BloodHound MCP Server
# BloodHound MCP
[](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0)
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that connects LLMs to BloodHound Community Edition and BloodHound Enterprise. Ask questions in natural language, get attack path analysis, run Cypher queries, and explore Active Directory, Azure/Entra ID, and OpenGraph environments — all from your AI assistant.
## Demo
[Watch the demonstration video](https://youtu.be/eZBT0Iw9CMA)
---
## How It Works
The server exposes BloodHound CE's REST API and Neo4j graph through a set of **13 composite MCP tools**, **10 reference resources**, and a **system prompt** tuned for offensive security analysis.
### Composite Tools
Each tool uses an `info_type` parameter to select what data is returned, keeping the tool surface small and token-efficient:
| Tool | `info_type` Options |
|------|---------------------|
| `domain_info` | `list`, `info`, `users`, `groups`, `computers`, `ous`, `gpos`, `dc_syncers`, `foreign_admins`, `foreign_group_members`, `linked_gpos`, `search` |
| `user_info` | `info`, `sessions`, `memberships`, `admin_rights`, `rdp_rights`, `dcom_rights`, `ps_remote_rights`, `sql_admin_rights`, `constrained_delegation`, `controllables`, `controllers` |
| `group_info` | `info`, `members`, `memberships`, `admin_rights`, `rdp_rights`, `dcom_rights`, `ps_remote_rights`, `controllers`, `controllables` |
| `computer_info` | `info`, `sessions`, `local_admins`, `rdp_rights`, `dcom_rights`, `ps_remote_rights`, `sql_admins`, `constrained_delegation`, `controllables`, `controllers` |
| `ou_info` | `info`, `users`, `groups`, `computers`, `gpos` |
| `gpo_info` | `info`, `controllers` |
| `graph_analysis` | `shortest_path`, `edge_composition`, `search` |
| `adcs_info` | `templates`, `esc_paths` |
| `cypher_query` | `run`, `saved_list`, `saved_get` |
| `data_quality` | `stats`, `platform_list`, `platform_info` |
| `asset_groups` | `list`, `members`, `custom_selectors` |
| `custom_nodes` | `list`, `get`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `validate_icon`, `extension_list`, `extension_upsert`, `extension_delete`, `extension_edges` |
| `file_upload` | `upload`, `start_job`, `upload_to_job`, `upload_bytes`, `upload_bytes_to_job`, `end_job` |
### Resources
Reference material the LLM loads on demand — no extra API calls:
| Resource URI | Contents |
|---|---|
| `bloodhound://cypher/reference` | Cypher syntax, schema, property names, patterns |
| `bloodhound://cypher/offensive-queries` | Battle-tested templates: DCSync, Kerberoasting, GPO abuse, delegation, ADCS, shadow credentials, NTLM relay, and more |
| `bloodhound://guides/ad` | AD node types and relationships quick reference |
| `bloodhound://guides/ad-methodology` | Full AD attack methodology and workflow |
| `bloodhound://guides/azure` | Azure/Entra ID analysis quick reference |
| `bloodhound://guides/azure-methodology` | Full Azure attack chains |
| `bloodhound://guides/adcs` | ADCS ESC1–ESC13 quick reference |
| `bloodhound://guides/adcs-methodology` | Detailed ESC analysis and exploitation |
| `bloodhound://opengraph/guide` | Custom node schema design and best practices |
| `bloodhound://opengraph/examples` | SQL Server and Web App OpenGraph examples |
### System Prompt
The `bloodhound_assistant` prompt includes behavioral rules that guide the LLM:
- Load the offensive query library before writing Cypher for any attack scenario
- Never draw privilege conclusions without checking group memberships and `admincount`
- Respect BloodHound's property naming conventions (`hasspn`, `enabled`, `admincount` — all lowercase)
- Handle uppercase name storage (`DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL`) correctly in filters
- Follow proper DCSync and GPO edge traversal patterns
---
## Prerequisites
- Python 3.11+
- [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/)
- BloodHound Community Edition instance with data loaded
- BloodHound API credentials (Token ID + Token Key)
---
## Installation
Run the MCP server directly from Git without cloning it first:
```bash
export BLOODHOUND_DOMAIN=your-bloodhound-instance.domain.com
export BLOODHOUND_TOKEN_ID=your-token-id
export BLOODHOUND_TOKEN_KEY=your-token-key
uvx --from git+https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp bloodhound-mcp
```
For a reproducible integration, append a commit after the repository URL, for
example `git+https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp@<commit>`.
