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maxkuminov

Obsidian MCP (pgvector + Ollama, self-hosted)

by maxkuminov

import_from_url

Fetch a public https file into your Obsidian vault by URL and destination path. The server downloads it, keeping bytes out of your context, and returns path, size, sha256, MIME, and final URL.

Instructions

Fetch a file from a public https URL straight into the vault. Requires write permission — a readwrite API key, or an OAuth token carrying the readwrite scope. Peer to write_file and request_upload — use this one when the bytes are already somewhere public.

The server does the fetching, so nothing passes through your context: a 20 MB PDF costs one tool call. Returns the path, size, sha256, MIME type and the final URL after any redirects.

Only genuinely public addresses. This server sits on a private network next to a database and other services, so the fetch is restricted: https only — plain http is refused unless the operator has set IMPORT_ALLOW_HTTP=true — no credentials in the URL, no private/loopback/link-local/metadata addresses in any spelling, and the same rules re-checked at every redirect. A refusal names the rule that was violated — that is information about the URL, not a hint to work around it. Rewriting the URL to evade the check is never the right next step; ask the user for a public link instead.

Size-capped at MAX_FILE_WRITE_BYTES, with one 30-second deadline for the whole fetch. No-clobber unless overwrite=True. Nothing is written unless the whole body arrives intact.

This tool shares the transfer tools' preflight, so it also refuses when the server has no public origin configured (MCP_HOSTNAME or BASE_URL), even though it mints no link — that is an operator setting, not something to work around.

Args: url: Public https URL of the file. path: Vault-relative destination (e.g. "Attachments/paper.pdf"). overwrite: If True, allow replacing an existing file at path.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYes
pathYes
overwriteNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.7.0

TDQS

A5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations present, the description carries the full disclosure burden and does so thoroughly. It states permission requirements (readwrite API key or OAuth scope), server-side fetching, security restrictions (https-only, URL rules, redirect re-checking), size cap, 30-second deadline, no-clobber behavior, atomic write guarantee, and preflight conditions. This is comprehensive behavioral transparency with no contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but every sentence earns its place, covering security, operational limits, failure modes, and parameter semantics. It is organized into digestible paragraphs with a clear Args section. The length is proportional to the tool's complexity, and the core purpose is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description anticipates the full decision space: how to invoke, what permissions are needed, which security rules apply, what is returned, what can go wrong, and what not to do after a refusal. Even the transfer-tool preflight condition is disclosed. An agent has everything needed to call the tool correctly and diagnose failures.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema has zero description coverage, so the parameter meanings fall entirely on the description. The 'Args:' section explains all three parameters clearly: url as a public https URL, path with a vault-relative example, and overwrite with its boolean semantics. This exceeds what bare parameter names provide.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb-resource pair: 'Fetch a file from a public https URL straight into the vault.' It also differentiates from sibling tools by naming write_file and request_upload and stating exactly when to use this one ('when the bytes are already somewhere public'). This leaves no ambiguity about what the tool does or how it differs from peers.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly names siblings and gives a decision rule: 'Peer to write_file and request_upload — use this one when the bytes are already somewhere public.' It also explains refusal conditions and explicitly tells the agent not to work around restrictions ('Rewriting the URL to evade the check is never the right next step; ask the user for a public link instead'), which is strong usage guidance beyond simple when-to-use.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.