OpenTTT-MCP
This server provides Proof of Time (PoT) cryptographic timestamping tools for blockchain/DeFi transaction verification and system monitoring.
pot_generate— Generate a Proof of Time for a transaction by providing atxHash,chainId, andpoolAddress. Returns apotHash, timestamp, stratum, and GRG integrity shards as tamper-evident proof of when a transaction occurred.pot_verify— Verify an existing Proof of Time using itspotHash, GRG integrity shards, chain ID, and pool address. Returns whether the proof is valid, the mode (turbo/full), and the verified timestamp.pot_query— Query historical PoT records from local logs and on-chain subgraph data, filterable by time range (startTime/endTime) with an optional resultlimit.pot_stats— Retrieve aggregated statistics (total swaps, turbo/full mode counts, turbo ratio) for a given period:day,week, ormonth.pot_health— Check system health, including time source status (NIST, Google, Cloudflare), subgraph sync state, server uptime, and current operating mode.
Uses Cloudflare's time source as one of three independent authorities for cryptographically signed timestamps in Proof of Time generation.
Uses Google's time source as one of three independent authorities for cryptographically signed timestamps in Proof of Time generation.
@helm-protocol/ttt-mcp
Reference implementation of draft-helmprotocol-tttps (IETF Experimental)
Proof-of-Time attestation — Ed25519-signed timestamps with multi-source corroboration and explicit error bounds. IETF draft-helmprotocol-tttps
EU AI Act Art. 50 — AI-Generated Content Transparency
TTTPS provides cryptographic time-provenance for AI-generated content at the moment of creation. A pot_generate call anchors a tamper-evident timestamp to a cryptographic hash of the content record — independently of any embedded metadata.
C2PA complementarity: C2PA metadata is stripped during recapture, transcoding, and format conversion. TTTPS survives as an external anchor independently verifiable without metadata chain continuity — allowing forensic reconstruction of content provenance even when embedded markers are absent.
GDPR-compatible by design: PoT records contain no content and no personal identifiers. Each record binds a cryptographic hash (SHA-256 + HMAC-SHA256) to a multi-source time attestation. No plaintext content transits or is stored on Helm servers.
IETF specification: draft-helmprotocol-tttps (ISE track). Contact: peter@kenosian.com.
Related MCP server: @unfakable/mcp
The Problem: Workflow Amnesia
Every Claude Code long-horizon workflow hits the same wall: context compression erases action history.
Agent B has no memory of what Agent A decided. Agent A resumes after compression with no record of its own prior steps. Duplicate work. Lost decisions. State corruption.
ttt-mcp is the external causal chain that survives context compression.
Every workflow step is anchored to a cryptographic timestamp on an external server — physically separate from Claude's context window. When compression happens, agents call pot_query(eventId) for O(1) exact step recall and resume with full causal context.
Claude workflow → [context compressed] → agents call pot_query(eventId)
→ external server returns full timeline
→ workflow resumes, zero lost stateMathematical Guarantees
Layer | Mechanism | Guarantee |
Identity | SHA-3 eventId (256-bit) | Collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶ — practically zero |
Lookup | O(1) exact retrieval | No context consumed by history reconstruction |
Ordering | TTTPS causal timestamps | Total order on events — tamper-proof sequence proof |
Causal chain | prevEventId DAG | O(depth) traversal — depth ~100 for 1B-token workflows |
Non-repudiation | Ed25519 signature | Cryptographic proof of who acted when |
Resilience | Erasure-coded cryptographic shards | ≥97% recovery at BER=0.05, 99.88% at BER=0.02 (theoretical) |
Persistence | Redis AOF + 90-day TTL | Server survives context compression and restarts |
Quick Start
Claude Code
claude mcp add ttt -- npx -y @helm-protocol/ttt-mcp@0.3.3With an API key (raises the free limit to your plan's monthly quota):
claude mcp add ttt -e TTT_API_KEY=your-key -- npx -y @helm-protocol/ttt-mcp@0.3.3Claude Desktop
Add to claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"ttt": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@helm-protocol/ttt-mcp@0.3.3"],
"env": { "TTT_API_KEY": "your-key" }
}
}
}Cursor
One-click install, or add the same mcpServers block above to .cursor/mcp.json.
Free tier: 100 calls/day per IP — no signup needed.
