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Delete a computer

delete_computer
DestructiveIdempotent

Permanently destroy a computer and its disk; this action is irreversible. Optionally purge snapshots by passing a fingerprint from snapshot_holdings.

Instructions

Destroy a computer and its disk. Irreversible. Its snapshots are kept by default and become orphans, which can still be cloned but not restored. To destroy those too, read snapshot_holdings first and pass its fingerprint as expect.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
expectNoThe fingerprint from snapshot_holdings. The purge is refused unless it still names the same set, so a capture that finished after you looked cannot be swept up in a decision that was never about it.
confirmYesMust be true. This destroys the disk and everything on it.
computer_idYesRequired in full, even when one is selected — a delete is not a call to infer a target for.
idempotency_keyNoOptional. Omit it on a first attempt: a fresh key is sent for you, and an answer that is lost names it. Pass the key such an answer named to send the SAME call again without it being done twice — the platform answers with the first call's result, or says it is still running. After a 5xx that names no operation_id, send the same call again with the same key: nothing may have been done, and the platform either carries it out (the key was released) or answers idempotency_outcome_unknown. After idempotency_outcome_unknown, or a 5xx that names an operation_id, the key is spent (resending with it answers idempotency_outcome_unknown): read get_computer (and get_operation when the error named an operation_id: succeeded means it happened, running means wait on it, pending alone is no reason to wait), and if the step did not take effect, send the call again with a new key, or none. Keys last 24 hours; the same key with different arguments is refused.
delete_snapshotsNoAlso destroy every snapshot of this computer. Requires `expect`. Opt-in because the wrong answer here is unrecoverable: a snapshot kept by mistake costs storage, one destroyed by mistake costs the disk it was the last copy of.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.13.1

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, so the safety profile is partly covered. The description nonetheless adds real behavioral consequence not in the annotations: snapshots survive as orphans that can be cloned but not restored, and the disk destruction is unrecoverable. It does not cover permissions or response shape, so not a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the destructive action and its irreversibility, then the default snapshot behavior, then the opt-in path. No filler; each clause carries a distinct rule.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive tool with no output schema, the description supplies the consequence model (disk gone, snapshots orphaned, clone-vs-restore distinction) and the sequencing to purge snapshots. Sufficient for correct invocation, though it stays silent on authorization requirements and the observable result of a successful delete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description goes beyond the schema by explaining the cross-tool workflow for `expect` (read snapshot_holdings, pass its fingerprint) and the rationale for the opt-in delete_snapshots flag, giving the parameter orchestration meaning rather than just restating field names.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Destroy a computer and its disk") and immediately distinguishes it from soft-stop siblings by pairing it with "Irreversible." An agent can separate this from stop_computer, suspend_computer, and delete_snapshot without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear conditional guidance: snapshots are kept by default, and to destroy them too you must first read snapshot_holdings and pass its fingerprint as `expect`. It names the sibling tool and the ordering constraint. It does not explicitly say when to prefer delete_computer over stop_computer/suspend_computer for a merely-halted machine, so it falls just short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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