Treasure Data MCP Server

Instructions

This tool extracts and reads a specific file from a project archive,
returning its contents. This allows examining SQL queries, workflow
definitions, and other files without fully extracting the archive.

Args:
    archive_path: The path to the downloaded project archive (.tar.gz file)
    file_path: The path of the file within the archive to read

Implementation Reference

• td_mcp_server/mcp_impl.py:512-589 (handler)

  The core handler function for the 'td_read_project_file' tool. It validates the archive and file paths, opens the tar.gz archive securely, extracts the specified file (skipping directories and oversized files), reads and decodes the content (UTF-8 preferred, fallback to Latin-1), and returns the file content along with metadata. Includes comprehensive error handling and security measures against path traversal and zip bombs.

  @mcp.tool()
  async def td_read_project_file(archive_path: str, file_path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
      """Read the contents of a specific file from a project archive.
  
      This tool extracts and reads a specific file from a project archive,
      returning its contents. This allows examining SQL queries, workflow
      definitions, and other files without fully extracting the archive.
  
      Args:
          archive_path: The path to the downloaded project archive (.tar.gz file)
          file_path: The path of the file within the archive to read
      """
      # Input validation - prevent path traversal
      if not _validate_archive_path(archive_path):
          return _format_error_response("Invalid archive path")
  
      if not _validate_file_path(file_path):
          return _format_error_response("Invalid file path")
  
      try:
          if not os.path.exists(archive_path):
              return _format_error_response("Archive file not found")
  
          try:
              with tarfile.open(archive_path, "r:gz") as tar:
                  try:
                      file_info = tar.getmember(file_path)
  
                      # Security check for the member
                      if not _safe_extract_member(file_info, "/tmp/validation"):
                          return _format_error_response(
                              "File access denied for security reasons"
                          )
  
                      # Don't try to read directories
                      if file_info.isdir():
                          return _format_error_response("Cannot read directory contents")
  
                      # Extract and read the file
                      f = tar.extractfile(file_info)
                      if f is None:
                          return _format_error_response("Failed to extract file")
  
                      # Read with size limit
                      if file_info.size > MAX_READ_SIZE:
                          return _format_error_response("File too large to read")
  
                      content_bytes = f.read()
  
                      # Try to decode as text
                      try:
                          content = content_bytes.decode("utf-8")
                      except UnicodeDecodeError:
                          try:
                              content = content_bytes.decode("latin-1")
                          except UnicodeDecodeError:
                              return _format_error_response(
                                  "File is not readable as text"
                              )
  
                      extension = Path(file_path).suffix.lower()
  
                      return {
                          "success": True,
                          "file_path": file_path,
                          "content": content,
                          "size": file_info.size,
                          "extension": extension,
                      }
                  except KeyError:
                      return _format_error_response("File not found in archive")
          except tarfile.ReadError:
              return _format_error_response("Invalid or corrupted archive file")
      except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError) as e:
          return _format_error_response(f"Failed to read file: {str(e)}")
      except Exception as e:
          return _format_error_response(f"Unexpected error while reading file: {str(e)}")

• td_mcp_server/mcp_impl.py:512-512 (registration)

  The @mcp.tool() decorator registers the td_read_project_file function as an MCP tool in the FastMCP server.

  @mcp.tool()

• td_mcp_server/mcp_impl.py:61-82 (helper)

  Helper function to validate the archive_path input parameter, ensuring it's in a temporary directory, ends with .tar.gz, and prevents path traversal.

  def _validate_archive_path(archive_path: str) -> bool:
      """Validate archive path to ensure it's in allowed temporary directories."""
      if not archive_path:
          return False
  
      # Normalize the path to prevent tricks
      normalized_path = os.path.normpath(archive_path)
  
      # Allow paths in temp directories or test paths
      temp_prefix = tempfile.gettempdir()
      allowed_prefixes = [temp_prefix, "/tmp"]
  
      if not any(normalized_path.startswith(prefix) for prefix in allowed_prefixes):
          return False
  
      # Prevent path traversal
      if ".." in normalized_path:
          return False
  
      if not archive_path.endswith(".tar.gz"):
          return False
      return True

• td_mcp_server/mcp_impl.py:49-58 (helper)

  Helper function to validate the file_path input parameter against path traversal attacks.

  def _validate_file_path(file_path: str) -> bool:
      """Validate file path to prevent path traversal attacks."""
      if not file_path:
          return False
      # Normalize path and check for traversal attempts
      normalized = os.path.normpath(file_path)
      # Prevent absolute paths and traversal
      if normalized.startswith("/") or normalized.startswith("\\") or ".." in normalized:
          return False
      return True

• td_mcp_server/mcp_impl.py:85-107 (helper)

  Helper function used to safely validate tar members before extraction, preventing path traversal, absolute paths, and oversized files (zip bombs). Called within the handler for security.

  def _safe_extract_member(member, extract_path: str) -> bool:
      """Safely extract a tar member, preventing path traversal and other attacks."""
      # Normalize the member name
      member_path = os.path.normpath(member.name)
  
      # Prevent absolute paths
      if member_path.startswith("/") or member_path.startswith("\\"):
          return False
  
      # Prevent path traversal
      if ".." in member_path:
          return False
  
      # Check final extracted path
      final_path = os.path.join(extract_path, member_path)
      if not final_path.startswith(extract_path):
          return False
  
      # Check file size (prevent zip bombs)
      if hasattr(member, "size") and member.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE:
          return False
  
      return True