5-Minute Test
Once connected, run this sequence in Claude:
Step 1 — Stamp a workflow step:
Just tell Claude naturally:
"Stamp this step as my-first-step" "Record what I just did as refactor-auth-step1"
Claude calls pot_generate automatically. Or call it directly:
pot_generate(eventId: "my-first-step")Step 2 — Simulate context compression: start a new Claude session
Step 3 — Recover in the new session:
Tell Claude:
"What did I do in my-first-step?" "Recover my last workflow state"
Or call directly:
pot_query(eventId: "my-first-step")→ Returns exact record. Amnesia gone.
Step 4 — Build a causal chain:
pot_generate(eventId: "step-2", prevEventId: "my-first-step")
pot_graph(eventId: "step-2", depth: 5)→ Full backward chain. Cryptographically ordered.
8 Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| Stamp a workflow step with a cryptographic timestamp |
| Verify a PoT signature |
| Verify a draft-08 §3 Payload Digest record |
| O(1) exact lookup by eventId — core amnesia recovery |
| Traverse causal DAG (backward + forward chain) |
| Roll up events into a compressed summary — use every ~100 events or before long tasks |
| Server statistics and mode status |
| Health check |
Tool Parameters
pot_generate
Stamp a workflow step with a cryptographic timestamp. For Claude Code: use eventId + prevEventId. For DeFi: use txHash + chainId + poolAddress. To bind the attestation to a specific piece of content (draft-08 §3 Payload Digest), also supply contentDigest. One of eventId, txHash, or contentDigest is required.
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
eventId | string | Either/or | Workflow step identifier. E.g. |
prevEventId | string | No | Previous step's eventId — links steps into a causal chain |
txHash | string | Either/or | Transaction hash (DeFi, hex with 0x prefix) |
chainId | number | No | EVM chain ID (DeFi) |
poolAddress | string | No | DEX pool contract address (DeFi) |
contentDigest | string | Either/or | SHA-256 digest (lowercase hex, 64 chars) of the content this record attests to. Computed by the caller — the server never sees the content. When the local time synthesis meets draft-08's own requirements (≥3 independent sources, a representable error bound), the response includes a spec-conformant |
ctxId | string | No | draft-08 §3.3 context identifier (Commitment domain separator, max 255 octets). Defaults to a fixed server value; MAY be public. |
pot_verify_v08
Verify a draft-08 §3 record produced by pot_generate's potRecordV08 field: recomputes the Commitment, checks the Ed25519 signature, and — if content is supplied — checks it against the record's Payload Digest.
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
potRecordV08 | string | Yes | Hex-encoded 184 or 216-octet record |
ctxId | string | No | Must match what |
issuerPubKey | string | No | Hex-encoded 32-byte raw Ed25519 public key. Defaults to this server's own key. |
content | string | No | Payload to check against the record's Payload Digest field |
pot_query
Query Proof of Time records. Use eventId for O(1) exact lookup after context compression.
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
eventId | string | No | Exact step lookup — collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶ |
startTime | number | No | Start time (unix ms). Default: 24h ago |
endTime | number | No | End time (unix ms). Default: now |
limit | number | No | Max entries to return. Default: 100, max: 1000 |
pot_graph
Traverse the causal chain from any step. Returns backward chain (ancestors) and forward chain (descendants).
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
eventId | string | Yes | Step to traverse from |
depth | number | No | Max backward depth. Default: 10, max: 100 |
Returns:
backwardChain— ancestors in chronological order (depth-compressed for large chains)forwardChain— steps that follow the given eventIdchainBroken—trueif a gap is detected (ancestor was evicted from ring buffer, or the chain root references an unknown entry)brokenAt—"server_restart"if the gap was caused by a server restart clearing in-memory state; otherwise the eventId at which the break occurred;nullif chain is intactreachableDepth— number of ancestors successfully traversed before the gap (or chain root)
Causal chain gap causes:
server_restart: the server restarted and the in-memory DAG was cleared. If Redis is available andREDIS_URLis set, the DAG is rebuilt from Redis on startup — reducing restart gaps.Ring-buffer eviction: the ring buffer holds the most recent 10,000 events in memory. Ancestors beyond that window show as
chainBroken: truewithbrokenAtset to the oldest reachable eventId.