An `uvx` installation does not read the `.env` from a separate checkout, so
the process that launches the MCP client must provide the credential variables.
For development, clone the repository and install its environment:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp.git
cd bloodhound-mcp
uv sync
```
Create a `.env` file in the project root:
```env
BLOODHOUND_DOMAIN=your-bloodhound-instance.domain.com
BLOODHOUND_TOKEN_ID=your-token-id
BLOODHOUND_TOKEN_KEY=your-token-key
```
At startup, the MCP server makes a signed, read-only request to
`/api/v2/self`. Invalid credentials, connectivity failures, and TLS failures
stop the server before it accepts MCP tool calls. The startup request times out
after 10 seconds.
The server defaults to `https` on port `443`. Override if needed:
```env
BLOODHOUND_PORT=8080
BLOODHOUND_SCHEME=http
```
TLS certificate verification remains enabled when no additional setting is
provided. For a trusted lab deployment that uses a self-signed certificate,
verification can be explicitly disabled:
```env
BLOODHOUND_VERIFY_TLS=false
```
Disabling verification weakens transport security and logs a warning. Do not
use this option on untrusted networks.
---
## Configuration
### Claude Desktop
Add to `claude_desktop_config.json`:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"bloodhound_mcp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"--from",
"git+https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp",
"bloodhound-mcp"
]
}
}
}
```
### Claude Code
Add to `~/.claude/mcp.json`:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"bloodhound_mcp": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"--from",
"git+https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp",
"bloodhound-mcp"
]
}
}
}
```
### OpenAI Codex CLI
Add to `~/.codex/config.toml` (or `.codex/config.toml` for project-scoped config):
```toml
[mcp_servers.bloodhound_mcp]
command = "uvx"
args = ["--from", "git+https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp", "bloodhound-mcp"]
```
The server inherits credentials from the process that launches Codex. To keep
them in the MCP configuration instead, pass them explicitly:
```toml
[mcp_servers.bloodhound_mcp]
command = "uvx"
args = ["--from", "git+https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp", "bloodhound-mcp"]
[mcp_servers.bloodhound_mcp.env]
BLOODHOUND_DOMAIN = "your-bloodhound-instance.domain.com"
BLOODHOUND_TOKEN_ID = "your-token-id"
BLOODHOUND_TOKEN_KEY = "your-token-key"
```
### MCP Inspector
- **Command:** `uvx`
- **Args:** `--from git+https://github.com/mwnickerson/bloodhound_mcp bloodhound-mcp`
### BloodHound API Token
1. Log into BloodHound CE or BloodHound Enterprise
2. Navigate to **Administration** → **API Tokens**
3. Create a new token and copy the Token ID and Token Key into your `.env`
---
## Usage
### Example Queries
**Reconnaissance:**
```
What domains are in BloodHound?
Show me all Domain Admins in CORP.LOCAL
Find all kerberoastable users
Which computers have unconstrained delegation?
```
**User and Group Analysis:**
```
What admin rights does jsmith@corp.local have?
Show me all sessions for the administrator account
What groups is this user a member of?
Who controls the IT ADMINS group?
```
**Attack Path Analysis:**
```
Find the shortest path from jsmith@corp.local to Domain Admins
Who has DCSync rights in the domain?
Show me all GPO abuse paths
Find ADCS ESC1 paths in the domain
```
**Custom Cypher:**
```
Run a Cypher query to find all users with SPN set and admincount=1
Find all computers where DOMAIN USERS can RDP
```
**Collection Uploads:**
```
Upload this SharpHound ZIP from /tmp/sharphound.zip into BloodHound
Upload these base64-encoded SharpHound ZIP bytes as sharphound.zip
Start an upload job, upload these base64 JSON bytes as users.json, then end the job
```
Agents that already hold a SharpHound or AzureHound collection in memory should
base64-encode the collection bytes and call:
```python
file_upload(
info_type="upload_bytes",
file_name="sharphound.zip",
file_bytes_base64="<base64-encoded zip bytes>"
)
```
For multi-file jobs, call `start_job`, then `upload_bytes_to_job` for each
base64 payload, then `end_job`.
