OpenTTT-MCP
This server provides Proof of Time (PoT) cryptographic timestamping tools for blockchain/DeFi transaction verification and system monitoring.
pot_generate— Generate a Proof of Time for a transaction by providing atxHash,chainId, andpoolAddress. Returns apotHash, timestamp, stratum, and GRG integrity shards as tamper-evident proof of when a transaction occurred.pot_verify— Verify an existing Proof of Time using itspotHash, GRG integrity shards, chain ID, and pool address. Returns whether the proof is valid, the mode (turbo/full), and the verified timestamp.pot_query— Query historical PoT records from local logs and on-chain subgraph data, filterable by time range (startTime/endTime) with an optional resultlimit.pot_stats— Retrieve aggregated statistics (total swaps, turbo/full mode counts, turbo ratio) for a given period:day,week, ormonth.pot_health— Check system health, including time source status (NIST, Google, Cloudflare), subgraph sync state, server uptime, and current operating mode.
Uses Cloudflare's time source as one of three independent authorities for cryptographically signed timestamps in Proof of Time generation.
Uses Google's time source as one of three independent authorities for cryptographically signed timestamps in Proof of Time generation.
@helm-protocol/ttt-mcp
Reference implementation of draft-helmprotocol-tttps-00 (IETF Experimental)
MCP Server for OpenTTT — Proof of Time tools for AI agents
The Problem: Workflow Amnesia
Large Claude Code workflows — 20-agent Dynamic Workflows, multi-day multi-session projects, 100K+ token contexts — all face the same failure mode: context compression erases action history.
Agent B has no memory of what Agent A decided. Agent A resumes after compression with no record of its own prior steps. Duplicate work. Lost decisions. State corruption.
ttt-mcp is the external nervous system that survives context compression.
Every workflow step is anchored to a cryptographic timestamp on an external server — physically separate from Claude's context window. When compression happens, agents query their exact action history through the MCP tools and resume with full causal context.
Claude workflow → [context compressed] → agents call pot_query(eventId)
→ external server returns full timeline
→ workflow resumes, zero lost stateMathematical Guarantee
Layer | Mechanism | Guarantee |
Identity | SHA-3 eventId (256-bit) | Collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶ ≈ 0 — practically 100% exact step recall |
Ordering | TTTPS causal timestamps | Total order on events — tamper-proof sequence proof |
Causal chain | prevEventId DAG | O(depth) traversal — depth ~100 for 1B-token workflows |
Fingerprint | Multi-layer cryptographic pipeline | Formally bounded tamper-evident step identity |
Non-repudiation | Ed25519 signature | Cryptographic proof of who acted when |
Quick Start
# Claude Desktop
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"ttt": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@helm-protocol/ttt-mcp"]
}
}
}Add TTT_API_KEY for unlimited calls (free tier: 100 calls/day per IP).
Tools
Tool | Description |
| Stamp a workflow step with eventId + prevEventId (builds causal chain) |
| Verify a Proof of Time using its hash and integrity shards |
| O(1) exact lookup by eventId — call this after context compression |
| Traverse full causal DAG — backward + forward chain from any step |
| Get turbo/full mode statistics for a time period |
| Check system health: time sources, uptime, current mode |
| Create a compressed rollup checkpoint of workflow history |
Tool Parameters
pot_generate
Stamp a workflow step with a cryptographic timestamp. For Claude Code: use eventId + prevEventId. For DeFi: use txHash + chainId + poolAddress. One of eventId or txHash is required.
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
eventId | string | Either/or | Workflow step identifier. E.g. |
prevEventId | string | No | Previous step's eventId — links steps into a causal chain |
txHash | string | Either/or | Transaction hash (DeFi, hex with 0x prefix) |
chainId | number | No | EVM chain ID (DeFi) |
poolAddress | string | No | DEX pool contract address (DeFi) |
pot_query
Query Proof of Time records. Use eventId for O(1) exact lookup after context compression.
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
eventId | string | No | Exact step lookup — collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶ |
startTime | number | No | Start time (unix ms). Default: 24h ago |
endTime | number | No | End time (unix ms). Default: now |
limit | number | No | Max entries to return. Default: 100, max: 1000 |
pot_graph
Traverse the causal chain from any step. Returns backward chain (ancestors) and forward chain (descendants).
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
eventId | string | Yes | Step to traverse from |
depth | number | No | Max backward depth. Default: 10, max: 100 |
pot_verify
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
potHash | string | Yes | PoT hash to verify (hex with 0x prefix) |
grgShards | string[] | Yes | Array of hex-encoded cryptographic integrity shards |
chainId | number | Yes | EVM chain ID |
poolAddress | string | Yes | Uniswap V4 pool address |
pot_stats
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
period |
| Yes | Time period for statistics |
pot_health
No parameters.
pot_checkpoint
Creates a compressed rollup checkpoint of workflow history.
Use when: Approaching context limit, before long tasks, or every ~100 events.