Recovering from a gap: call pot_checkpoint before long tasks to compress and preserve the chain within the token budget, or use Redis persistence to survive restarts.
pot_verify
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
potHash | string | Yes | PoT hash to verify (hex with 0x prefix) |
grgShards | string[] | Yes | Array of hex-encoded cryptographic integrity shards |
chainId | number | Yes | EVM chain ID |
poolAddress | string | Yes | Uniswap V4 pool address |
pot_stats
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
period |
| Yes | Time period for statistics |
pot_health
No parameters.
pot_checkpoint
Creates a compressed rollup checkpoint of workflow history.
Use when: Approaching context limit, before long tasks, or every ~100 events.
Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
fromEventId | string | No | Start of range — first eventId in the causal chain to include |
toEventId | string | No | End of range — last eventId in the causal chain to include |
startTime | number | No | Unix ms. Default: 1 hour ago |
endTime | number | No | Unix ms. Default: now |
maxTokens | number | No | Approximate max tokens for rollup output. Default: 2000 |
Returns:
checkpointId— unique checkpoint identifierrollup— compressed event history (depth-adaptive: full/compact/minimal/rollup)summary— human-readable one-line summary of the checkpointchainIntact— whether the causal chain is unbrokennextCheckpointHint— recommended events before next checkpoint
Depth-adaptive compression:
Depth | Format | ~Tokens |
1–5 | Full entry | ~200/event |
6–20 | Compact (id+hash+ts) | ~80/event |
21–50 | Minimal (id+ts) | ~30/event |
51+ | Rollup string | ~10/event |
Use Cases
1. Claude Code Workflow — Amnesia Prevention
Problem: A 20-agent Dynamic Workflow refactors a 500K-line codebase over hours. After each context compression, agents have no memory of what they already processed. Duplicate work. State corruption.
Solution: Each agent stamps its steps with pot_generate(eventId, prevEventId). After compression, it calls pot_query(eventId) to recover its exact action history — what ran, when, in what order — from the external server. The server is outside Claude's context window; compression never touches it.
// Agent starts a workflow step
const pot = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: {
eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3",
prevEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step2"
}
});
// pot.potHash — cryptographic proof this step happened at this time
// After context compression, agent recovers its history:
const history = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_query",
arguments: { eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3" }
});
// history.local[0] — exact record: timestamp, prevEventId, potHash
// history.found: true — O(1) lookup, collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶
// Traverse full causal chain:
const chain = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_graph",
arguments: { eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3", depth: 20 }
});
// chain.backwardChain — all ancestor steps in chronological order
// chain.forwardChain — steps that follow this one
// chain.chainBroken — true if a gap was detected in the ancestor chain
// chain.brokenAt — "server_restart" if the server restarted and cleared
// the in-memory DAG; otherwise the eventId of the oldest
// reachable ancestor before the gap; null if chain intact
// chain.reachableDepth — how many ancestors were recovered before the gap
// Handle a server-restart gap:
if (chain.chainBroken && chain.brokenAt === "server_restart") {
// Server cleared in-memory state; ancestors before the gap are gone unless
// Redis was configured (REDIS_URL) — in that case the DAG was rebuilt on
// restart and chainBroken will be false.
// Recover by querying the most recent checkpoint or restarting from a known step.
}Before a long task or every ~100 events — create a checkpoint:
// Compress workflow history before context fills up — by causal range:
const checkpoint = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_checkpoint",
arguments: {
fromEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step1",
toEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3"
}
});
// checkpoint.checkpointId — store this; resume from it after compression
// checkpoint.rollup — depth-adaptive compressed history (10–200 tokens/event)
// checkpoint.chainIntact: true — causal chain verified unbroken
// checkpoint.nextCheckpointHint: 87 — suggested events before next checkpoint
// Or compress by time window with a token budget:
const checkpoint = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_checkpoint",
arguments: {
startTime: Date.now() - 3_600_000, // last 1 hour
maxTokens: 1500
}
});
// After context compression, restore from checkpoint instead of re-querying all events:
const history = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_query",
arguments: { eventId: checkpoint.checkpointId }
});
// Full causal context restored in a single callOutcome: Zero duplicate work. Full workflow timeline recoverable even after complete context resets.
2. MEV Bot — Transaction Ordering Proof
Problem: You got front-run. You can't prove it — mempool timestamps are per-node, unsigned, non-authoritative.
