Skip to main content
Glama
make-audit-mcp

make-audit-mcp

by koleharv

make-audit-mcp

An MCP server that audits Make.com (Integromat) scenario blueprints before you import them. Blueprints are shared everywhere — template galleries, forums, "1000 automation" bundles — and importing one means importing its webhooks, HTTP calls, and whatever credential-shaped strings the author left inside.

  • "What's in this blueprint?" — modules, apps, trigger, routers, error handling, scenario settings

  • "Is it safe to import?" — hardcoded tokens (masked in output), plain-http:// calls, dangling module references, unfiltered router routes, missing error handling, log-retention settings

  • "What feeds module 5?" — mapping-reference tracing in both directions

Make's official MCP runs your scenarios; this one reviews the files before they become scenarios. Local files only.

Quick start

Claude Code

claude mcp add make-audit -- npx -y make-audit-mcp

Claude Desktop — add to claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "make-audit": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "make-audit-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Then: "Audit C:\Downloads\lead-intake.blueprint.json before I import it."

Related MCP server: n8n Workflow Security Scanner

Tools

Tool

What it does

inspect_blueprint

Scenario overview: modules, apps, trigger, routers, error handlers, settings

trace_module

One module in detail — parameters/mappings (secrets masked), references out and in

audit_blueprint

Findings report: errors / warnings / info

What the auditor checks

  • Credential-shaped literals in parameters or mappings (api_key, token, Authorization, Bearer …) — connections are stripped on export, so any literal secret is exactly what shouldn't be in a shared file. Values are masked (supe… (18 chars)) everywhere, including in findings — the auditor never amplifies a leaked token into the model's context.

  • Dangling references — mappings like {{99.output}} pointing at modules that don't exist (common after hand-editing or merging blueprints). The extractor understands Make's expression syntax: {{formatDate(2.date; "X")}} references module 2, while {{parseNumber(3.14)}} references nothing.

  • Plain-http:// URLs, webhook triggers (anyone with the URL can invoke), routers where no route is filtered, disabled-but-present modules, no error handlers with DLQ off, confidential=false log retention.

Known limitation: execution-order validation across router branches is not attempted — reference checks are existence-only.

Development

npm install
npm test                 # offline tests — synthetic blueprints built in-suite
npm run build            # tsc → dist/
node scripts/smoke.mjs   # end-to-end: generates a blueprint, drives the server over stdio

Architecture: src/blueprint.ts (recursive module walk, reference extraction, secret masking) and src/audit.ts (checks) are pure logic; src/index.ts is the MCP wiring. Zero runtime deps beyond the MCP SDK.

Not affiliated with or endorsed by Make / Celonis.

License

MIT

Available Tools

3 tools
audit_blueprintAudit the blueprintA

Risk report before importing: hardcoded credential-shaped values, dangling module references, plain-http URLs, unfiltered router routes, missing error handling, log-retention settings. Secrets are masked in the output.

Inputs: path (required).

inspect_blueprintInspect a Make blueprintA

Overview of a Make.com scenario blueprint before importing it: modules, apps used, trigger, routers, error handlers, scenario settings.

Inputs: path (required).

trace_moduleTrace a moduleA

One module in detail: type, parameters and mappings (credential-shaped values masked), which modules it references, and which modules reference it.

Inputs: id (required), path (required).

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A4.4/5.0

    Scored across 3 tools

    Disambiguation5/5

    Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: inspect_blueprint provides a high-level overview, trace_module dives into a specific module, and audit_blueprint identifies risks. There is no overlap that would confuse an agent.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    All tool names follow the verb_noun snake_case pattern (inspect_blueprint, trace_module, audit_blueprint), making the naming perfectly consistent and predictable.

    Tool Count5/5

    With only 3 tools, the set is well-scoped for an audit-focused server. Each tool covers a necessary step in the workflow (overview, detail, risk assessment), and no tool feels extraneous.

    Completeness5/5

    The tools cover the full audit flow: inspect the blueprint for structure, trace modules for detail, and audit for risks. There are no obvious gaps, and the workflow is complete without dead ends.

    Maintenance

    ActivityMaintained
    ResponsivenessNo recent community issues

    Related MCP Connectors

    Related MCP Servers

    • A
      license
      Not graded
      quality
      C
      maintenance
      Security scanner for MCP servers — vet an MCP before you wire it into an agent. Detects prompt-injection, credential exfiltration (via taint analysis), RCE, and supply-chain risks, and catches cross-server exfil chains no single server reveals. Zero-dependency local CLI, SARIF output, CI-gateable, no account.
      63 npm
      MIT
    • A
      license
      A
      quality
      B
      maintenance
      Enables agents and CI pipelines to audit MCP servers and agent tool-chains by statically scanning repositories, local checkouts, tools/list exports, or live endpoints for risks such as destructive actions without confirmation, mismatched safety annotations, injection surfaces, credential or PII exposure, and unguarded command, path, or URL sinks. All checks are read-only and never execute the scanned code or call tools/call.
      3
      MIT
    • A
      license
      A
      quality
      C
      maintenance
      Lints n8n workflow exports and returns machine-readable findings with per-rule fixes, helping agents and reviewers catch reliability gaps such as missing error workflows, retries that swallow errors, unauthenticated webhooks, and hardcoded secrets without sending data anywhere.
      3
      MIT