Summarise vulnerability exposure

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint true, idempotentHint true, and destructiveHint false, covering the main safety aspects. The description adds that it aggregates data, which is consistent with a read-only summary operation. No contradiction and the existing annotations lower the burden.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise—two sentences. The first sentence lists the aggregation outputs, the second gives the use case. No fluff or irrelevant details, and the key information is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool is simple, parameters are fully described in the schema, annotations cover behavior, and an output schema exists. The description is sufficient for an agent to understand the tool's purpose and use it correctly without missing critical information.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema description coverage is 100% (top, agent_id, min_severity each have clear descriptions). Since the schema already fully explains the parameters, the description does not add extra parameter context, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool aggregates vulnerability exposure across the fleet, listing specific outputs (counts by severity, most affected agents, common CVEs, worst offending packages) and the intended use case (exposure reporting, deciding where to look in detail). This is specific and distinguishes it from sibling tools like wazuh_vulnerabilities.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides a clear use case ('Use this for exposure reporting and to decide where to look in detail'), which implies when to use it. It does not explicitly state when not to use it (e.g., for raw vulnerability lists), but the purpose is clear enough to guide the agent.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.