Solution: Call pot_generate before every submission. The PoT receipt is cryptographically signed using three independent time sources (NIST, Google, Cloudflare). The on-chain hash can be anchored via a separate Base Sepolia TTT ERC-1155 contract. If front-running occurs, you have a timestamped record predating the attacker's block inclusion.
const pot = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: { txHash: pendingTxHash, chainId: 8453, poolAddress: "0x..." }
});
// pot.potHash — your evidence, timestamped by NIST+Google+CloudflareNote: The DeFi path (
txHash+chainId+poolAddress) requires a server-side build with the integrity-shard pipeline enabled. It is not available in the publicopentttnpm package; calls without it will throw. The Claude Code path (eventId) works out of the box.
3. DEX Protocol — Sandwich Deterrence
Solution: Integrate TTTHookSimple (Uniswap V4 hook, Base Sepolia: 0x8C633b05b833a476925F7d9818da6E215760F2c7). Honest builders get turbo mode. Tampered sequences get full mode (penalty delay). Economics, not governance.
Note: Shard-based verification (
pot_verifywithgrgShards) requires a server-side build with the integrity-shard pipeline enabled — not available in the publicopentttnpm package.
4. Hedge Fund / Prop Desk — MiFIR Art.22c Compliance
Problem: MiFIR Article 22c / RTS 25 requires microsecond-precision UTC-synchronized timestamps. Hardware PTP appliances cost $50K–$500K.
Solution: pot_generate produces an Ed25519-signed timestamp with an uncertainty bound and multi-source attestation. Structurally compatible with the RTS 25 audit record format. One API call per trade.
const audit = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: { txHash: tradeHash, chainId: 8453 }
});
// audit.timestamp: high-resolution timestamp
// audit.uncertainty: ± bound (RTS 25 uncertainty field)
// audit.confidence: fraction of sources that agreedPrecision note: The default network time sources (Roughtime / NTP) provide a few-millisecond uncertainty bound. The MiFIR Art. 22c / RTS 25 ±1ms (and tighter) requirement is met only with an added GEO time source (KTSat); this is a roadmap configuration, not the default deployment.
Outcome: Structurally compatible audit trail. IETF specification: draft-helmprotocol-tttps.
5. Multi-Agent Coordination — Causal Order Proof
Problem: When multiple AI agents interact in a pipeline, the causal order matters for debugging and audit. Agent logs are unverifiable.
Solution: Each agent stamps its action with pot_generate. The potHash chain is independently verifiable. pot_graph reconstructs who did what and in what order.
How It Differs — A Different Job, Not "Better"
Tool | Integration | What it recalls | Integrity | Hot-path cost |
Letta (MemGPT) | owns the agent loop | self-editing semantic memory | none | embedding + vector search per memory op |
LangGraph / LangMem | LangGraph only | graph state / semantic | none | checkpoint I/O (+ embeddings) |
RAG / vector DB | bolt-on | fuzzy similarity | none | embed + vector search per item |
ttt-mcp | 2-min MCP retrofit | exact causal step (by eventId) | Ed25519 + TTTPS timestamp | sign + hash + write — 0 embedding calls |
The cost difference is structural, not incidental.
Letta and Mem0 treat agent memory as a semantic search problem — every recall forces an LLM embedding call and a vector search. ttt-mcp bypasses the LLM/embedding layer entirely: state recovery is an O(1) cryptographic hash lookup. Marginal cost is commodity CPU + storage, not API tokens.
Scope: agents stamp the steps worth checkpointing — not every token, not every query. Volume tracks decisions, not total chat traffic.
If you need fuzzy semantic search over past conversations, use Letta or a vector DB. If you need a zero-embedding, deterministic state recovery layer for long-horizon workflows that survives context compaction, use ttt-mcp.
Pricing
Tier | Price | Calls/month |
Free | $0 | 100/day per IP — no signup |
Dev | $29/mo | 100K |
Pro | $99/mo | 1M |
Team | $299/mo | 10M + $0.01/1K overage |
Enterprise | $999+/mo | 100M calls/mo · $0.001/1K overage · SLA 99.9% |
Platform License | Negotiated ($2M+/yr) | Volume cap negotiated · native integration |
Subscribe:
Dev $29/mo · Pro $99/mo · Team $299/mo — to subscribe, email peter@kenosian.com.
