phishfort-mcp
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TDQS
Scored across 23 tools
Each tool targets a distinct operation: incident listing vs. finding by subject, document metadata vs. signed URL, etc. No two tools have overlapping purposes; descriptions clearly differentiate them.
All tools follow a consistent 'phishfort_verb_noun' pattern in snake_case, e.g., 'list_incidents', 'create_webhook', 'verify_webhook_signature'. No mixing of conventions.
23 tools is on the higher side but still reasonable for a platform covering incidents, documents, users, clients, webhooks, and system info. Each tool has a clear purpose, so the count feels justified rather than excessive.
Core incident lifecycle is covered (list, get, report, request action, add attachments/comments), but missing direct update or delete incident operations. Webhook CRUD is complete. Overall, notable gaps exist but the main workflows are functional.