paa-guard mcp
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Alternatives to paa-guard mcp
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- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceA local gate that lets agents submit risky tool actions for policy evaluation and receive ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVE decisions before executing irreversible side effects. It can also open human approval holds and record an activity trail without executing the side effect itself.1,614 npm3MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceProvides permission gates and tamper-evident audit logging for AI agent tool executions, with declarative policies, consent ladders, and hash-chained verification.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables governed tool-calling agents with policy decisions, optional human approval, hash-chained audit logging, and deterministic evaluation.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceGoverns AI agent tool calls by checking them against Agentic Control Plane policies, returning allow/deny/ask decisions with audit logging and identity attribution for MCP clients like Claude and ChatGPT. Exposes acp_check and acp_status tools for policy enforcement and connection verification.MIT

ERDL Guardofficial
AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnforces deterministic policy decisions on AI agent tool calls, supporting allow, deny, correct, escalate, and human review actions with verifiable audit receipts.MIT- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceProvides a human-in-the-loop approval gateway for AI agents, enforcing policies and audit logging for MCP-compatible tool calls.Apache 2.0
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Each tool occupies a clearly separate slot in the guard lifecycle: pre-action check, memory write, refusal recording, status read, and emergency stop. The descriptions make the boundaries explicit (e.g. check returns allow/require_approval/deny while status only reads state), so an agent can select without hesitation.
All five tools share the paa_guard_ prefix followed by a snake_case verb or verb_noun (check, remember, record_refusal, status, stop_self). The pattern is fully predictable and readable, with no camelCase or style drift.
Five tools is a tight, well-scoped surface for a policy/guard server — one gate, one memory write, one refusal record, one status read, one kill switch. Nothing appears redundant or missing for the core interaction loop.
Core guard lifecycle (check, approve-and-retry, refuse, halt, observe) is covered, but the memory surface is write-only — there is no tool to recall, list, or forget stored memories, and pending approvals can be seen via status but not resolved directly. These are minor, workable gaps rather than dead ends.