Enterprise & Platform License: peter@kenosian.com
Contact: peter@kenosian.com
Quota mechanics — stdio vs HTTP:
HTTP mode (Glama / Smithery container,
PORTset): the per-IP free tier limit (100 calls/day) is enforced locally in the server process.stdio mode (Claude Code
npx, Claude Desktop): there is no per-IP counter. Tool calls are delegated toapi.kenosian.comviaX-TTT-API-Key; quota is enforced server-side against your plan's monthly allowance. WithoutTTT_API_KEYthe local fallback runs with no daily cap, but plan features (server-side DAG persistence, multi-session causal chains) are unavailable.
Requirements
Node.js >= 18
Network access for time synthesis (HTTPS to time.nist.gov, time.google.com, time.cloudflare.com)
Time source tiers (automatic fallback):
Tier | Source | Stratum | Notes |
1 (preferred) | PTP / hardware clock | 0–1 | Requires local PTP daemon |
2 | Roughtime / NTP (NIST, Google, Cloudflare) | 2–4 | Default for most deployments |
3 (offline fallback) | Local system clock | 16 | RFC 5905 unsynchronized stratum — used when all network sources are unreachable |
The server falls through to stratum 16 automatically; no manual configuration needed. The stratum field in every pot_generate response indicates which tier was used.
Redis persistence (optional):
Redis is not required. The in-memory DAG is authoritative at runtime. If REDIS_URL is set, events are written to Redis with a 90-day TTL and the DAG is rebuilt from Redis on server restart — reducing server_restart chain gaps. Without Redis, the in-memory DAG is cleared on restart.
Production Tips
Cold Start warm-up — On first startup, BatchSigner requires one request to initialize. Call pot_health or send a single dummy pot_generate before your load balancer health check goes live. Without this, the first request may see p99 ~500ms; subsequent requests stabilize to <10ms.
# Kubernetes / Docker: add to your startup script
curl -s http://your-server/pot/health > /dev/nullLearn More
OpenTTT SDK — The underlying SDK
IETF Draft: draft-helmprotocol-tttps — TTTPS Protocol Specification
Helm Protocol — GitHub
License
BSL-1.1 — free for non-commercial use.
Commercial use (production bots, hedge funds, prop desks) requires a license.
Change Date: 2029-05-28 → Apache 2.0
Available Tools
5 toolspot_generateB
Generate a Proof of Time for a transaction. Returns potHash, timestamp, stratum, and GRG integrity shards.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| txHash | Yes | Transaction hash (hex with 0x prefix) | |
| chainId | Yes | Chain ID (e.g. 8453 for Base, 84532 for Base Sepolia) | |
| poolAddress | Yes | DEX pool contract address |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full burden but lacks behavioral details. It mentions the return values (potHash, timestamp, stratum, GRG integrity shards) but doesn't disclose critical traits like whether this is a read-only or mutating operation, authentication needs, rate limits, or error conditions. The output description is helpful but insufficient for full transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that front-loads the purpose and key output details. Every word earns its place with no redundancy or fluff, making it highly concise and well-structured.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given 3 parameters with full schema coverage and no output schema, the description is minimally adequate. It explains the purpose and outputs but lacks context on when to use, behavioral traits, or error handling. For a tool with no annotations, it should do more to compensate, but the output details provide some completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema fully documents parameters (txHash, chainId, poolAddress). The description adds no parameter-specific semantics beyond what the schema provides, such as format examples or constraints. Baseline 3 is appropriate as the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Generate a Proof of Time') and the resource ('for a transaction'), with specific output details. It distinguishes from siblings like pot_health or pot_stats by focusing on generation rather than monitoring or verification, though it doesn't explicitly contrast with pot_query or pot_verify.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives like pot_verify (which might validate proofs) or pot_query (which might retrieve existing proofs). The description implies usage for generating proofs but offers no context about prerequisites, timing, or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pot_healthB
Check PoT system health: time source status, subgraph sync, server uptime, and current mode.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full burden for behavioral disclosure. It mentions what gets checked (time source status, subgraph sync, server uptime, current mode) but doesn't disclose important behavioral traits like whether this is a read-only operation, if it requires authentication, potential rate limits, or what happens when the system is unhealthy. The description is functional but lacks critical operational context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that front-loads the core purpose ('Check PoT system health') followed by specific aspects being examined. Every word earns its place with no redundancy or unnecessary elaboration. Perfectly sized for this simple diagnostic tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simplicity (no parameters, no output schema, no annotations), the description provides adequate context for what the tool does. However, it lacks information about the return format, error conditions, or what constitutes 'healthy' versus 'unhealthy' states. For a health check tool, knowing what the output looks like would be valuable, especially without an output schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters with 100% schema description coverage, so the baseline is 4. The description appropriately doesn't discuss parameters since none exist, and it doesn't need to compensate for any schema gaps. This is the correct approach for a parameterless tool.