firewall
Evaluate outgoing payment instructions against your agent's history and detect injected destinations, routing changes, drain patterns, overcharges, and intent mismatches; return allow, hold, or block.
Instructions
Buyer-side payment firewall: should YOUR agent make THIS payment now? Where assess_counterparty vets the seller, this vets the payment instruction in the context of your agent's own history + provenance. Returns allow/hold/block + signals: routing_anomaly (payTo swapped vs the address you usually pay = fraudulent routing), velocity_anomaly (drain), amount_anomaly (overcharge), provenance_flag, counterparty_risk, injection_destination (if the payTo appears in the untrusted page/tool-output you're acting on, the destination was injected — pass it as context.untrusted_text), intent_mismatch (pass context.intended={payto,max_amount} so a mid-flight redirect is caught), new_counterparty_burst, recurring_flagged (poisoned-memory loop). STRONGLY recommended: pass untrusted_text + intended to catch prompt-injection payments. agent_id and a wallet-ownership signature are attached AUTOMATICALLY from your configured wallet — you don't pass agent_id, and your routing history is trusted with no extra steps. Costs $0.002. Seed history free with firewall_record.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| policy | No | ||
| context | No | ||
| payment | Yes | ||
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent — use your payer wallet address |