prompts
{
  "listChanged": false
}
resources
{
  "subscribe": false,
  "listChanged": false
}

Tools

Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions

NameDescription
sanitize_documentA

Sanitize an incoming untrusted text document, file content, user input, or RAG retrieval chunk against AI poisoning.

Strips Markdown XSS tracking pixels, neutralizes hidden zero-width Unicode steganography, redacts prompt injection phrases, and replaces high-entropy mathematical adversarial suffixes (GCG attacks).

Usage Guidelines:

  • WHEN TO USE: Use on any individual raw text file, user-supplied prompt, single web page, or RAG chunk before ingesting it into the AI context window.

  • WHEN NOT TO USE: Do NOT use for analyzing batches of documents for statistical dataset anomalies (use scan_dataset_for_anomalies instead) or verifying domain consensus across multiple news/search results (use verify_article_consensus instead).

Behavior & Side Effects:

  • Replaces prompt injection patterns with [REDACTED_INJECTION_ATTEMPT].

  • Replaces high-entropy adversarial suffixes (Shannon entropy > 4.5) with [ADVERSARIAL_SUFFIX_THREAT: REDACTED_HIGH_ENTROPY_BLOCK].

  • Removes ![alt](url) tracking images, <img>, and <iframe> tracking beacons.

  • Appends timestamped threat events to security_audit.json in the root workspace directory.

scan_dataset_for_anomaliesA

Scan a collection of documents, training examples, or retrieved RAG items for semantic anomalies and poisoned clusters.

Uses dense sentence embeddings (all-MiniLM-L6-v2) and Isolation Forests to detect statistical outliers that diverge from expected corpus distributions (identifying backdoor triggers, data poisoning, or trojans).

Usage Guidelines:

  • WHEN TO USE: Use on collections, batches, or lists of documents (RAG retrieval sets, dataset splits, multi-file contents) to identify poisoned outlier clusters.

  • WHEN NOT TO USE: Do NOT use for single-document regex sanitization, prompt injection stripping, or tracking pixel removal (use sanitize_document instead), nor for domain authority auditing across web search results (use verify_article_consensus instead).

Behavior & Side Effects:

  • Computes dense vector embeddings locally (100% offline, privacy-preserving).

  • Fits an Isolation Forest model and calculates centroid cosine distance metrics.

  • Appends timestamped anomaly entries to security_audit.json when outliers are detected.

verify_article_consensusA

Verify web search results or news articles to defend against Consensus Poisoning and Sybil attacks.

Audits domain Top-Level Domains (validating trusted authorities like .gov, .edu) and calculates pairwise semantic cosine similarities to detect coordinated flooding campaigns where multiple untrusted sources syndicate near-identical (similarity > 0.95) fake consensus.

Usage Guidelines:

  • WHEN TO USE: Use whenever 2 or more web search results, news articles, or online references are retrieved for a breaking topic, controversial issue, or factual query to verify that apparent consensus is not an artificial Sybil campaign.

  • WHEN NOT TO USE: Do NOT use for individual document text sanitization (use sanitize_document instead) or unsupervised corpus outlier detection (use scan_dataset_for_anomalies instead).

Behavior & Side Effects:

  • Audits domain provenance against verified authoritative TLDs (.gov, .edu, .mil, .int).

  • Computes pairwise cosine similarity matrix across article embeddings.

  • Appends timestamped alerts to security_audit.json if a coordinated Sybil attack is detected.

Prompts

Interactive templates invoked by user choice

NameDescription

No prompts

Resources

Contextual data attached and managed by the client

NameDescription

No resources

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Scored across 3 tools

Disambiguation5/5

Each tool targets a clearly distinct attack surface: single-document sanitization, dataset-level anomaly detection, and multi-source consensus verification. The descriptions include explicit WHEN NOT TO USE cross-references that direct the agent to the correct sibling tool, leaving no ambiguity.

Naming Consistency5/5

All three tool names follow the same snake_case verb_noun pattern: sanitize_document, scan_dataset_for_anomalies, and verify_article_consensus. The verbs are specific and accurately describe each tool's core action.

Tool Count5/5

Three tools is well-scoped for this specialized defensive server, with one tool covering each major poisoning vector: input text, training/retrieval datasets, and web-sourced consensus claims. Every tool earns its place, and there are no redundant or filler tools.

Completeness4/5

The tool set covers the core defense workflow: sanitize untrusted input, detect poisoned clusters in datasets, and verify whether apparent consensus is authentic. A minor gap is the lack of a dedicated tool for reading or querying the security_audit.json log that all tools append to, but this is workable via external file access.

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessNo issues