supabase-security-mcp
Related Servers
Alternatives to supabase-security-mcp
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseBqualityBmaintenanceRead-only security audit for Supabase. Surfaces RLS gaps, permissive policies, exposed functions and grants, and returns scored findings with fix SQL that is never executed.451MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI coding agents to audit Supabase or Postgres databases for Row Level Security and multi-tenant isolation holes, reading tables, grants, policies and functions for static findings and optionally probing those policies inside a rolled-back transaction. It reports each hole with an explanation and a fix, so an agent can verify the migrations it just wrote before declaring them done.1MIT
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceAudits PostgreSQL/Supabase schemas for security issues like missing RLS, permissive policies, and sensitive data exposure during AI conversations.3MIT
- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI coding assistants to check whether an API key is safe to expose, audit Supabase Row Level Security, generate owner-based RLS policy templates, and run a builder-specific pre-launch security checklist. Runs locally over stdio with no network calls, telemetry, or file access.5MIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceScan a deployed site for an exposed Supabase service_role key and audit Row Level Security from your AI coding agent.250 npmMIT
- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceMCP server that lets AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Cline) audit Supabase projects for security misconfigurations AND apply the fixes — without leaving the agent. Tools: audit_project, list_findings, preview_fix (BEGIN/ROLLBACK safety), apply_fix (with confirmation), apply_all_fixes (transactional bulk). Closes the audit-fix loop entirely in the agent — other Supabase scanners only report.54 npm1MIT
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
The probes are differentiated: `probe_anon` is black-box REST exposure, `audit_policies` inspects database catalogs, `two_account_test` verifies cross-user isolation, and `security_report` orchestrates. There is some conceptual overlap between `probe_anon` and `audit_policies` around anon/RLS exposure, so an agent might briefly hesitate, but no tool duplicates another.
`probe_anon` and `audit_policies` follow a verb_noun command style, while `two_account_test` and `security_report` are noun-style names. They are all readable snake_case, but the action-first convention is not applied consistently across the set.
Four tools is appropriate for a focused Supabase security-audit server: three distinct probes plus one report aggregator. Each tool has a clear job, and none feels redundant or missing.
The set covers anon REST exposure, RLS policy misconfigurations, SECURITY DEFINER functions, and cross-user table isolation, which are the core Supabase data-security risks. Minor gaps remain, such as no dynamic storage-object cross-account test and no anonymous INSERT probe, but static policy checks partially compensate.