---
## OpenGraph Support
BloodHound 8.0+ supports custom node types via OpenGraph, letting you model non-AD infrastructure (cloud resources, databases, custom assets) in the same graph as Active Directory.
The `custom_nodes` tool handles legacy CRUD operations on node type display configurations through `/api/v2/custom-nodes`. For BloodHound v9.0.0+ instances with OpenGraph extension management enabled, the same composite tool also supports `/api/v2/extensions` and `/api/v2/extensions-edges` via `extension_list`, `extension_upsert`, `extension_delete`, and `extension_edges`.
Use the `bloodhound://opengraph/guide` and `bloodhound://opengraph/examples` resources for schema design and Cypher patterns. For structured OpenGraph schemas, upsert the extension schema first, then ingest collection data with `file_upload`.
> Requires BloodHound Enterprise or BloodHound CE 8.0 or later.
> OpenGraph extension management requires BloodHound 9.0.0+ and the corresponding feature flag to be enabled.
---
## Security Considerations
BloodHound data processed through this tool is transmitted to your LLM provider's servers. **Do not use this with production AD data unless you have assessed that risk.**
Recommended use cases:
- Lab environments (GOAD, DetectionLab, custom ranges)
- Training and certification prep
- Research and tool development
- Non-production domain analysis
Best practices:
- Rotate BloodHound API tokens regularly
- Use a read-only API token where possible
- Consider a local LLM bridge for sensitive environments
---
## Testing
```bash
# Full test suite
uv run pytest
# Specific modules
uv run pytest tests/test_main_mcp_tools.py -v
uv run pytest tests/test_bloodhound_api.py -v
# Integration tests (requires a live BloodHound instance)
BLOODHOUND_INTEGRATION_TESTS=1 uv run pytest tests/test_integration.py -v
```
---
## Roadmap
- [ ] Direct Neo4j access mode (bypass REST API for complex graph traversal)
- [ ] Enhanced Azure/Entra ID tooling
- [ ] Improved ADCS attack path coverage
- [ ] Additional OpenGraph examples and templates
---
## Contributing
Contributions are welcome. Open an issue to discuss significant changes before submitting a PR.
1. Fork the repo
2. Create a feature branch
3. Add tests for new functionality
4. Run `uv run pytest` and confirm everything passes
5. Submit a pull request
---
## Acknowledgments
- **SpecterOps** for [BloodHound Community Edition](https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound)
- **Orange Cyberdefense** for [GOAD](https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/GOAD) (used for testing)
- **@jlowin** for [FastMCP](https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp)
- **@xpn** for MCP inspiration via the Mythic MCP project
## License
GNU General Public License v3.0 — see [LICENSE](LICENSE) for details.
TDQS
Scored across 79 tools
The tools are highly specialized with distinct purposes, such as get_computer_admin_rights vs get_computer_admin_users, which target different aspects of computer administration. However, some tools like get_computer_rdp_rights and get_computer_rdp_users have overlapping domains that could cause minor confusion, but descriptions clarify the differences. Overall, the set is well-differentiated with minimal ambiguity.
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern using snake_case, such as get_computer_info, list_saved_queries, and run_cypher_query. There are no deviations in naming conventions, making the set predictable and easy to navigate. This uniformity enhances usability and reduces cognitive load for agents.
With 79 tools, the count is excessive for a single server, likely overwhelming for agents and increasing the risk of misselection. While the domain of BloodHound (Active Directory security analysis) is complex, this many tools suggests poor scoping or fragmentation, as many functions could be consolidated into more generic queries or parameters. It far exceeds the typical well-scoped range of 3-15 tools.
The tool set provides comprehensive coverage for BloodHound's domain, including CRUD operations for saved queries, detailed queries for various Active Directory objects (users, computers, groups, GPOs, OUs, domains, certificates), and advanced analysis tools like get_shortest_path and get_edge_composition. There are no obvious gaps; agents can perform reconnaissance, attack path analysis, and security assessments effectively.