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
fromEventId | string | No | Start of range — first eventId in the causal chain to include |
toEventId | string | No | End of range — last eventId in the causal chain to include |
startTime | number | No | Unix ms. Default: 1 hour ago |
endTime | number | No | Unix ms. Default: now |
maxTokens | number | No | Approximate max tokens for rollup output. Default: 2000 |
Returns:
checkpointId— unique checkpoint identifierrollupSummary— compressed event history (depth-adaptive: full/compact/minimal/rollup)chainIntact— whether the causal chain is unbrokennextCheckpointHint— recommended events before next checkpoint
Depth-adaptive compression:
Depth | Format | ~Tokens |
1–5 | Full entry | ~200/event |
6–20 | Compact (id+hash+ts) | ~80/event |
21–50 | Minimal (id+ts) | ~30/event |
51+ | Rollup string | ~10/event |
Use Cases
1. Claude Code Workflow — Amnesia Prevention
Problem: A 20-agent Dynamic Workflow refactors a 500K-line codebase over hours. After each context compression, agents have no memory of what they already processed. Duplicate work. State corruption.
Solution: Each agent stamps its steps with pot_generate(eventId, prevEventId). After compression, it calls pot_query(eventId) to recover its exact action history — what ran, when, in what order — from the external server. The server is outside Claude's context window; compression never touches it.
// Agent starts a workflow step
const pot = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: {
eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3",
prevEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step2"
}
});
// pot.potHash — cryptographic proof this step happened at this time
// After context compression, agent recovers its history:
const history = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_query",
arguments: { eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3" }
});
// history.local[0] — exact record: timestamp, prevEventId, potHash
// history.found: true — O(1) lookup, collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶
// Traverse full causal chain:
const chain = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_graph",
arguments: { eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3", depth: 20 }
});
// chain.backwardChain — all ancestor steps in chronological order
// chain.forwardChain — steps that follow this oneBefore a long task or every ~100 events — create a checkpoint:
// Compress workflow history before context fills up — by causal range:
const checkpoint = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_checkpoint",
arguments: {
fromEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step1",
toEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3"
}
});
// checkpoint.checkpointId — store this; resume from it after compression
// checkpoint.rollupSummary — depth-adaptive compressed history (10–200 tokens/event)
// checkpoint.chainIntact: true — causal chain verified unbroken
// checkpoint.nextCheckpointHint: 87 — suggested events before next checkpoint
// Or compress by time window with a token budget:
const checkpoint = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_checkpoint",
arguments: {
startTime: Date.now() - 3_600_000, // last 1 hour
maxTokens: 1500
}
});
// After context compression, restore from checkpoint instead of re-querying all events:
const history = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_query",
arguments: { eventId: checkpoint.checkpointId }
});
// Full causal context restored in a single callOutcome: Zero duplicate work. Full workflow timeline recoverable even after complete context resets.
2. MEV Bot — Transaction Ordering Proof
Problem: You got front-run. You can't prove it — mempool timestamps are per-node, unsigned, non-authoritative.
Solution: Call pot_generate before every submission. The PoT receipt is cryptographically signed by three independent time sources (NIST, Google, Cloudflare), anchored on Base Sepolia TTT ERC-1155. If front-running occurs, you have a timestamped, on-chain record predating the attacker's block inclusion.
const pot = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: { txHash: pendingTxHash, chainId: 8453, poolAddress: "0x..." }
});
// pot.potHash — your evidence, timestamped by NIST+Google+Cloudflare3. DEX Protocol — Sandwich Deterrence
Solution: Integrate TTTHookSimple (Uniswap V4 hook, Base Sepolia: 0x8C633b05b833a476925F7d9818da6E215760F2c7). Honest builders get turbo mode. Tampered sequences get full mode (exponential backoff). Economics, not governance.
4. Hedge Fund / Prop Desk — MiFIR Art.22c Compliance
Problem: MiFIR Article 22c / RTS 25 requires microsecond-precision UTC-synchronized timestamps. Hardware PTP appliances cost $50K–$500K.
Solution: pot_generate produces an Ed25519-signed timestamp with uncertainty bound and multi-source attestation. Structurally compatible with RTS 25 audit record requirements. One API call per trade.
const audit = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: { txHash: tradeHash, chainId: 8453 }
});
// audit.timestamp: nanosecond precision
// audit.uncertainty: ±ms bound (RTS 25 required field)
// audit.confidence: fraction of sources that agreedOutcome: MiFIR-grade audit trail. IETF standardized via draft-helmprotocol-tttps-00.
5. Multi-Agent Coordination — Causal Order Proof
Problem: When multiple AI agents interact in a pipeline, the causal order matters for debugging and audit. Agent logs are unverifiable.
Solution: Each agent stamps its action with pot_generate. The potHash chain is independently verifiable. pot_graph reconstructs who did what and in what order.
Rate Limits & Pricing
Free Tier: 100 calls/day per IP — no API key needed
BOT Tier: $199/mo — unlimited, SLA
DEX Tier: $499/mo — unlimited, priority support
FUND Tier: $2K+/mo — enterprise, dedicated infraContact: heime.jorgen@proton.me
Requirements
Node.js >= 18
Network access for time synthesis (HTTPS to time.nist.gov, time.google.com, time.cloudflare.com)
Learn More
OpenTTT SDK — The underlying SDK
IETF Draft: draft-helmprotocol-tttps-00 — TTTPS Protocol Specification
Helm Protocol — GitHub
License
BSL-1.1 — free for non-commercial use.
Commercial use (production bots, hedge funds, prop desks) requires a license.
Change Date: 2029-05-28 → Apache 2.0
Maintenance
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