lookup_kev

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral disclosure burden. It does well by revealing that this is the only tool that touches the network and that the catalog is cached for an hour, which are meaningful behavioral traits. It could add more about failure modes or rate-limit behavior, but what is disclosed is genuine and useful.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is tightly written with no wasted sentences. It front-loads the core purpose as a question, follows with concrete output details, and ends with a high-value network/caching caveat. Every sentence earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter lookup tool with no output schema, the description is nearly complete: it explains what the tool checks, what data it returns, what input it accepts, and a caching/network caveat. It does not explicitly describe the behavior for non-exploited or unknown CVEs, but the core decision an agent needs to make is well supported.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description's statement 'Accepts any text containing CVE ids' largely mirrors the schema's parameter description, adding no substantially new semantic information. It is adequate but not additive.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a direct, operational question—'Is this CVE exploited in the wild?'—and then names the exact resource being queried: CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. It enumerates the specific fields returned (date added, federal due date, ransomware usage, required action), making the tool's purpose and scope unmistakable and distinct from siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description clearly tells the agent when to use the tool: whenever CVE exploit status in the wild is needed. It also provides practical input guidance ('Accepts any text containing CVE ids') and a key environmental note that it is the only network-touching tool. It stops short of explicitly naming alternative tools or exclusion conditions, but the context is strong.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.