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose with specific verbs ('Check') and resources ('PoT system health'), listing the specific health aspects examined. It distinguishes from siblings by focusing on system health rather than generation, querying, statistics, or verification. However, it doesn't explicitly differentiate from 'pot_stats' which might also provide health-related statistics.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus its siblings. There's no mention of alternatives, prerequisites, or specific contexts where this health check is appropriate versus using other tools like 'pot_stats' for statistical monitoring or 'pot_verify' for validation checks.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pot_queryB
Query Proof of Time history from local log and on-chain subgraph.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| startTime | No | Start time (unix ms). Default: 24h ago | |
| endTime | No | End time (unix ms). Default: now | |
| limit | No | Max entries to return. Default: 100, max: 1000 |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full burden but only states what the tool does without behavioral details. It doesn't disclose whether this is a read-only operation, potential rate limits, authentication needs, or what happens if data sources are unavailable. For a query tool with zero annotation coverage, this leaves significant gaps in understanding its behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence with zero wasted words. It front-loads the core purpose ('Query Proof of Time history') and specifies data sources concisely. Every element earns its place without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity (querying multiple data sources), lack of annotations, and no output schema, the description is minimally adequate. It states what the tool does but doesn't explain return values, error conditions, or behavioral traits. With 100% schema coverage, parameters are well-documented, but overall completeness is limited for a query tool without output details.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema fully documents all three parameters with defaults and constraints. The description adds no additional parameter semantics beyond implying time-based filtering, which is already covered in the schema. This meets the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Query') and resource ('Proof of Time history'), specifying both data sources ('local log and on-chain subgraph'). It distinguishes from siblings like 'pot_generate' or 'pot_verify' by focusing on retrieval rather than creation or validation. However, it doesn't explicitly contrast with 'pot_stats' which might also involve querying.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives like 'pot_stats' or 'pot_verify'. The description implies it's for historical queries, but there's no explicit context, prerequisites, or exclusions mentioned to help an agent choose between sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pot_statsB
Get PoT statistics: total swaps, turbo/full counts, and turbo ratio for a given period.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| period | Yes | Time period for statistics |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It implies a read-only operation ('Get') but does not specify data sources, permissions required, rate limits, error handling, or whether the statistics are real-time or cached. For a tool with zero annotation coverage, this leaves significant gaps in understanding its behavior and constraints.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that front-loads the key action and metrics without any wasted words. It directly communicates the tool's function and scope, making it easy to parse and understand quickly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's low complexity (1 parameter, no output schema, no annotations), the description is minimally adequate. It covers the basic purpose and parameter context but lacks details on behavioral traits, usage guidelines, and output format, which are important for effective tool invocation. It meets the minimum viable threshold but has clear gaps in completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema description coverage is 100%, with the parameter 'period' fully documented in the schema (including enum values and description). The description adds minimal value by mentioning 'for a given period', which aligns with but does not expand beyond the schema. With high schema coverage, the baseline score of 3 is appropriate as the description does not enhance parameter understanding.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose with a specific verb ('Get') and resource ('PoT statistics'), listing the specific metrics returned (total swaps, turbo/full counts, turbo ratio) and the scope (for a given period). However, it does not explicitly differentiate from sibling tools like 'pot_query' or 'pot_stats', which might have overlapping functions, leaving some ambiguity about uniqueness.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as 'pot_query' or 'pot_health', nor does it mention any prerequisites, exclusions, or contextual cues for usage. It merely states what the tool does without indicating appropriate scenarios or comparisons to siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pot_verifyC
Verify a Proof of Time using its hash and GRG shards. Returns validity, mode (turbo/full), and timestamp.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| potHash | Yes | PoT hash to verify (hex with 0x prefix) | |
| grgShards | Yes | Array of hex-encoded GRG integrity shards | |
| chainId | Yes | EVM chain ID (e.g. 84532 for Base Sepolia) | |
| poolAddress | Yes | Uniswap V4 pool address (0x-prefixed) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the tool returns validity, mode, and timestamp, but lacks details on error handling, rate limits, authentication needs, or side effects. For a verification tool with four required parameters, this leaves significant gaps in understanding its operational behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that front-loads the core action (verify) and key inputs. It avoids redundancy and wastes no words, though it could be slightly more structured by separating purpose from output details for clarity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (four required parameters, no annotations, no output schema), the description is insufficient. It doesn't explain the verification process, potential outputs beyond a vague list, or how results should be interpreted. For a tool with cryptographic inputs and no structured output, more context is needed to ensure correct usage.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema fully documents all four parameters. The description adds minimal value beyond this, only implying that potHash and grgShards are used for verification. It doesn't explain relationships between parameters or provide usage examples, meeting the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: verifying a Proof of Time using hash and GRG shards, and specifies what it returns (validity, mode, timestamp). It distinguishes from siblings like pot_generate (creation) and pot_query (querying) by focusing on verification. However, it doesn't explicitly contrast with pot_health or pot_stats, keeping it from a perfect score.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like pot_query or pot_stats. It mentions the required inputs but doesn't specify prerequisites, error conditions, or typical use cases. Without such context, users must infer usage from the purpose alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
5 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
pot_generate - First observed
pot_health - First observed
pot_query - First observed
pot_stats - First observed
pot_verify
TDQS
Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: generate creates a new Proof of Time, health checks system status, query retrieves history, stats provides analytics, and verify validates existing proofs. There is no overlap or ambiguity between these functions.
All tools follow a consistent 'pot_' prefix with descriptive action suffixes (generate, health, query, stats, verify), using snake_case uniformly. This pattern is predictable and enhances readability.
With 5 tools, this server is well-scoped for managing Proof of Time operations. Each tool serves a specific, necessary function without redundancy, fitting a typical range for a focused domain.
The toolset provides complete coverage for the Proof of Time domain: creation (generate), verification (verify), monitoring (health), historical access (query), and analytics (stats). There are no obvious gaps, supporting full lifecycle management.
Maintenance
Resources
Unclaimed servers have limited discoverability.
Looking for Admin?
If you are the server author, to access and configure the admin panel.
Related MCP Connectors
Clockchain®: neutral verified network time for AI agents (get_time). Testnet.
Tenzro Network MCP server: wallet, identity, payments, inference, staking, bridges, verification.
Tamper-evident proof creation and verification for AI agents via MCP, A2A, and REST.
A time server that keeps your AI honest about time. Real clock + drift guard, zero dependencies.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceMCP server for AI agent identity — verify agents with Ed25519 signatures, check trust scores, sign and verify content, exchange encrypted messages. Built on the Agent Identity Protocol (AIP).8MIT
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceDocument verification MCP server enabling AI agents to verify file authenticity by computing SHA-256 fingerprints locally and checking Bitcoin-anchored proofs via OpenTimestamps.516MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceMCP Server for AI agent identity and authorization. Create, verify, and manage agent identities with trust scores and scoped authorization tokens.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceA Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that enables AI models to timestamp files and verify proofs on the Bitcoin blockchain using OpenTimeStamps.20MIT
Appeared in Searches
Latest Blog Posts
- Who's Calling? MCP Hosts Are an Identity Blind Spot (And the Spec Knows It)By Om-Shree-0709 on .mcpAgent IdentityOAuth 2.1
- Your AI Chatbot Just Exposed Your CEO's Salary to an InternBy Om-Shree-0709 on .Agent IdentityMCP SecurityOAuth Delegation
- Why MCP Servers Need Execution Sandboxing (And Why Your Current Stack Isn't Enough)By Om-Shree-0709 on .Agentic AiPrompt InjectionWebAssembly
MCP directory API
We provide all the information about MCP servers via our MCP API.
curl -X GET 'https://glama.ai/api/mcp/v1/servers/Helm-Protocol/openttt-mcp'
If you have feedback or need assistance with the MCP directory API, please join our Discord server